The European Option: Questions and Objections

Roundtable: Dan Smith, Ben Cramer, Peter Weiss,Huub Jaspers, Matthias Küntzel

Dan Smith:

While running the risk of oversimplifying or doing scant justice to three extraordinarily strong lectures, I want to accentuate several points before starting this roundtable discussion.

The future of the international non-proliferation regime is not only determined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also by the possibility of the Europeanization of the British and French nuclear forces. This European option has been intentionally kept open. There existed - and there still exists - the wish to keep it open. Franco-British cooperation, with possible German participation, forms the basis for it.

As an issue, it is part of the diplomatic game. Part "G" of the Maastricht Treaty addresses the future common European defense policy. According to the views of both proponents and opponents, this common policy must have a nuclear component. The reason given is that Western European policy has long been based on nuclear weapons and, therefore, future European policy should also be based on them. There are several scripts and models for how this might happen. It does not necessarily mean the formation of a European nuclear force; it could also mean the institution of a common doctrine for the French and British nuclear forces. Although the matter currently does not receive highest priority, it is present in politics, especially concerning Franco-British cooperation.

Obviously, there are clear and evident objections to a European nuclear force. The following discussion on the possibilities of, assumptions about, and objections to it will have a rather speculative character.

Introductions

Ben Cramer:

I'm supposed to talk for eight minutes about French nuclear policy. Do not expect too much. My excuse is that France's official policy still is in the process of being drafted. We find ourselves in quite a surrealistic situation. Jacques Chirac, currently France's president, is one and the same person who, in 1950, signed the Stockholm Declaration, and twenty-five years later signed a contract with Saddam Hussein to supply Iraq with a nuclear research reactor called Osiraq (some call it "OChiraq"). This reactor was bombed by Israel in June 1981. We now have Minister of Defense Million, a former left-wing sympathiser who, like myself, refused military service. I could go on for some time with references to the past about individuals who currently occupy positions in the French cabinet or who are advisors to Chirac.

As you probably know, in 1987 Chirac himself was an important player in the Western European Platform. This Platform was instituted for two reasons. The first was a common one, namely to bind Germany to the West. This has been France's main obsession and is the reason behind its emphasis on European integration. The second reason was obviously to end pacifism. France was and is convinced that European pacifism and especially Dutch pacifism was not related so much to the military problem of the nuclear weapons but to the political dimension of them: the nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO's boss, the USA.

We could distinguish a "linkage" between France's political and military ambitions and China's. Both have a problem with one of their neighbours: France vis-a-vis Germany, China vis-a-vis Japan. Both have the intention to go on with nuclear testing. Both have regarded the bomb as a way to be left out of the superpowers "condominium", or "hegemony". Both have promoted the bomb as the only way to give value to the concept "independance" (or non-alignment). Both have been proliferators and have given the same arguments to snob all previous disarmament or arms control treaties, like the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Both justify their testing program by saying that they have done fewer tests than the two superpowers.

Two other things have to be said regarding France's official policy. France continues to attempt to play a leadership role, not only in Europe but in other parts of the world too, even more so since her role as a watchdog in Africa seems to be welcomed and recognised by the United States as part of the "burden sharing" that NATO has conceived for the management of a certain "world order".

Looking towards the Mediterranean is an old French obsession that gaullism has revigorated under the slogan "we are not only a regional power". The post-Cold War era has increased this southern oriented trend because of Germany's victory on the "continental" front. Power projection towards the South is now a "must" to differentiate from Germany.

The balance between France's nuclear bomb and the German mark is a long-standing matter. More and more, this balance is questioned. The balance has not developed as France had expected, and I believe that for the French the "German problem" really exists. In French military circles the nuclear force was not seen solely as a weapon against the Soviet Union. It was also simply about the possession of a nuclear force; one of the main motives was to have something that the Germans did not have.

Proliferation is jeopardizing this balance. Through proliferation, the status of the happy few "haves" is diminishing. The parameters of power are changing, because of the potential spread of a weapon that was supposed to remain the monopoly of five. Ironically, the spread of nuclear weapons within the Soviet Union has contributed to its collapse. The emphasis on the military build-up, the focus on "overkill" among the superpowers had reached such a stage that the Cold War era could not last. France is aware of this phenomenon. The fact that Germany, as well as Japan, will ask for a seat at the United Nations Security Council is a matter of deep concern in Paris. It will after all demonstrate that the equation "our bomb against their mark" is not relevant anymore.

