Perspectives after the 1995 NPT Extension Conference

Wolfgang Liebert

From April 7 to May 12, 1995, the fifth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) took place at the United Nations in New York, which coincided with the Treaty Extension Conference, as mandated in Article X of the Treaty. The most concise summary of the NPT Review and Extension Conference is the following: The NPT has been extended indefinitely, which was successfully pushed through by the recognized Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and their Western and Eastern allies. That is all.

Indeed, the most important result to be considered by the Western countries and the majority of non-proliferation scholars might well be the reduction of the meaning of the NPT as a barrier against the further spread of nuclear weapons.

However, a more substantial analysis of the NPT Conference must look beyond the extension decision itself. It must also examine everything that accompanied that decision - including the behavior of the various states, groupings of states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) - in order to fully understand the prospects of the NPT, and to identify the next steps toward nuclear disarmament and the end of vertical and horizontal proliferation.⁽¹⁾ The following remarks are a contribution to this broad concern.

Conference Decisions

Officially, the NPT extension decision reads, "The (...) NPT will continue in force indefinitely according to a decision taken without vote this morning by the States Parties to the Treaty. In conjunction with that decision, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (...) also adopted, without vote, a declaration on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and a text on strengthening the Treaty review process. The conference also called for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction in a resolution also adopted without a vote." ⁽²⁾

The extension decision was made without a vote. Instead, a strange form of consensus was chosen, and a consensual statement was issued stating that a majority of states favored an indefinite extension. Attending the conference for at least part of the time were 175 of the 178 parties to the Treaty at the time. Indeed, 103 attendees signed a proposal written by Canada that called for indefinite extension (later, 111 supporters were counted). It is difficult, however, to label this a consensual decision when 22 countries were explicitly outspoken against indefinite extension.

11 of the dissenting voices, joined by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), endorsed an Indonesian proposal for a conditional twenty-five-year "rolling extension".⁽³⁾ This proposal drew on a set of conditions agreed to at a parallel conference of foreign ministers of the 60 state members to the NAM, held in Bandung (India). Within the ongoing review processes of the NPT, several objectives relating to the aim of the Treaty were presented, which are to be achieved within specific time frames. They include:

• A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT).
• Legally-binding security assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), preventing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the NWS.
• A cutoff of the production, and elimination of the stockpiling of fissile materials and other nuclear materials for weapon purposes.
• The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
• The establishment of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ).
• The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The most disparaging result of the conference for the Western Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) took place on the last working day of the conference; it was the day after the extension decision had been achieved and still no consensus could be reached on the conference's review document. The three Western NWS engaged in bitter dispute with four NAM states over the review statements relating to Article VI of the Treaty, which calls for "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

What is the story behind this result of the NPT Conference? Admittedly, it was not completely unexpected. However, there were many promising signs that the NAM - representing the largest grouping of NPT member states - would be able to block the NWS from gaining an easy majority on the extension vote, unless they made substantial progress toward fulfilling their disarmament obligations as mandated in the NPT. However, the NAM was never able to reach consensus on its strategy at the Bandung Conference, and it remained divided over the extension decision. This discord dramatically weakened the position of their leading states: Indonesia, Nigeria, and Mexico.

Of critical importance was the role played by South Africa at the Bandung Conference. South Africa, supported by four smaller African states, opposed the idea of a rolling extension and instead favored an indefinite one. Furthermore, it presented 23 "Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", which the conference was asked to adopt simultaneously as yardsticks by which all States Party to the Treaty could measure their non-proliferation and disarmament achievements. The South African diplomats avoided the term "conditions" and instead formulated rather moderate and broad "principles".

