Introduction

Huub Jaspers

From April 7 to May 12, 1995, an important international conference took place at the United Nations in New York on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). With its impressive list of signatories⁽¹⁾ the Treaty is the largest, and according to many disarmament experts, the most important treaty on international arms control. It came into force in 1970 with a limited validity of twenty-five years. In conformity with Article X of the Treaty, it had to be extended in 1995, in one way or another.

After long and hot debates, the Review and Extension Conference in New York finally decided - by a form of a consensus that did not involve voting - to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Despite the enormous pressure that had been exerted by a powerful block of countries under the leadership of the United States, the outcome was still somewhat surprising.

Proponents of the indefinite extension of the Treaty included the United States, Russia, Canada, and the European Union. Foremost opponents were 'non-aligned' Southern countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria. Their main objection to an indefinite and unconditional extension was that the five Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT (France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) had not sufficiently fulfilled their obligations under Article VI of the NPT on nuclear disarmament. They wanted to block an indefinite consolidation of the existing separation between Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) and Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). They felt that a limited extension would give them political leverage to pressure the Nuclear Weapon States to accelerate nuclear disarmament.

This conflict between North and South made the Extension Conference exciting until the last moment, as much for the involved diplomatic community as for the numerous observers from non-governmental organizations and the media. The strategy of the Southern countries failed in the end, and the Treaty - without real commitments towards nuclear disarmament - was extended indefinitely. This lays out very clearly, regardless of whether one considers the outcome to be positive or negative, exactly where the balance of power lies in the world. A contributing factor to this was the lack of unanimity within the Southern opposition.

The NPT is a peculiar treaty, with some fairly contradictory elements. It only can be understood by placing it in the historical context of the Sixties, when the East-West conflict was the determining factor in geopolitics; more precisely it was the transition period between the height of the Cold War in the Fifties and early Sixties, and the period of "Détente" from the mid-Sixties until the end of the Seventies. One of the main aims of the NPT is that it seeks to stem both horizontal proliferation (the increase in the number of Nuclear Weapon States) and vertical proliferation (the increase in nuclear weapons per state). On the other hand, however, the Treaty simply forbids all Non-Nuclear Weapon States to possess what the Nuclear Weapon States have been allowed to possess and expand for quite a long time without any hindrance.

Another important contradiction of the Treaty is that it increases the threshold for a number of countries with nuclear ambitions, while at the same time it promotes, through Article IV, the spread of nuclear technology and fissile materials, the necessary components in the production of nuclear weapons. Thus, the Treaty in fact fosters an increase in the number of potential Nuclear Weapon States, so-called "latent proliferation". A case in point is Iraq, which received significant support from a number of important NPT signatories and, with the consent of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), managed to carry out a nuclear energy program. Only after the 1991 Gulf War it was discovered that Iraq had used part of this program to try to develop secretly a nuclear weapon.

Germany is may be the most convincing example of the positive effects that the NPT has had. In the period preceding the NPT, Germany was often the cause of concern over nuclear proliferation, and it opposed the Treaty for a long time. It joined only after years of laborious negotiations, and the Treaty has definitely increased the threshold for Bonn to become a Nuclear Weapon State. On the other hand, Germany accepted the Treaty only at the price of it containing major loopholes, for instance with regard to the NPT Safeguards regime. It was also due to Germany's NPT diplomacy that Article IV, which promotes "the peaceful uses of nuclear energy", was included in the Treaty.

Another positive effect of the NPT has been that it helped crush the positive image of nuclear testing. Until the late Sixties, each country's first nuclear test was internationally recognized as a prestigious entree into the nuclear club. Since the NPT came into force, not one country that had not conducted a nuclear test before has had the courage to conduct a military nuclear test publicly. The test that India conducted in 1974 was declared to be "peaceful", and Israel has even never admitted to its 1979 test.

All these examples show how complicated a review of the operation of the Treaty is if it is to be done in a fair and balanced way, without assuming the outcome until a full accounting of the pros and cons has been completed. Who can say how history would have unfolded, had there not been a NPT? Would there have been dozens of Nuclear Weapon States, as was feared in the Sixties? Would the economic superpowers Germany and Japan have become Nuclear Weapon States long before the fall of the Berlin Wall? Politically and militarily, both World War II losers play a limited role in geopolitics. What might have been the political consequences if they, in the Seventies or Eighties, had had a finger on the nuclear trigger? On the other hand, would Third World countries like Iraq have received less international support in the development and operation of their nuclear programs without the NPT with its Article IV?