We need to look seriously at the division of labor that will occur - with the approval of the United States - within European defense policy. Do not forget that France's change of course over the past years is very significant. France, in fact, is becoming one of the closest US allies, not only because Paris is endeavoring to tie Germany closer to the West, but also because, as a kind of reward, France is given the possibility to expand its sphere of influence southward.

It is interesting to see the contradictions that exist within the French elite - between those who want more influence on the continent in the direction of Eastern Europe, and those who readily wish for a greater expansion of France's power on a global scale. From a strategic point of view these possibilities form a paradox. Nuclear (weapons) power no longer guarantees independence; rather, it represents the possibility of being part of a continuation of the US domination strategy over the South.

Should a European defence really take shape, it will try to swallow or digest the imperialistic ambitions of those powers like France who are part of it and who would appreciate to lead the show. Currently, France has no intention of sharing its nuclear weapons with other European nations. France advocates independence ("one finger on the button") and its offers of nuclear consultation with Germany are less attractive than those currently under way within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

However, this stance might evolve, especially if we keep in mind France's nuclear adventure in the Fifties and the secret deals France made with Western Germany for uranium enrichment. France pretends already that it shares de facto its nuclear umbrella. Sometime in the future - as we saw in the case of the Western European Union's Charter in 1987, and as we will notice under the spacegoat of "proliferating countries" (Franco-German negotiations about the Ilelios satelite) - France might feel more and more eager to "contaminate" other European nations with its nuclear "trip".

Those European "allies" who denigrate and/or underestimate France's nuclear "protection", who might complain about this vicious protective "gift", are nevertheless inclined to take the French bomb serious. This phenomenon will go ahead for the simple reason that the vision of Europe, according to a number of (Western) European leaders has something to do with the construction of a new political entity that is meant to match another superpower.

Peter Weiss:

Martin Butcher described at some length the coordination difficulties that exist between France and the United Kingdom over nuclear cooperation. I hope for both the French and the British that they will never have to cooperate in that manner with the United States, because then they will really be in trouble. I will give you an example of this, based on a recent Washington Post report on US nuclear policy. According to the report, Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense under George Bush, studied the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for US nuclear weapons.

He discovered that, in fact, no such integrated plan existed; it was never more than a collection of loose ideas. One reason for this was that four different task forces were establishing targets for nuclear weapons. One task force focused on enemy nuclear forces, a second on conventional forces, a third on enemy leaders, and the last on the military industry. The result was, for example, that 40 nuclear missiles were aimed at Kiev, while one obviously would have sufficed.

Effective coordination, therefore, really creates a problem. Concerning a European nuclear force, no one in Washington is saying anything about it: not the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and not the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Everybody responds, "What? A European nuclear force? You're talking to the wrong department. Besides, it doesn't even exist." Which, of course, does not mean that nobody is reflecting on it. But those who are, are probably doing so for the same reason already mentioned by Martin Butcher - namely, that they do not want anybody else to think about it. It is my opinion that Mr De Decker, the author of the WEU report on the role and future of nuclear weapons in Europe, does not need to worry about the United States ever removing its nuclear umbrella from Europe. The United States will never voluntarily give up its status as the world's only remaining superpower. Just recently this became quite clear.

It was said that President Clinton, in an address, was going to declare that the United States would commit itself to abolishing nuclear weapons in the future. Next thing, we hear that the President was forced to cut this sentence from his speech. Instead, he promised to make efforts on inspections of nuclear weapons and disarmament. A similar thing happened in 1994, when India's Prime Minister asked President Clinton if they together would sign a declaration on the destruction of nuclear weapons. Clinton thought this was a good idea and signed a similar declaration. However, the declaration was only published in Indian newspapers and never reached the US media.

When Gorbachev, at the Reykjavik meeting with President Reagan a couple of years ago, proposed to him: Let's abolish all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, Reagan replied: That's a fantastic idea! But then his advisors said: Now what have you done, Mr. President? And Reagan had to change his mind. Hence, I do not think you have to worry that the United States will abandon Europe, and I am sure you all feel greatly reassured.

