Israel, the Bomb & Peace in the Middle East

Frank Barnaby

The question is: Can the Israeli nuclear weapon program be controlled? The amazing thing about Israel's nuclear weapon program is how little is known about it. Even the world's intelligence services - including those of the United States and the former Soviet Union - appear to know virtually none of the important details. Even such an elementary fact as the power output of the reactor used by Israel to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons is a mystery. And so, therefore, is the number of nuclear weapons in Israel's arsenal.

Even less is known about the types of nuclear weapons produced by Israel and the systems used to deliver nuclear weapons. Israel's ballistic missile systems are very closely guarded secrets. This deeply ingrained culture of nuclear secrecy will be a major obstacle to Israel's participation in regional nuclear disarmament negotiations. The world's powers - including the Arab states, it seems - simply do not want to know about Israel's nuclear weapons; perhaps the facts would be too embarrassing for them. Their ignorance may, in other words, be deliberate. Be this as it may, the Americans know considerably more about the Russian nuclear arsenal than they know about the Israeli one. A consequence of this state of affairs is that what sparse information there is about Israel's nuclear weapon program is always incorrect or misleading.

Israel's nuclear weapon policy is related to its perceptions of the nuclear capabilities of other countries in the Middle East. Some Middle Eastern countries are currently operating research reactors, and a number have plans to use nuclear power reactors to generate electricity. The countries operating research reactors include Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, Morocco, and Syria. Those planning to acquire nuclear power reactors include Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. Only time will tell which, if any, of these plans will come to fruition. Apart from Iran and possibly Israel (which is interested in desalinating water with nuclear power), a lack of financial resources is likely to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear power reactors in the near future. Moreover, nuclear power reactors of suitable electrical power outputs for developing countries are currently not available.

Any country operating reactors - research or power - will build up a cadre of trained nuclear scientists and engineers who can be employed to design and fabricate nuclear weapons. Large research reactors and nuclear-power reactors can be used to produce the type of plutonium best suited for the most effective nuclear weapons - so-called weapon-grade plutonium. A country's "civil" nuclear program is, therefore, a measure of its capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Israel has made it clear that it will do all it can to prevent any other country in the region from producing nuclear weapons. The bombing of Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981 was a dramatic demonstration of how seriously Israel takes this policy. Now that Iraq's nuclear weapons program has been effectively stopped, Israel's main current concern is Iran's nuclear program, a concern enhanced by Iran's ambition for hegemony within its region, its extensive rearmament program, and the opportunities created for Iran by the emergence of the independent Islamic republics from the former Soviet Union. Israel is also concerned about, and feels threatened by, Pakistan's nuclear program, a concern enhanced by possible nuclear collaboration between Pakistan on the one hand and Iran, Libya, and/or Saudi Arabia on the other.

Israel is unlikely, to say the least, to move toward nuclear disarmament until it feels secure in the region. It will need assurances that regional nuclear non-proliferation measures are effective. The situation is complicated by the fact that Israel's nuclear weapon force and its delivery systems are unsuitable for a policy of nuclear deterrence; they are only suitable for a policy of nuclear war.

Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Israel's efforts to produce nuclear weapons date back 50 years or so. Israel realized early on that its best route to nuclear weapons was the construction of a nuclear reactor dedicated to the production of plutonium for use as fissile material in nuclear weapons. The decision to acquire such a reactor made sense, given that Israel had the uranium to fuel it. Uranium is mixed with phosphate deposits mined in the Negev desert. These deposits are estimated to contain about 40,000 metric tons of uranium; on average 100 metric tons of uranium are produced a year. In the mid-Eighties a plant for the production of heavy water, used as a moderator in reactors, began operating at Rehovot.

