Course and Results of the 1995 NPT Conference in New York

Edith Ballantyne

Those of us who advocated a definite time limit to the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were disappointed by the outcome of the Review and Extension Conference when it ended May 12, 1995 in New York. Throughout the preparatory process, strong voices opposing indefinite extension came from the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). There was reason to hope - right up until the early part of the conference - that some time limitation and some conditions on extension would be set. I say "hope" rather than "believe" because, already at the time of the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva, an informal count indicated a majority in support of indefinite extension. However, this rumored majority was small and it did not include states whose vote was considered important. Also, the number of states that had not yet declared their position was large enough to make the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) uneasy about the final outcome.

By the time of the fourth and last PrepCom, the idea of a "rolling extension" of 25-year successive periods had gained ground as an alternative to an indefinite extension. Many of us had hoped that a large enough number of states would stand firm in refusing unconditional, indefinite extension and would press the nuclear powers to make a clear commitment to take specific measures to implement Article VI of the Treaty, including the negotiation of a convention to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. Some of us even nurtured the faint hope for a democratization of the Treaty, for example, by bringing the Nuclear Weapon States under the safeguards regime.

To come anywhere near this goal would have required the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty to unite behind such a position. This, of course, was not the case. Nor, for that matter, was it the case with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Positions taken by NGOs and institutes ranged from indefinite, unconditional extension at one end, to termination of the Treaty because of its discriminatory character and its failure to prevent proliferation at the other. These varying views were expressed in writings, conferences, and in the special briefings for government delegates that were held in the margin of the Preparatory Committee meetings, with the approval of the committee and the cooperation of the secretariat. On the side of governments, among the most outspoken states opposing unconditional indefinite extension of the Treaty were Mexico, Indonesia, and Nigeria.

As is usually the case, procedural matters provided the platform on which the battle over substantive issues were fought. Given the hard positions taken by the nuclear powers and their allies for indefinite, unconditional extension on one side, and by a number of NNWS for a fixed one-time extension with conditions on the other, the Preparatory Committee was long in producing agreement on the order in which the items of the agenda should be taken up. Mexico and others argued that the review of the performance of the Treaty and implementation of the provisions must precede the extension decision, whereas the NWS and their allies wanted it the other way around. There was also disagreement over the rules of procedure.

Agreement was finally reached at the fourth PrepCom on the agenda but not on the rules. An intercessional meeting was convened just prior to the opening of the conference in an attempt to finalize the rules of procedure so that the conference could get under way. Sixty States Parties to the Treaty took part in these last-minute negotiations on April 14 and 15. Two days of intensive negotiations failed to produce agreement on Rule 28 (3), as did a final meeting the morning of the opening day of the conference. Rule 28 (3) concerned the way in which the extension decision was to be taken - by either open or secret ballot.

The Western and Eastern groups argued for a roll-call vote on the grounds that governments must take responsibility for their positions and be accountable to the public. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - with only a third of its members present - argued for a secret vote. They wanted to protect states from the pressure and strong-arm tactics which, they said, the Nuclear Weapon States and their friends had submitted their governments to for months, hoping to persuade them to vote for an indefinite and unconditional extension.

Another disputed issue was the date on which voting on extension would start; connected to this was the question of how to narrow down options, should it become impossible to reach consensus. Countries in the Non-Aligned Movement wanted voting to begin May 10 and supported dropping proposals with the fewest number of votes before the next round of voting. The Western and Eastern groups wished to have two rounds of voting before dropping any proposal. The suspected reason was to keep the 25-year rolling extension option on the table past the first round of voting in case an indefinite extension seemed unobtainable.

The conference opened without agreement on Rule 28 (3). In order to proceed, rules of procedure were provisionally adopted until full agreement on Rule 28 (3) could be reached. Work at the conference was accomplished in plenary sessions at which the States Parties stated their main positions on the Treaty and its extension, and in three Main Committees in which the states reviewed the performance of the specific articles of the Treaty. The conference established a Drafting Committee to harmonize all reports into a final review document. There was also a Credentials Committee.