It is still unclear who or what got the South Africans to take this position, which divided the NAM. In any case, the South African proposals turned out to have a major impact on the outcome of the conference. The South African paper played an important role in conference president Jayantha Dhanapala's "presidential consultations" throughout the conference. It was also the foundation for Dhanapala's (Sri Lanka) "three-pack" proposal, which suggested that:

1. The Treaty should be extended indefinitely.
2. The review process of the Treaty should be strengthened with Review Conferences to be held every five years. Intercessional meetings should be held in each of the three years prior to the Review Conferences. These Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings should be ten working days with the goal to "consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference" so that the conferences can "identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future". ⁽⁴⁾
3. All future proceedings should be based on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". ⁽⁵⁾

The set of "Principles and Objectives" referred to here is a slightly watered-down version of the original South African proposal. It includes:

• The wish for universal adherence to the NPT and the objective - easier said than done - that the NPT has a "vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons".
• A reaffirmation of the NWS's disarmament commitments as stated in Article VI. A program of action would have to include:
  • The completion of an "effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the NWS should exercise utmost restraint" regarding nuclear testing.
  • "The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally-applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
  • "Systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."
• A call for regional NWFZ treaties, with relevant protocols signed by the NWS. Zones free of all weapons of mass destruction are particularly encouraged in regions of tensions, such as the Middle East.
• A call for assurances to be given against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by NWS who are party to the Treaty.
• A recognition of the "competent authority" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose nuclear safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated, with an increase in its capability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. The acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and "internationally legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons" should be the precondition for nuclear transfers. In place of the current framework of voluntary safeguards for the NWS, fissile material stemming from the military sector should also be placed under IAEA safeguards. "Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved."
• A reaffirmation of the "inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" and in conformity with the NPT. Transparency in nuclear-related exports should be promoted, whereas "undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented".
• A declaration that attacks, or threats of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities jeopardize nuclear safety and "raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases".

This declaration of principles is neither legally binding nor sufficient. Nevertheless, there were strong hopes that it would be considered politically binding; the resolution, together with the extension decision, should be brought "to the attention of the heads of state or government of all states and seek their full cooperation (...) in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty".

How should these conference results be assessed? Only future international activities related to the "Principles and Objectives" will show whether a majority of states that are party to the Treaty will judge the outcome of the conference to be too weak - which will probably be the case - or not.

The "Dark Side" of the Conference

The "dark side" of the conference is also important. The experience with the NPT Conference was frustrating - at least for scientists who feel uncomfortable within the UN jungle. The diplomatic tug-of-war over the extension decision is - at least for me - reminiscent of the rhetorical pattern of a huge part of the arms-control negotiations during the Cold War. Nothing significant has come onto the table from the Nuclear Weapon States. The nuclear powers and their allies have no serious answer to the challenge of how best to really end the nuclear threat. Focusing on the procedural aspects of the NPT extension, they drew attention away from the crucial problems related to existing nuclear weapon arsenals and the global use of nuclear technology. Furthermore, the call for an indefinite and unconditional extension might mean, in practice, the indefinite postponement of complete nuclear disarmament as promised in the NPT.

It is also important to mention that the NGOs had little meaningful access to the conference. After the historical breakthrough at the third PrepComm of the NPT Conference in September 1994 in Geneva - where, for the first time, NGO representatives were permitted to attend a major disarmament conference as observers - it was an annoying experience in New York to find, once again, that most meetings were closed to NGOs. Therefore, it was hard to follow what was really going on at the conference. Without Rebecca Johnson's carefully investigated reports it would have been even worse.

Positive Signs at the Conference

On the other hand, one has to welcome the phrase "elimination of nuclear weapons" being seriously mentioned in a significant number of speeches by representatives, not only from a huge number of NAM states but also from countries such as Russia, Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland.

NGOs in New York reached near-consensus on their future focus: a full ban on possession of all nuclear weapons. About 200 research institutions and NGOs were represented in New York. Several well-organized and stimulating meetings were held parallel to the NPT Conference. Most important of these were:

• The "Citizens Assembly", organized primarily by the US peace movement and supported by other international groups.
• A one-day meeting of the "World Court Project", which promoted the idea - adopted by the UN General Assembly - of asking the International Court of Justice to issue an advisory opinion on whether the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is in accordance with international law.
• A two-day "Forum on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons", organized in accordance with the framework of the International Coalition for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.⁽⁶⁾ The first day was dedicated to the presentation of a document prepared by the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) entitled, "Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World". More than 40 scientists from 17 countries had contributed to this study, which emphasizes the need for a transformation from the traditional non-proliferation regime to a new and more convincing nuclear weapon-free world regime, and which outlines important steps toward this goal. The second day, there was an NGO strategy meeting that 100 representatives participated in. After the NGO strategy meeting, the International Coalition decided to start a process which should lead to a much broader coalition, the "Abolition 2000 Network - A network for the global elimination of Nuclear Weapons". This network seeks a more global representation on its steering committee in order to improve world-wide coordinated activities.