Under an agreement signed in 1955 with the United States, the United States supplied Israel with a small research reactor, with a thermal power output of 5 MW(th). Built at Israel's Nuclear Research Center at Nahal Soreq and fueled with highly enriched uranium (containing 90% uranium-235), it began operating in 1960 and is the only Israeli nuclear facility under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

In 1963 the nuclear reactor at Israel's nuclear establishment at Dimona began operating. The reactor, and a reprocessing plant to remove the plutonium from the spent fuel elements, were supplied by France. Moderated by heavy water and fueled with natural uranium, the Dimona reactor is a very efficient producer of plutonium. Yellowcake, from Israel's uranium mill, is converted into uranium dioxide at the Dimona establishment, and the fuel elements for the reactor are manufactured there as well. The reprocessing plant is housed a few hundred meters from the reactor. Only about 150 of Dimona's 2,700 employees have access to the plant.

The Power Output of Dimona

According to the data given by Mordechai Vanunu⁽¹⁾ for the operation of the Dimona reactor and the amount of plutonium produced by the reprocessing plant, Dimona produced about 40 kilograms of plutonium a year between 1976 and 1985 (inclusive), giving a total plutonium production of about 400 kilograms. This average annual production suggests that the reactor has a power output of about 150 MW(th).

The power output of the Dimona reactor is not publicly known. Reference books listing the world's research reactors still usually record it as 26 MW(th), and it is generally thought that the original power output was of this value. But, according to Vanunu, who worked at Dimona between November 1976 and October 1985, the power output was increased to 70 MW(th) sometime before 1976 and, he claims, it increased again to about 150 MW(th). According to Vanunu, a new cooling unit was added to the reactor while he was still working at Dimona. There is independent evidence that the power output of the reactor was increased. If Vanunu's figures about the amount of plutonium produced at Dimona are right - and there is no reason to doubt them - the power output must have been increased by a factor of four or five.

How could this increase in power have been achieved without a significant increase in the physical size of the core and, therefore, in the size of the reactor building? The reactor could have been originally moderated with heavy water but cooled with a gas, probably carbon dioxide. This is likely, because at the time they were building Dimona the French were constructing gas-cooled, heavy-water moderated reactors. The power output of Dimona could have been considerably increased by adding a heavy-water pressure circuit to cool the reactor with heavy water rather than gas. Having a liquid coolant in contact with the fuel rods would allow a much greater output to be obtained using the same amount of uranium fuel.

The Israelis may also have obtained more power by changing the geometry of the fuel rods in the core of the reactor so that more uranium fuel could be packed into the same volume. The power could also have been increased by using slightly-enriched uranium fuel instead of natural uranium. A French reactor of similar design, for example, uses uranium enriched to about 1.5% in uranium-235. It is, however, unlikely that the Israelis switched to enriched fuel because of the difficulty in obtaining it. Nevertheless, Vanunu's claims that Dimona's power output has been significantly increased, appear to be correct.

Assuming that Dimona's power-output increase is correct, then a reasonable estimate of the total amount of plutonium produced by the facility before 1976 is 200 kilograms, and since 1985 a total of 300 kilograms. Adding to these amounts the 400 kilograms of plutonium that were produced between 1976 and 1985, these figures suggest that the Israelis have produced a total of about 900 kilograms during the 21-year lifetime of the Dimona reactor and the reprocessing plant.

Vanunu claims that the Israelis use about 4.5 kilograms of plutonium in a nuclear weapon. The Israelis may, therefore, have produced enough plutonium for about 200 nuclear-fission weapons.

Other Activities at Dimona

There is evidence, including that given by Vanunu, that the Israelis are producing lithium-6 at Dimona. Subsequently, tritium is produced by bombarding lithium-6 with neutrons in the reactor. Tritium is also produced at Dimona by removing it from heavy water, tritiated when bombarded with neutrons during use to moderate the reactor. Production of these materials is of great importance. Lithium-6 is compounded with deuterium to produce lithium-6 deuteride. With supplies of tritium and lithium-6 deuteride, Israel could produce boosted nuclear-fission weapons and/or thermonuclear weapons.