I think it is clear from a purely legal perspective that a European nuclear force constitutes a violation of the NPT, for the simple reason that both Article I and Article II of the Treaty use the word "control". Just as countries may not transfer nuclear weapons, they are also not allowed to transfer control over them. In practice, however, it will not matter much whether this is legally allowed or not, because the United States and all other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) completely ignore Article VI of the NPT. Should Europe really want to become a nuclear force, it will do so, regardless of whether it is legal or illegal.

I am not so sure, for that matter, if I would object to a European nuclear force, if it was on the condition that there would be a two-sided control mechanism and that every EU member state would have to sign on. I believe I would not object, provided that countries like Norway, Ireland, and Austria would be involved in decisions over the use of French and/or British nuclear weapons, especially if this is compared to the current situation where only France and the United Kingdom themselves make these decisions. This, however, is only my initial reaction.

Given the tremendous resistance in the Netherlands to the Cruise Missiles, I find it rather strange that the Dutch government does not express itself more forcefully against a European nuclear force. The "Case against the State" was an important attack on the legality of nuclear weapons, and was even brought before the Supreme Court. It posed many problems for NATO.

At the International Court of Justice (ICJ) a case is currently pending on the legality of using nuclear weapons. This court case is truly a great victory for the peace movement. It came about through excellent coordination and cooperation between lawyers' organizations, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the International Peace Bureau (IPB), and many other organizations. They received support from the World Health Organization's (WHO) General Assembly, which voted in support of filing this court case: 73 votes for, 40 against, and 40 abstentions. The next step was the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). After a losing vote in 1993, the resolution was passed in 1994 with 78 votes for, 43 against, and 38 abstentions.

In this resolution, the ICJ is being asked to render an advisory opinion on the legality of the use, and threat of use, of nuclear weapons. I believe that the World Court Project is extremely important, especially after the unfortunate outcome of the NPT Conference. The NWS feel quite strong. They experience the outcome of the NPT Conference as a major victory and think they have now defeated the Non-Aligned Countries. Above all, they believe that from now on they will be relatively free to do whatever they want with their nuclear weapons. The promises that were coupled to the extension of the NPT are not hard conditions.

Wolfgang Liebert mentioned in his introduction that "Principles are not legally binding, but are politically binding". As a lawyer I can assure you that "politically binding" does not mean very much. In fact, "politically binding" has no real force whatsoever.

Let me close with my favorite quote on the nuclear weapons issue. Miguel Marin Bosch, UN Ambassador from Mexico, was asked in an interview after the defeat in the UN General Assembly's vote on the World Court resolution (1993), "Why do you think that the Nuclear Weapon States are so keen to prevent this case from coming before the Court?" He answered, "Because the big boys are scared shitless to lose their toys." I think this is still the case. The only way to frighten the "big boys" again, after their victory with the indefinite extension of the NPT, is by continuing the struggle against nuclear weapons. So, you are the ones who will have to make them scared shitless again.

Huub Jaspers:

Several years ago, a colleague and I had been working for some months as journalists covering a big scandal involving corruption in Germany's nuclear industry - the "Transnuklear affair". While researching this we came in contact with Matthias Küntzel, who at the time was fully engaged in working on his doctoral thesis. At a certain moment he showed us some interesting, confidential documents dating back to 1964, concerning an internal discussion on the European option within the European Social Democratic community. A big difference of opinion existed between the German SPD on one side, and the British Labour Party and Dutch Socialist Party (PvdA) on the other side. The SPD wanted the European Monet Committee to pass a resolution in support of the goal of a common European nuclear force. PvdA and Labour were quite frightened by this situation and were fiercely opposed to it.

They tried to organize a meeting in London of Western European Social Democratic parties to discuss the matter. The meeting, however, never took place. The documents Küntzel showed us concerned internal correspondence between the three principal SPD leaders at that time, namely Herbert Wehner, Willy Brandt, and Fritz Erler. The documents showed how the SPD leadership had successfully sabotaged the proposal for the London meeting. The German comrades apparently did not want a European-wide discussion. They did not want it to be internationally known that the SPD was pursuing a common European nuclear force, while Labour and the PvdA were quite concerned about a possible German finger on the nuclear trigger.