Also, the "Abolition Caucus" - which began as a daily gathering of NGOs interested in promoting the elimination of all nuclear weapons as soon as possible - remains active. By strengthening a very moderate and traditionally-formulated statement by some members of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, the Abolition Caucus adopted a much more forward-looking statement. This statement was signed by approximately 200 NGOs worldwide.

Mexican Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch, a state delegate, explicitly mentioned the INESAP proposal to mandate the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Nuclear Weapon Convention that would replace the NPT at some future time. Ambassador Marin Bosch emphasized that giving this mandate would be the next logical step.

NPT Critique Remains Valid

Despite the promising developments in international activities supporting the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we must be aware that, since the NPT extension, nothing has really changed regarding the critique that NGOs and researchers have made on the existing non-proliferation regime or on the NPT itself⁽⁷⁾. The central criticism of the NPT is that it is de jure discriminatory, because it legitimizes the division of the world into Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, and it imposes stringent control measures on the latter while the obligations of the former are not set out in any strict and enforceable way. The "Principles and Objectives" of the NPT Conference have not changed anything in this respect.

The non-proliferation regime, in practice, is even more discriminatory, because it divides countries into three different classes, each permitted different levels of access to nuclear technology. The first class of states is entitled to possess nuclear weapons and to improve their arsenals - maybe indefinitely. The second class of (mainly industrialized) states are denied access to nuclear weapons, although all sensitive nuclear technologies enabling access to weapon-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are available to them under IAEA safeguards. The third class of states is denied access not only to nuclear weapons but also to certain sensitive nuclear technologies, out of fears that they might attempt to "go nuclear". By imposing additional unilateral export control measures, major supplier countries of nuclear technology are able to maintain this system in a rough and ready way. Unilateral export control will, however, be seen as discrimination by the supplier countries as long as the industrial allies of the NWS continue to insist on the unrestrained use of all nuclear technology.

The Treaty is a flawed agreement, because no path leading toward disarmament - particularly to nuclear disarmament - has been established. Nevertheless, this goal is made clear in Article VI and the Preamble, although the steps to its realization are not legally binding.

Another fundamental defect of the NPT is that it ignores the insurmountable dual-use character of many nuclear technologies. As long as weapon-usable materials are produced and allowed to be used in the civilian sector, there is a risk of them being diverted for use in making nuclear weapons. The promotion of peaceful nuclear energy has resulted in nuclear technology spreading widely, providing many states with the prerequisites for weapon programs. Even under IAEA safeguards, a State Party to the NPT could stockpile plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for allegedly peaceful purposes and research its weaponization. At a time of its choosing, it could give three months' notice of withdrawal from the Treaty and begin to assemble a stockpile of nuclear weapons after the withdrawal took effect.

Generally speaking, an important source of both horizontal and vertical proliferation is the civil-military ambivalence of nuclear research and technology. Worldwide established civilian nuclear programs lower the threshold for developing nuclear weapon programs, and can lead to the improvement of existing capabilities.

The NPT now looks like a historical document stemming from the Cold War and the nuclear euphoria of the past. With the end of the Cold War, the time has come to think about a transformation of the old non-proliferation regime into a new nuclear weapon-free regime. Of course, this will have to be a gradual, step-by-step process that removes the disadvantages and defects of the present regime without losing its advantages.

No doubt exists that to date, the recently indefinitely extended NPT remains the only existing barrier against worldwide proliferation. While the Treaty calls for nuclear disarmament, accompanying steps have to be introduced urgently. The INESAP document makes suggestions about how to go beyond the NPT.⁽⁸⁾ The document outlines a gradual transformation process, while maintaining the major elements of the existing non-proliferation regime. As a cornerstone of this urgently needed new regime, we propose a Nuclear Weapon Convention, based on a total ban, like the one already achieved for biological and chemical weapons. The convention should replace the NPT in the not-too-distant future.