According to Vanunu, about 170 kilograms of lithium-6 were produced from 1984 to 1987, enough to produce about 220 kilograms of lithium-6 deuteride. This amount of lithium-6 deuteride could be used to produce about 35 typical thermonuclear weapons. But there is no evidence that Israel has produced thermonuclear weapons. Photographic evidence was obtained by Vanunu, however, that Israel produced shells of lithium-6 deuteride. Boosted nuclear-fission weapons could be produced either by feeding a mixture of tritium and deuteride into the center of the plutonium sphere in the core of a weapon, or by placing a lithium deuteride shell around the plutonium sphere.

Israel is thought to be enriching uranium, using gas centrifuges and laser-isotope separation (LIS) techniques. According to Vanunu, gas centrifuges have been used to enrich uranium since 1980. In 1981, the Israelis began using LIS techniques to enrich uranium and may have expanded the process to production scale in 1985. Whether highly enriched uranium is used in Israeli nuclear-fission weapons is not known.

Nuclear Delivery Systems

An Israeli nuclear weapon is likely to weigh between 200 and 400 kilograms. The American W70 nuclear warhead for the Lance surface-to-surface missile, for example, weighs about 200 kilograms. Israel operates about 650 combat aircraft (most of which could deliver nuclear weapons), including F-4Es, A-4s, and F-16s supplied by the United States, and the Kfir, indigenously designed and built. The F-16, for example, has a combat range of 1,500 kilometers carrying a weapon load of 6,000 kilograms.

Israel could also deliver nuclear weapons with its Jericho-2 surface-to-surface missiles. The Jericho-2 program is kept more secret than Israel's nuclear weapon program. The Jericho-2 has been tested up to ranges of 900 kilometers; it may have a maximum range of about 1,500 kilometers. It may have a payload of about 650 kilograms. Aerospace Daily reported on May 1, 1985 that Israel has deployed nuclear weapons on Jericho-2 missiles in the Negev desert since 1981. More than 100 Jericho-2s may have been produced.

Israel's Anti-Ballistic Missile and Space Programs

An issue that has relevance to Israel's nuclear policy is the development of the Arrow (Chetz) anti-tactical ballistic missile interceptor. The Arrow missile is 12 meters long, carrying a conventional warhead capable of intercepting incoming hostile missiles at ranges of up to 90 kilometers - enough to intercept missiles coming from distances of up to 1,000 kilometers. The plan was to begin deploying Arrow anti-ballistic missiles in 1995. But the program has been riddled with problems, with five out of six tests failing. In the meantime, Israel is deploying US Patriot missiles, which have limited anti-tactical ballistic missile capabilities. The total cost of the Arrow program is about $2 billion.

The Arrow missile program is a good example of US-Israeli weapon collaboration; the Americans are largely funding it. Because the missile is defined as "defensive" it is exempt from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), even though the United States is transferring advanced rocket technology to Israel.

Israel's space program continues. Israel has placed two satellites, Ofeq-1 and -2, into orbit aboard the Shavit space launch vehicle and plans to launch other satellites. The Ofeq-2 satellite weighed about 160 kilograms. Future Ofeq satellites, in low orbits (at an altitude of about 200 kilometers) and with resolutions of 25 centimeters or better, are likely to be ideal for collecting real-time intelligence data, early warning of attack, and targeting Israeli weapons, including missiles. The booster for the Shavit space-launch vehicle is based on the Jericho-2 ballistic missile. The Shavit could be converted into an intercontinental ballistic missile, able to carry a nuclear warhead over a range of more than 7,000 kilometers.

Should Israel's Nuclear Weapon Program be Capped?

The Dimona reactor has now been operating for more than 30 years and is likely near the end of its life. The current state of the reactor is not publicly known, although rumors appear from time to time of accidents, including fires, at Dimona. Because Dimona is approaching the end of its life, Israel may be amenable to the suggestion of the Clinton Administration that it should "cap" its nuclear program by shutting down Dimona and produce no more plutonium, as a unilateral commitment.