My colleague and I did some supplementary research and published a full-page article in one of the Dutch national dailies "De Volkskrant". Some days after its publication, we received a phone call from former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoel. Van der Stoel, as PvdA secretary for international affairs, had been closely involved in 1964 in the above-mentioned discussion on a European nuclear force. At first, we were startled when he called. We had quoted him extensively in our article, but it had all happened quite a long time ago; perhaps he felt uncomfortable by our revelations. However, it soon appeared that Van der Stoel was actually quite pleased with the Volkskrant article. He congratulated us on the reconstruction, which had not only refreshed his memory, as he emphasized, but had also contained some important details that he had not known before.

In 1965, within a year after the controversy between the three Social Democratic parties, Van der Stoel became Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and politically responsible for the Dutch delegation at the NPT negotiations. During these negotiations he collided with the Germans. Bonn strongly opposed the idea of a NPT and felt discriminated against by the Treaty, while the Dutch were ardent supporters of the NPT.

One of the topics Küntzel has dealt extensively with in his book "Bonn & the Bomb" are the year-long negotiations on the role the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the agency responsible for supervising compliance with the NPT - was to play in Western Europe. Germany felt that EURATOM should be responsible for inspections in EURATOM member states, and wanted to limit, as much as possible, the role of the UN-affiliated IAEA in these countries. The Netherlands (and later also Belgium and Luxembourg), on the contrary, wanted a strong IAEA inspection regime and felt that it would set a bad precedent for EURATOM to have a system of inspections that was, in fact, nothing but mere self-inspection.

The German negotiators brought all kinds of arguments forward, such as the fear of industrial espionage. The quarrel lasted until 1975. Van der Stoel was not the only Dutch official involved who was convinced that the German resistance, in fact, had quite a different motive. This motive, which was never stated aloud, was the fear that possible IAEA snooping would stand in the way of the possible development of a European nuclear force.

This was a short retrospective on the Dutch perspective on the European option. Concerning the present, it is much more difficult to say anything on the Dutch perspective, because it seems to be non-existent. In The Hague, there does not seem to be any discussion taking place on it. The NPT Coordination Group - which organizes these seminars - has, on several occasions, had discussions on this topic with politicians and officials in The Hague, as well as with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During these discussions the WEU document on the future of nuclear weapons in Europe was referred to by us several times. Hardly anyone in The Hague even knew of its existence.

Today we have heard that this topic is being discussed in Bonn, Paris, and Brussels. In The Hague, however, no discussion takes place. I do not know why this is so, but I can think of four possible reasons. The first, indeed, is ignorance. The second could be that The Hague just does not want to know. Background for this could be that the idea exists that German nuclear ambitions ended when Germany signed the NPT, and furthermore, that the Treaty rules out a European nuclear force. The best way to maintain this situation would be not to make an issue out of it, hence not to talk about it. Given the fact, however, that the discussion has long since started in other countries, this hardly seems much of a strategy to me. The third reason for not engaging in this discussion might be the existence of a faction in The Hague that, under certain conditions, would be supportive of a European nuclear force but so far has not deemed the time ripe to discuss this in public. The fourth reason, finally, might have to do with the reassessment of the Dutch foreign policy that is currently taking place. It is my impression that one impact of this reassessment will be that the Netherlands will become more aware of the modest role it can play internationally, and that The Hague will have to stay, more or less, out of the way of its European allies.

Discussion

Question:

I have a question for Cramer. He said the main purpose behind the French bomb was for France to prevent German superiority. I, however, thought that the main purpose was not to lag behind the British.

Cramer:

What I presented has been part of an official investigation. One of the prime motives for the French nuclear force was its position vis-à-vis Germany. That does not exclude competition with the British, however. I also think that France's defeat in the Suez crisis was a very important geopolitical factor. However, I think that I have correctly put the emphasis on Germany, and I have brought official documents that can confirm this.

Question:

Why are there no women participating as speakers in this discussion? Don't women play an important role in the struggle against nuclear weapons? Half of the population consists of women. I think you are on the wrong track because I see only men behind the table. Now a question for Weiss. Are female lawyers also involved in the World Court Project or only male lawyers?

Weiss:

First of all, I fully agree with your remark. At the NPT NGO Conference the majority of participants were women. Women were doing the work and men were making the speeches. The women did a marvelous job, and came from all parts of the world. Also at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that has been asked to render its opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, there were many female lawyers, but - with two exceptions - they did not make presentations and were not the ones making the decisions.