The only way to establish a system of nuclear non-proliferation that is absolutely tight and foolproof is to completely abolish all nuclear weapons. As long as the possession of nuclear weapons and weapon-usable materials by a handful of states is seen as legitimate, other countries will continue to be encouraged in their desire to maintain a nuclear option. As a consequence, the nuclear threat will endure and continue to increase.

Outlook

The 1995 NPT Conference has missed the historic chance to fundamentally reassess the Treaty and to make an essential shift toward a more rational and constructive direction.

Of course, it will be argued that such an international gathering of state representatives cannot solve the nuclear question in one meeting. It is also quite clear that many troublesome regional problems - e.g., the Israeli dilemma - hamper successful international agreement on this issue.

To give another example: As long as the governments of Germany and Belgium remain convinced that the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories serves their security interests without risking possible non-compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT, then continuing diplomatic battles over the objectives of the NPT and how best to improve procedures to support the "ultimate goal" of the NPT in a time-bound framework, are predictable.

Indeed, it is questionable whether diplomats can determine the right steps for effective non-proliferation and disarmament. Regarding the upcoming NPT events, the thanks given by conference president Dhanapala to the NGOs for their helpful role can be seen as a positive sign. NGOs should now be given the right to address international disarmament bodies in a direct and unimpeded way.

However, NGOs and independent researchers must also continue to pursue their own plans and actions. The official start of the new NPT review process in 1997, and the planned fourth UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1997 might well be anchoring points for future activities that will, again, give testimony of the increasing strength of NGOs.

Developments since the end of the NPT Conference are not at all encouraging. The recent Chinese nuclear test demonstrates how seriously China takes the peculiar "consensus" of the conference. The inaugural speech of the new French President Chirac emphasizing the necessity of maintaining and improving his country's nuclear deterrent, flagrantly ignores the rather moderate call for disarmament by the conference. Extended nuclear testing by France and China could well torpedo the weak international agreement regarding the nuclear issue.

But we must count the early setbacks in the civilian nuclear sector as well. Despite the call during the conference by eight European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) together with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to end all construction of new civilian reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium - HEU is weapon-grade quality - the German government is ready to financially support the construction of a new HEU reactor in Garching near Munich. Even worse, this reactor would set a bad precedent by using HEU in the form of new high-density fuels, which have been developed to make a replacement of HEU fuels by LEU (low enriched uranium) possible. LEU is virtually non weapon-usable. The German project could totally undermine the international efforts concerning an international conversion program from HEU to LEU, which has been run for fifteen years now.

Also, the long and hotly contested new US/EURATOM agreement on the exchange of nuclear technology and material seems to have been negotiated just in time to take full advantage of the NPT decision. Europe will now have a free hand in the nuclear sector without having to ask the United States for "prior consent", as was required in the past. It seems that this is the price the US government has paid to get Europe's major nuclear states to support the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Notes

1. For information on the day-to-day progress during the NPT Conference, I refer to the reports written by Rebecca Johnson, published by the ACRONYM Consortium, PO Box 176, CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.
2. 1995 Conference of Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 17th meeting, UN Report, DC/2510, May 11, 1995.
3. Document NPT/CONF.1995/L.3 (May 5, 1995). "Rolling 25 Years Extension" means that after this fixed period again a review and extension conference should be convened to conduct a comprehensive review of the operation of the Treaty. After that the Treaty would be extended for another fixed period of 25 years unless the majority of Parties to the Treaty would decide otherwise at this conference.
4. Document NPT/CONF.1995/L.4 (May 10, 1995).
5. Document NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 (May 9, 1995).
6. The International Coalition was formed in 1993 by the International Peace Bureau (IPB), the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES) and its sub-network INESAP, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA).
7. Liebert, W., "Whither the Non-Proliferation Treaty", in: Proceedings of the 44th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, "Towards a War-Free World", Kolymbari, Crete, Greece, June 30 - July 6, 1994, Singapore/London, World Scientific, 1995, p.246-259.
8. INESAP, Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World, New York/ Darmstadt, April 25, 1995. (Copies are available at IANUS, TH Darmstadt, Schlossgartenstrasse 9, D-64289 Darmstadt.)