Agreement on the officers of the conference had been reached well before April 17 and their election was a mere formality. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka was elected president. Prvoslav Davinic, director of the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs, was elected secretary general of the conference. Main Committee I (on disarmament) had Isaac Ayewah of Nigeria as chair and Richard Starr of Australia and Anatoli Zlenko of Ukraine as vice-chairs. The chair of Main Committee II (on safeguards and nuclear weapon-free zones) was André Erdos of Hungary and the vice-chairs were Enrique de la Torre of Argentina and Rjab Sukayri of Jordan. Main Committee III (on peaceful uses) was chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, with Yanko Yanev of Bulgaria and Gustavo Alvares Goyaga of Uruguay as vice-chairs. The Drafting Committee was chaired by Tadeusz Strulak of Poland, with Pasi Patokallio of Finland and Nabil Fahmy of Egypt as vice-chairs. Finally, the Credentials Committee had as its chair Andelfo Garcia of Colombia, with Alyaksandr Sychou of Belarus and Mary Elisabeth Hoinkes of the United States serving as vice-chairs.

When accepting the presidency, Ambassador Dhanapala read a message from Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in which she denounced the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and emphasized the desirability of reaching consensus. Dhanapala exhorted the states to harmonize their differences, consult, and compromise, and to truly discuss and debate all issues. Referring to the objectives of the NPT, he strongly underlined the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

On April 24, Rebecca Johnson - who monitored the conference for the ACRONYM Consortium and issued a daily NPT Update - reported the extension options that had been put forward up to then by the States Parties. In summary, the Nuclear Weapon States maintained their proposal for indefinite, unconditional extension (with a slight variation from China). Indefinite extension was supported by the European Union and other Western states, as well as a host of others, bringing the number to 92.

Not all, however, gave unconditional support. For example, Switzerland and Sweden asked that commitments be given to stronger efforts for implementing the Treaty's provisions, and sought agreement on a timetable for further substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals. Sweden demanded a specific timetable for further nuclear disarmament and suggested that security assurances - which the Nuclear Weapon States had declared not long before the start of the conference - could serve as the basis for negotiating a multilateral treaty on negative security assurances and declarations of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Sweden also proposed that the fissile cut-off negotiations should include a ban on existing and future stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

South Africa supported indefinite extension and proposed the establishment of "Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" as a means to strengthen the future review process. Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo proposed the establishment of a committee to meet between the five-yearly Review Conferences called for in Article III.3 of the Treaty. Its task would be to do an ongoing review and evaluation of the Treaty and make recommendations on its implementations. In South Africa's view, the review process needed more than strengthening; it also needed to provide for accountability.

Venezuela proposed that the Treaty be extended for 25 years, opting then for another extension under Article X.2. It maintained the proposal's legal validity, which was challenged by other States Parties. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan would not agree to an indefinite extension as long as Israel refused to accede to the NPT and to submit its nuclear installations to IAEA inspection. Egypt and Syria suggested suspension of the conference as an option. Nigeria proposed a single, fixed period with the possibility of later extensions. It did not specify the length of the periods.

As speaker followed speaker, the number of states supporting indefinite extension grew. This trend increased when the NAM, whose ministers were meeting in Bandung, India, failed to achieve a united front against either indefinite extension or the mode of voting. As a result, the focus of many conference participants who had opposed indefinite extension shifted from the extension issue to that of strengthening the review process. More of them demanded measures that would ensure progress in the implementation of all Treaty provisions, particularly the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Some members of the European Union who supported indefinite extension were also putting forward proposals in this direction. Like South Africa, they were careful to point out that their proposals did not constitute conditions for extension, but were to be yardsticks for measuring progress of the implementation of the Treaty in the future. Among the proposals were some calling for: the establishment of a timetable for nuclear disarmament; a speedy conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons; and stronger safeguards over fissile materials.

South Africa continued working on its proposed principles and identified eight of them, including progress on a CTBT, fissile material cutoff, and significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. Mexico proposed that an addendum be attached to the extension decision stipulating the conclusion of a CTBT not later than 1996, a fissile material cutoff, legally-binding security assurances, and the reduction of nuclear arsenals with the aim of their total elimination. The proposal was, in fact, Treaty extension with conditions. Both South Africa and Mexico proposed mechanisms for an ongoing review by which the nuclear powers could be pressured to meet their obligations; South Africa proposed a committee to evaluate developments and recommend tasks to be fulfilled, while Mexico proposed a committee with a negotiation task.

In her NPT Update of April 27 from New York, Rebecca Johnson reported a shift in mood among the Western states, as the focus turned to the future of an indefinite NPT. A crack appeared in the European Union (EU) front as the nuclear "haves" saw that the indefinite extension was secure, and, consequently, they were less willing - or should one say, unwilling - to commit themselves to concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament. A resolution circulated by Canada on indefinite extension was shunned by a number of EU members because of their fear that it would prevent meaningful negotiations on measures to strengthen the review and implementation processes.