A common desire for a thorough and unprejudiced assessment of twenty-five years of NPT history was the main motive behind the Transnational Institute (TNI) and the World Information Service on Energy (WISE) organizing a series of seminars. Experts from diverse parts of the world and with different points of view were brought together to discuss the meaning of the NPT and the future of nuclear non-proliferation. During the seminars a number of lesser known - and generally underestimated, or even completely forgotten - aspects of the non-proliferation issue were raised.

The seminars were held from February to June 1995 at TNI in Amsterdam. TNI is a fellowship of scholars, researchers and writers from the Third World, Europe and the US committed to critical and forward-looking analyses of transnational issues, including security and North- South relations. The Amsterdam-based institute works closely with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington D.C. as well as with institutes in Spain, Central America, and Asia. WISE is an international network of core groups advocating against nuclear energy, and is also based in Amsterdam.

The first seminar took place February 26 and discussed the origin, meaning, and future of the Treaty. The first lecturer, Piet de Klerk of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a former representative of the Netherlands to the IAEA. De Klerk discussed the origin and history of the NPT from his current perspective, with a view toward the role the Netherlands played at the time of the Treaty's negotiation and in the acceptance of the Treaty by other Western European countries.

The second presenter was the German political scientist Matthias Küntzel. Küntzel discussed the (not so positive) influence Germany had on the origin and history of the NPT, a subject that Küntzel had researched and disseminated for years. As part of his research, Küntzel not only scrutinized previously secret archives, but also interviewed dozens of diplomats from seven countries who had been closely involved in the NPT negotiations. His PhD dissertation was published in German by Campus Verlag (Frankfurt) and in English by TNI at Pluto Press (London). His book is already a reference work on the NPT.

The third lecturer was Bharat Bhushan, a daily newspaper editor from India. India is one of the countries that has been most critical of the NPT, not least of all because of the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. Hence, India never acceded to the Treaty. It is regarded as one of the de facto Nuclear Weapon States, that is, as one of the Nuclear Weapon States not recognized as such under the Treaty. What stands out in Bhushan's presentation is his ardent opposition to both the NPT and India's nuclear program.

The second seminar took place March 25 and had as its main subject nuclear energy, development, and proliferation. Discussion centered on the question of whether civil and military nuclear technology can indeed be separated as adequately as claimed by proponents of nuclear energy. The seminar's first speaker was the German physicist and political scientist Roland Kollert, then director of the Bremen-based consultancy firm Kollert & Donderer. Kollert & Donderer was specialized in analyzing technology and safety aspects of nuclear installations. It was involved in the safety evaluation of the billion-dollar German-Dutch-Belgian Kalkar fast-breeder reactor. This evaluation played an important role in the final decision of the state government of Nordrhein-Westfalen not to allow the plant to begin operation. Kollert discussed "the military use of 'civil' nuclear technology", which also was the subject of his PhD dissertation.

The second presenter was Shaun Burnie, nuclear research coordinator of Greenpeace International. He discussed the NPT safeguards regime: the methods and means of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that all nuclear activities in the world are in compliance with the NPT. This issue has been hotly debated over the past years. During the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Greenpeace released an extremely critical report on the role of the IAEA.

The third lecturer was anti-nuclear activist Hok An from Indonesia, who advocates that, for a country like Indonesia, sufficient alternatives to nuclear energy are available to meet the country's development and energy requirements.

The third seminar took place April 22 and discussed the role that nuclear armament continues to play in international conflicts in the post-Cold War era, both on a regional and a global level. Bart van der Sijde, physicist at the Eindhoven University of Technology and board member of Pugwash Netherlands, discussed horizontal proliferation since the NPT came into force, and the aims and dilemmas of the US non-proliferation policy.

Former NATO general Gerard Berkhof, currently professor of Strategic Studies at Leyden University, discussed the Counter Proliferation initiative launched in 1993 by the Clinton administration. Some fifteen years ago, during the hotly debated Cruise Missile period, Berkhof was one of the advocates for basing US intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe.

One of Berkhof's opponents in that debate was former SIPRI director Frank Barnaby. He spoke on the Israeli nuclear weapons program and its significance for the Middle-East conflict. During the Fifties Barnaby had worked as a nuclear physicist on the development of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons program. In 1986, when the British Sunday Times - alerted by Mordechai Vanunu's testimony - revealed important details on the Israeli nuclear weapon program, Barnaby was consulted by the newspaper as scientist on the subject. Vanunu, a former employee at the Israeli nuclear center Dimona, was kidnapped a few days before publication of the Sunday Times article, and was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment in Israel for espionage and high treason.

