Foreword

Jan Herman Burgers

As head of the disarmament desk of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Department from 1965 to 1972, I was one of those who struggled for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The first three years were spent on the drafting and adoption of the treaty itself. Following that, we exerted ourselves to have EURATOM adhere to the Treaty. The tug of war over the latter issue even continued until 1975!

When I reflect upon those days, my first remembrance is the absence of public participation. The Dutch media and public payed little attention to the negotiations on the Treaty itself, and after these had been crowned with success they showed no interest whatsoever in the controversy that blocked the Treaty's ratification by EURATOM member states. Consequently, the few Dutch politicians and officials who were working for an effective NPT did not find themselves supported and pushed along by a committed public opinion, as became the case later on with human rights issues.

My second remembrance is the disregard for the danger of proliferation within Europe. In as far as people felt concerned at all over the spread of nuclear weapons, their concerns focused exclusively on non-European countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Argentina, and Brazil. Of course, these were not merely imaginary concerns, in particular regarding the first three countries. However, people seemed to overlook that it was precisely in Europe that proliferation had started, with the British and French nuclear weapons programs, and that it was precisely in Europe that these examples had contagious effects. The main obstacles we encountered along the way while struggling for an effective NPT actually originated in the desire of other European countries to attain a similar nuclear status. This included both the option of shared possession of nuclear weapons, as embodied in the Multilateral Force (MLF) plan, and the resistance to IAEA inspection within countries under EURATOM's jurisdiction.

A third memory of these times is not related to proliferation dangers per se, but rather to the dangers inherent in nuclear armament in general. I was struck by the fact that those dangers were always discussed solely in terms of numbers of people who would be the immediate victims of the use of nuclear weapons, whereas hardly any discussion took place on the far more disastrous long-term environmental consequences of nuclear war.

Against this background, I found myself quite pleased with the initiative of TNI and WISE to organize a series of seminars in which the future of non-proliferation was examined from many perspectives. Firstly, because one of their goals was to activate public interest in this matter. Secondly, because the seminars would include a discussion of the dangers of proliferation within Europe. And thirdly, because the environmental movement was also involved in this initiative.

The overall quality of these seminars was very high. It is therefore important that their contents reach a broader audience than their participants only. Accordingly, I hope this report of the seminars will be widely circulated.