Israel has already produced far more plutonium than it needs for any rational purpose. An Israeli agreement to stop producing plutonium is seen as a step toward a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In return, the Arab states and Iran would allow the IAEA to make special inspections at suspect facilities. The Arab countries are not enthusiastic about this proposal. They are unwilling to give Israel - even as an interim measure - a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Israel is unwilling to have an open debate about its nuclear weapon program, let alone allowing safeguards inspections of Dimona. The capping proposal is also opposed by some Washington politicians on the grounds that the United States should tolerate the acquisition of small nuclear arsenals by countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan, but not larger ones.

After the Gulf War, President Bush - in a speech at the Air Force Academy in Colorado on May 29, 1991 - put forward the "Bush Initiative" on arms control in the Middle East. The proposals included: a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-usable material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium); a freeze on the acquisition, production, deployment, and testing of ballistic missiles; an end to the production and the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons; and "negotiations among major weapons-exporting countries to reduce the flow of arms to the region". The Arab countries, however, argue that no progress on arms control is possible until the nuclear weapon issue is settled. This, they insist, requires that Israel officially acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT, and sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, putting all its nuclear facilities - including those at Dimona - under international safeguards.

The Arab countries say that until Israel accedes to the NPT, they will not ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which was opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. As far as biological weapons are concerned, Egypt and Syria have signed - but not ratified - the 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on their Destruction, while Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have ratified it. This situation is unlikely to change until Israel joins the NPT. It should be noted that Iraq reportedly possessed anthrax and tularemia as biological warfare agents before the 1991 Gulf War, but it is not clear whether it had the means of delivering them.

Both Israel and the Arab countries support the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, originally put forward in 1974 by Iran, and supported by Egypt. But there is a fundamental difference in approach. Israel demands that a NWFZ should be negotiated; it also insists that a NWFZ can only be achieved when there is real and adequate peace in the region. The Arab countries, however, insist that to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East all the countries concerned must accede to the NPT. Since all the important Arab countries have already fully acceded to the Treaty - including the completion of Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA - the onus is now on Israel to do so. The Arab position does not require any negotiation between the Arab countries and Israel, since accession to the NPT can be done unilaterally.

In the meantime, some, like Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller⁽²⁾, suggest that Israel might agree to limit its nuclear capacity as a step toward a NWFZ in the Middle East and that the "Arab states and Iran should reinforce their declaratory commitment not to produce nuclear weapons by accepting the authority of the IAEA to make special inspections at both declared and suspected nuclear facilities". This proposal was incorporated into the Bush Initiative. The reactions of Israel and the Arab countries to the proposal were not favorable. The Arab countries are unwilling to accept - even as an interim measure - an Israeli monopoly on nuclear weapons. And Israel is unwilling to accept safeguards inspections of the Dimona nuclear center. Moreover, the Israeli leadership is unwilling to have an open debate about nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, Cohen and Miller⁽³⁾ suggest that Israel should "shut down the Dimona reactor - and hence cease its production of plutonium - as a unilateral undertaking, and to convey assurances about its nuclear doctrine in private discussions and through third parties, especially the United States". This idea may prove to be a realistic one; Israel may be persuaded to shut down Dimona soon because it is now more than 30 years old and likely near the end of its life. Moreover, as previously described, Israel has already produced far more plutonium than it needs for any rational purpose. But Israel is unlikely to go further than a cutoff in the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons until the peace process has succeeded and Israel is satisfied that the risks of further nuclear weapon proliferation in the Middle East have been minimized. Even then, the Israeli political leadership will have to counter those who argue that nuclear weapons are even more necessary to guarantee the security of a smaller Israel. Of all the world's nuclear weapons, Israel's will prove the most difficult to get rid of.

Notes

1. Barnaby, F., "The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East", London, I. B. Tauris, 1989.
2. Cohen, A., and Miller, M., "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp. 101-115.
3. Cohen, A., and Miller, M., "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation", in: Frankel, B., "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications", Frank Cass, London, 1991.