Question:

In the introduction, Butcher said there are a number of obstacles to a common European nuclear force. I don't want to be too pessimistic, but I want to give another scenario and ask his opinion on it. In Europe, discussion is taking place on the possibility of a "two-track Europe". There are those countries that look forward to a new dynamic in European integration, and they want to move faster. If you want to be pessimistic and assume that there is a core of six to seven "fast" countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux countries) and you combine this with the aspirations for a European nuclear force, would it then be possible that these "fast" countries will move ahead with defense-related cooperation? France, for example, is saying, "As a first step to a common nuclear defense, we would be willing to extend our nuclear security guarantee to other countries." With a smaller number of more like-minded countries, wouldn't fewer problems be encountered on cooperation?

Cramer:

Of course, it is possible to view the idea of a two-track Europe in the area of conventional defense more pessimistically than I have in the area of nuclear defense. I do not know what the effect would be in the nuclear area should France want to extend its nuclear security guarantee to a group of countries within the EU. But in the short term this would imply the estrangement of the United Kingdom, because the British would not want to go further in the defense area within the context of such a small group. It could be that after the next British elections this may change, but at the moment it would create a rift between France and the United Kingdom.

But then, perhaps I am too optimistic. It is, of course, possible to view the development of cooperation on defense policy within such an EU core group much more pessimistically.

Küntzel:

The question is, who would gain in Europe with this European option? Looking at France and the United Kingdom, they would not be very interested because it would decrease their status. Perhaps some of the other countries have an interest in a European defense policy, with the French force de frappe at the foundation. However, France would not want to relinquish any of its authority over its nuclear weapons or its nuclear status, and neither would the United Kingdom. I also think that countries like the Netherlands and Sweden have no interest in a European nuclear option. What they do have an interest in is economic integration and prosperity.

There are a number of countries that are, in fact, neither Non-Nuclear Weapon States, nor Nuclear Weapon States - countries such as Spain, Italy, and Germany. They represent a kind of intermediate form, hermaphrodites. These countries may have a motive for elevating their status within Europe. Maybe they are motivated to promote the idea of a European nuclear option and to put it on the agenda. This applies primarily to Germany. As a German, I do not want to focus too much on Germany, but Germany is unable to accept a lesser status in the world without ill feelings. This provides a motive to proceed on this path. Some years ago, the peace movement and the Green Party asked the German government to include the Non-Nuclear Weapon Status into Germany's constitution. The government refused because it wished to retain the European option.

It is a major problem that some countries are not, at heart, Non-Nuclear Weapon States, but to the contrary, wish to increase their status gradually. I do not believe that the real underlying motive is the possible disappearance of the US nuclear umbrella. Security was never a motive for nuclear proliferation. When the United Kingdom produced its nuclear weapon it was not for reasons of security - there was the US nuclear guarantee. The same applied for France. It is not a matter of security but of status: When you have nuclear weapons, you sit at the same table as the "big boys" and you share the discussion. In some ways this is an irrational motive.

Question:

What will be the influence and consequence of a future European nuclear force on countries outside Europe, especially on the so-called threshold countries in the Third World? Will these countries be stimulated to develop their own nuclear weapons?

Küntzel:

It is obvious that a European nuclear force would set a bad precedent.

Question:

I will give two arguments for a common European nuclear force. First, there will be one Nuclear Weapon State less; instead of France and the United Kingdom, there will be only one European nuclear force. Second, the European decision-making process is too complicated to be used effectively. A nuclear weapon, over which fifteen countries will have to decide jointly, would probably never be used at all. Could you explain to me why these arguments are false?

Jaspers:

The main question is this: Would nuclear deterrence be reduced by European integration? Observing political discussions, it becomes clear that the purpose of a common European nuclear force would be to enhance this deterrence, not to reduce it. In certain circles discussions are taking place about decision-making models: How do you achieve these and what is their legal framework? However, I am quite sure the European nuclear force will not happen, unless, according to the main countries involved - France, Germany, and the United Kingdom - nuclear deterrence is strengthened. Problems that have to be solved about decision making are, indeed, substantial.