The fourth seminar took place on May 20, this time in Amsterdam's De Balie theater. Central in the discussions was the question whether or not European integration would lead to a common European nuclear force, and what its consequences would be for global non-proliferation happen. At the time, this was still a very speculative matter. Many, including the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo⁽²⁾ and Dutch Member of Parliament Jan Hoekema⁽³⁾, viewed this matter as an absolute non-issue. However, the French government's proposal to its European allies in August 1995 to "Europeanize" the "force de frappe" - during rising protests against the French resumption of nuclear testing - has put this issue on the international political agenda.

Physicist Wolfgang Liebert of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) opened the seminar with a report on the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York that ended earlier that week, and that he had attended as an NGO observer.

The other introductions were given by Matthias Küntzel, who discussed the importance of the "European option" from a German perspective, and Martin Butcher from the Brussels-based Center for European Security and Disarmament (CESD), who discussed the European option from the perspective of the two existing Western European Nuclear Weapon States, France and the United Kingdom.

After the introductions, a roundtable discussion followed. Participants included: Dan Smith, director of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO); Peter Weiss, co-president of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Armament (IALANA); Ben Cramer, nuclear researcher for Greenpeace France; and Huub Jaspers, NPT project coordinator of TNI.

The fifth and final seminar took place July 10, four weeks after the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. This seminar both evaluated the conference itself and gave an outlook on the agenda for nuclear disarmament. Edith Ballantyne, president of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and secretary of the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament at the UN in Geneva, presented an overview of the NPT Conference and its results. Just prior to the seminar, Ballantyne, who also is a former chair of CONGO (Conference of NGOs with Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council), had been awarded the Gandhi Peace Award.

The second presenter was Jürgen Scheffran, physicist at the Darmstadt Technical University and one of the founders of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP). Scheffran's topic was nuclear disarmament after the NPT and the role of NGOs.

The third and last speaker was Greenpeace research coordinator Shaun Burnie, who discussed the lessons for the future that can be drawn from past campaigns for a Nuclear-Free World.

Whether the series of seminars have indeed helped, or will help, in creating a better understanding of the problems associated with the NPT - as a leading Dutch nuclear weapons expert expressed it - is left to the judgment of the reader. We, the organizers of the seminars and editors of the book, felt that the contributions were important enough to warrant publication, both in Dutch and English. Obviously, this publication should not only be read in the context of the NPT extension, but also in the context of the future of nuclear armament and disarmament.

This series of NPT seminars is part of a broader project initiated by TNI and WISE, entitled NNPP Project (Project for a New Non-Proliferation Policy). It has produced a number of publications, including Matthias Küntzel's book "Bonn & the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option"; the report "Germany, Plutonium & Proliferation - The Unstated Threat", and a series of Dutch- and German-language articles and brochures. Furthermore, the NNPP Project has organized public activities in several cities in the Netherlands.

For the organization of the seminars a NPT Coordination Group was formed. In addition to WISE and TNI, other participating organizations included: Greenpeace Netherlands; the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV); the Dutch section of Friends of the Earth (FOE); Women for Peace (VVV); the Dutch section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); Women Against Nuclear Weapons (VTK); the Humanist Peace Council (HVB); the Dutch section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (NVMP); the Dutch Documentation and Research Center on Nuclear Energy (LAKA); the Anti Militarist Research Group (AMOK); and the Dutch Anti Nuclear Coalition (NKC).

The Dutch-language edition of this book was published in December 1995 by TNI, WISE, and the Peace Research Institute of the Catholic University of Nijmegen. It is entitled "De Bom Voorbij? - De verlenging van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag en de toekomst van de kernbewapening".

Notes

1. For a full list of States Parties, with the respective dates of accession to the Treaty, see in the Appendices. As of now (July 1996), there are only nine remaining states which are not party to the NPT: Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Cuba, Djibouti, India, Israel, Oman, and Pakistan. Israel, India and Pakistan are seen as de-facto Nuclear Weapon States.
2. In a discussion between the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo and a delegation of Dutch NGO representatives, some of whom were organizers of the NPT seminars series.
3. From a discussion between Dutch Member of Parliament Jan Hoekema (D'66) and Huub Jaspers (TNI), VPRO radio, April 28, 1995.