In the meantime, debates in the three Main Committees heated up, particularly in Committee I on disarmament. The activities by the nuclear powers in the months preceding the NPT Conference - agreeing in the Conference on Disarmament to a working group with a fissile cut-off mandate; a statement on non-proliferation by France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, issued on April 6; the withdrawal by the United Kingdom and France of their proposals to allow nuclear weapon tests in certain circumstances, thereby opening the way for progress in CTBT negotiations; statements by the five nuclear powers on negative security assurances - did nothing to assuage the Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

Many disagreed with the nuclear powers' assertion that the nuclear arms race had ceased; they held that it had, at best, abated but not ceased. They did not consider the reductions in nuclear arsenals anywhere to be nearly sufficient, and called for strict compliance with Article VI. Many agreed that only agreement on time-bound disarmament measures would lead to full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. There was also a heated debate over whether or not Articles I and II were violated by the transfer of nuclear weapons and devices in connection with exercises and training, to the territories of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The United States and the United Kingdom were accused of violating Article I by transferring nuclear devices between themselves under their Mutual Defence Agreement.

Main Committees II and III overlapped considerably in subject matter. In Committee II on safeguards and nuclear weapon-free zones, the focus was on a variety of related issues: problems with nuclear energy as the primary source of nuclear weapons material; strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime, which China demanded must be fair and objective; the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes with full-scope safeguards and transparency; and restrictions posed by suppliers on the transfer of technology to certain countries. The latter issue was denounced, particularly by Iran, as a violation of Article IV, but was denied by the United States and others. There was criticism of the transfer of nuclear technology and assistance to non-NPT countries, such as Israel. A nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East was supported by many.

The three Main Committees were expected to submit their reports to the Drafting Committee on May 5. While Main Committees II and III were able to hammer out most of their differences and provide reports with a limited number of square brackets, the report of Main Committee I on disarmament had practically nothing but square brackets. The Drafting Committee began its consultations and drafting.

The submission of proposals on extension also had a May 5 deadline. Three were submitted to the conference president: one - proposed by Mexico - for indefinite extension with recommendations for steps to bring about nuclear disarmament; a second - presented by Indonesia on behalf of two other Non-Aligned States - for 25-year rolling fixed periods; and a third - presented in a draft resolution by Canada and supported by 107 states - for indefinite extension. Since there was no consensus on any of these proposals, 48 hours were given for consultations. If by May 8 there was still no consensus, voting would begin May 19, as had been decided earlier. However, there was still no agreement on Rule 28 (3) despite intensive efforts by the conference president to overcome differences. He emphasized again the need to reach consensus.

At the same time, twenty states negotiated the "Declaration of Principles on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" that had originally been proposed by South Africa, and had been taken under the wing of Ambassador Dhanapala. Agreement on the means to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty was thought essential to obtaining consensus on indefinite extension. Dhanapala missed no opportunity to emphasize the importance of the review process in the future.

Not all of the 107 states that had lined up behind indefinite extension did so unconditionally. A fair number asked for agreement on ways to strengthen the implementation and review process, and for concrete measures to be taken by Nuclear Weapon States toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Rule 28 (3) was finally agreed upon: All three proposals would be put to a vote simultaneously, with each State Party voting in favor on one proposal. The Rules of Procedure could then be adopted in their entirety, even though the question of open or secret written ballots was still to be decided if the need for a vote would arise.

No agreement was in sight on the document that reviewed the 25-year performance of the Treaty's existence and that set tasks for the future. The main stumbling block was the question of nuclear disarmament. The differences among states ran so deep that hopes for a final declaration began to die despite earnest efforts by the chair of the Drafting Committee, which he vowed to continue.

Meanwhile, three decisions were proposed by the conference president: one on the Treaty's extension, one on principles for non-proliferation and disarmament, and one on strengthening the review process. Decisions were postponed to allow delegations time to consult with their governments and to seek possible further compromises.

At noon on May 11, the president placed the three documents before the conference. He first asked for approval of the three together as a package. I am told he did not wait long in bringing down the gavel, sealing the acceptance. He then obtained the approval of each one individually. The NPT had become permanent.

The principles adopted will serve as a yardstick against which progress of the implementation of the Treaty will be measured. The third document adopted established a Review Conference every five years, with the next one to be held in the year 2000. A committee will be established three years prior to the conference and will meet yearly. A fourth meeting may be held in the year of the conference. The structure of the three Main Committees will be maintained, with the possibility of establishing subsidiary bodies within them. The document spells out the purposes of the Review Conferences.