In 1994, Harald Müller, a prominent German proliferation expert, published a contribution to this topic. He discussed the topic extensively, and made all kinds of suggestions for steps along the way, given the current situation and problems. I cannot predict if, or how, European consensus will be reached over this topic, but I am certain that it will not happen if the deterrent is reduced in value. This is also the thrust of my main objection to it. My second objection was already mentioned by Küntzel: it would set a bad precedent for non-proliferation. The current focus with regard to proliferation has been particularly strong on countries in the South. I, however, feel that Europe is one of the main problem areas where proliferation is concerned.

Consider, for a moment, the idea of a common nuclear force in another region of the world. Assume that tomorrow China would propose a nuclear force in Asia consisting of Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and China. Or, imagine that news suddenly reaches us about the formation of an Islamic nuclear force, with participation of Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. This would be perceived as an enormous threat to the West. I think that the European nuclear force, in essence, should be seen likewise. Deterrence is always directed against someone - explicitly or implicitly - and this someone will always feel threatened by it.

I am not quite sure about my third argument against the European option. For Germany, it is a matter of status; it constitutes the main area in which Germany has a lower status than France and the United Kingdom. Germany, however, clearly is the leading economic force in Europe. Should the difference in status between European NWS and NNWS disappear, Germany would assume a much greater leadership role in Europe. And I doubt if this would be a good thing.

The fact that Germany is not a NWS is a direct result of the Second World War. Increasingly, it can be heard that "we are now fifty years further down the road and Germany has become a stable democracy, securely anchored within Europe and NATO". Nevertheless, I fear that within Germany a tradition still exists that flies in the face of a number of more liberal and democratic traditions of other European countries. I would regret it if these liberal traditions would get short shrift in a united Europe.

Indeed, why should Germany have a voice in the matter of nuclear weapons? I cannot come up with a single good reason. On the other hand, this is exactly the principal dilemma within the current non-proliferation regime: Some countries have nuclear weapons, and as long as they maintain them, others will pursue them as well. In the long run, the choice is clear: Either no one has nuclear weapons, or we will continue to find ourselves in a situation where many states are pursuing them.

To stir things up a bit, I would propose that Germany should be one of the last countries in the world to have access to nuclear weapons, owing to its history, owing to the sensitivities and fears that exist in neighboring countries regarding this issue, and especially owing to its pretense of having learned from its own history.

However, the differences in status within Europe could also be solved in a different manner. There may well be some conservative German politicians who support the idea of abolishing France's and the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons. This would evidently resolve the difference in nuclear status. I would be a proponent of this option and want to move nuclear disarmament high up on the international political agenda.

Weiss:

You are right to have doubts about your last argument. When you select one particular country that cannot have nuclear weapons it implies that another may have them. Why especially Germany but not Japan?

Jaspers:

Japan - like Germany and for the same reasons - should be one of the last countries in the world to gain access to nuclear weapons. However, this does not imply that others should be allowed to have them.

Küntzel:

I do not agree with everything that Jaspers has said. He maintains that the engine behind the discussion on a European nuclear force is the pursuit of a higher status by a number of countries. I, however, see that it is primarily Germany that is pressing for the European option. Besides, I think that such a European option would not satisfy Germany's needs in this area, but rather would stimulate a larger need. A joint nuclear weapon with the French and the British could be an intermediate step on the road toward a German nuclear weapon. With German participation, in any case, an important psychological barrier would have been overcome, namely the fear of a German finger on the nuclear trigger.

Question:

Last year it was said that the United States would supply China with computer technology for simulating nuclear tests. If this is true, then why did China conduct a nuclear test anyway? Could this be politically motivated? And what arguments could there be behind the decision to announce this test right before the NPT Conference and conduct it just a few days after it? Was this just macho behavior?

Cramer:

One: China has never joined the moratorium on nuclear testing. Two: The offer by the United States does not mean that an agreement already exists, nor that this know-how has already been transferred. Three: The Chinese have stated that they will have to conduct many tests to develop simulation technology, which is, by the way, exactly the same argument France uses. The United States' offer was more of a public than a political gesture. They like to see all NWS toeing the line, with no one stepping out of line. Should one country - such as China - step out of line, then other countries - such as France, currently - would seize the opportunity to conduct their own tests.

Weiss:

Both China and France are attempting to make a good impression. Recently, they have acceded to the NPT, and just prior to the NPT Conference they stated that they would sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "Just one more nuclear test, and then we will stop -- and then one more, which is necessary for the development of computer simulation techniques." It is very important that this matter is raised.