A fourth document - a resolution on the Middle East sponsored by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - the depository States of the Treaty - was also adopted without vote. No action was taken on the other two resolutions - one by Mexico, and the other by twelve Non-Aligned States in agreement with the sponsors.

While no one raised objections at the time the documents were approved, 24 delegates made brief statements following the decisions, most of them critical of the documents just adopted.

NPT Update 20 quotes Canada, one of the major promoters of indefinite, unconditional extension, saying, "Permanent values - not temporary, uncertain provisions - have today joined the forces of nuclear disarmament. Now the real, enduring pressure begins." But one must ask how. Many believe that an opportunity to put pressure on the Nuclear Weapon States to begin nuclear disarmament in earnest was lost when the NPT became permanent.

Unfortunately, the pressure exerted by the nuclear powers and their friends upon the opponents of indefinite extension, to change their minds, was by far more forceful than it was the other way around. The pressures took different forms and were applied at different levels. To give only a few examples: In February, the Bundesakademie fur Sicherheitspolitiek in Bonn, in cooperation with the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, organized a half-day forum with non-governmental organizations on security policy and arms control in the mid-Nineties. It was an interesting initiative and provided an opportunity to learn about and discuss Germany's position on a number of security issues.

But was its timing purely coincidence? Among the issues discussed at the forum was the NPT. An official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the reasons for Germany's strong support for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and spoke of the urgent need to persuade governments opposing this position to change their minds. He informed us that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had decided to send officials to a number of countries to do just that. Persuasion is usually by the carrot, or the stick, or both. Perhaps a visit by German officials to Bern accounted for the change in Switzerland's position from a 25-year rolling extension to indefinite extension. A spokesperson of the Swiss Foreign Affairs Department, when asked about the change of mind, admitted that the department had received visits from a number of governments, but wished to assure the public that there had not been any question of pressure.

A second example: The Mexican position at the NPT Conference is a bit of a puzzle. Mexico had been one of the strongest voices opposing indefinite extension. All along, it had taken leadership in the Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament fora to advance general and complete nuclear disarmament. One of Mexico's most outspoken representatives in disarmament matters has been Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch. Earlier this year, he was transferred from Geneva to be Mexico's governor in Barcelona. Before leaving Geneva, he told us with some amusement that Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been receiving a string of visitors from the United States and other Western countries, trying to persuade his government to change its position and support indefinite extension. They seemed to have had some success. At the conference Mexico came down on the side of indefinite extension, although, it is true, with conditions.

These are just two examples. The pressure exerted by the United States and other Western countries onto the poorer, aid-dependent countries is not particularly subtle. We should remember the oft-reported episode in the Security Council when Yemen voted against the US resolution on military action against Iraq. The microphone was still open after the Yemen ambassador had announced his vote when a US representative walked over to him and told him that he had just spoken his most expensive words. Indeed, the few million dollars in US aid to Yemen were canceled within days. In the case of resolutions at the UN against Cuba, or in earlier days against Nicaragua, warnings were issued to developing countries about what they could expect if they did not vote with the sponsors of these resolutions.

It was not too surprising, although certainly disappointing, that agreement could not be reached on a final declaration on the review of the Treaty because of the deep division over the nuclear disarmament issue. The future of the NPT will hinge on progress made in implementing Article VI and the principles of the Preamble of the Treaty.

In closing the conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala emphasized that non-proliferation and disarmament must be pursued together, and warned that there was no room for relaxation in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and in achieving their total elimination through their prohibition. The lack of willingness to compromise in an effort to produce the Final Declaration, the Chinese nuclear weapons test shortly after the end of the conference, and now the talk in France of resuming nuclear weapons testing - these are indications of the enormity of the difficulties ahead.

As reported in a UN press release, conference president Dhanapala, answering a journalist at a final press conference, agreed that "public confidence in the NPT would be greatly eroded if there was no fulfillment of the Treaty's provisions". He could envisage a situation "where the cumulative effect of disenchantment with the NPT could lead citizens to press their governments to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty".

Of the three documents the conference adopted, only the extension decision is legally binding. The other two - on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, and the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament - are considered to be only politically binding. The three documents must be studied by us and we must develop our own strategies and mechanisms to hold governments to their Treaty obligations and be accountable to their citizens.

We need much wider citizen involvement in the NPT issue than we now have. Access by non-governmental organizations and other groups to the conference and its documentation was difficult, and became non-existent as more and more informal meetings and negotiations took place behind closed doors. I am sure it took great perseverance and ingenuity by those monitoring the conference to get the information to share with others.