Cramer:

It is important to note that France does have the hardware that is necessary for the simulations. It does not imply, however, that it also has the software or the data to really work with computer simulations. This is the reason why the French establishment wants to conduct more nuclear tests. I am not abreast of the details of the United States' proposal to China, but it would have to include a wide range of special technology. Computer simulation by itself is not sufficient; a full series of experiments is necessary.

Question:

Will nuclear testing, after the conclusion of a CTBT, be fully banned? I understand that not all nuclear tests will be prohibited.

Cramer:

The official US perspective on a CTBT is that tests above two kilograms TNT will be prohibited. Unofficially, the Department of Defense is thinking about permitting stronger explosions. Internationally, there is a push for a so-called zero-yield CTBT. The very small tests, however are very difficult to detect or to locate, which means that verification would be impossible.

Weiss:

The pressure to either continue as usual, or with very small-scale tests, is coming from nuclear scientists and technicians. They do not want to become unemployed and are exercising strong pressure for the development of mini- and micro-nuclear weapons. The development of these weapons requires the continuation of small-scale nuclear testing.

Question:

Why do nuclear weapons enjoy such a high status? They cannot be used, anyway. What is so special about having a weapon you cannot use? I ask this because it is repeatedly said that Germany only wants to have nuclear weapons to elevate its own status, not because it wants to ever use them.

Weiss:

Status is reality. Status is what other people think. If you think I have status, then it does not matter if I really have it. Your thoughts are creating reality.

Cramer:

The European option might be seen as a kind of non-proliferation. It would mean exchanging fifteen countries - most of which have the raw materials, the nuclear industry, and the know-how to produce nuclear weapons - for one nuclear power. But it could also be called horizontal proliferation, and in any case, political proliferation. I think we have to get back to a more political assessment of it. If you decide to share the responsibility over nuclear weapons, then you will also have to share the risks. This might mean that France, at some point in time, might wish to station some Mirages with nuclear weapons somewhere in Germany. That would have to be approved by both parties, which would never happen - just look at the current debate in France. That debate is about a switch over to a more operational deterrent, with Cruise Missiles aimed at Baghdad and Tripoli, and a capacity for counter-proliferation. This, however, cannot be sold to our neighboring countries.

Küntzel:

I do not agree with the proposition that in every country there are people who are investigating how to obtain nuclear weapons. There are real differences between countries. In Europe, there are countries that would like to elevate their status. Other countries, like Sweden, are aiming to abolish all nuclear weapons.

Weiss:

Sweden had a nuclear weapons program.

Küntzel:

Yes, in the Sixties. But now they have changed their mind. It is important to see the differences. In the European Union you can try to make these differences work to your advantage. My last point is that the advantages that come with having nuclear weapons have more to do with threatening to use them than with actually using them. If you look at why the United Kingdom and France decided to develop nuclear weapons, you end up at the Suez crisis. At the time, the United Kingdom was disappointed with the attitude the United States took. Nuclear weapons were developed because France and the United Kingdom wanted to exercise more influence in the Western Alliance. Just like China wanted more influence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

It always revolves around power and status where nuclear weapons are concerned. It is always important to oppose this kind of thinking and to continue to exercise pressure; for example, through this series of seminars here in the Netherlands and this roundtable discussion. It is a pity we have not succeeded in organizing something similar in Germany.

Cramer:

The outcome of the NPT Conference, nevertheless, gave me a little hope, which I had not expected. I am still more positive about the outcome than most people. My first impression was that the NWS were coming to the conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and to get rid of - once and for all - every debate on disarmament. The conference, however, had one positive, concrete result: In about four or five years there will be a conference where disarmament will be discussed. For NGOs and activists this is an opportunity that did not exist before, and this means: Back to work!

Jaspers:

I am convinced we must persevere in our struggle against nuclear weapons and nuclear energy in every country in the world because many connections exist between the two, many more than commonly is assumed. At the same time, we must take into account that in Europe a number of specific problems exist: in France and the United Kingdom, fears exist that the military and political elites will be pulled into a spiral of nuclear disarmament; in Germany, there is the issue of nuclear status. All this could possibly lead to a compromise, to some kind of common European nuclear deterrence. It is our task to also campaign against such a compromise, and undertake action. How else could we convince others, in other parts of the world, to leave nuclear weapons alone?