Counter Proliferation: A New US Strategy or Old Wine in New Bottles?

Gerard Berkhof

After the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957, it was clear that the superpowers were now capable of hitting each other's territory with nuclear weapons. Consequently, it also became clear that it was in the interest of both parties to prevent an unintended war, and stop the unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to address these concerns, several multilateral and bilateral treaties have since been negotiated. These treaties address a variety of important related issues. They

  • Forbid military activities in certain areas (Antarctica Treaty, 1959);
  • Forbid the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in specific regions or territories (on the moon and outer space bodies, 1967; in Latin America, 1967; on the seabed outside the 12-mile zone, 1971; in the southern Pacific Ocean, 1985);
  • Forbid biological weapons (Biological Weapons Convention,1972);
  • Reduce the probability of war ("Hot-Line" Conventions, 1963, 1971; Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear [weapon] Accidents, 1971; Agreements on the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the United States, 1972; Convention on the Prevention of Accidents at Sea, 1972 and revisions; and the Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1973);
  • Reduce the risks of test explosions (Prohibition on Nuclear Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space, and Under Water, 1963; Limitation of "Peaceful" Nuclear Explosions, 1967);
  • Restrict anti-missile weapons (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972; Anti-Ballistic Missile Protocol, 1974);
  • Restrict offensive nuclear weapons (Interim Stategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement, 1972; Agreement of Vladivostok, 1974; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] II, 1979; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, 1987; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START] I, 1991; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II, 1993);
  • Restrict chemical weapons (Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use of Chemical Weapons, 1925; Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993);
  • Restrict conventional weapons (Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty, 1990; Convention on the prohibition of "inhumane" weapons, 1981, to be extended in 1996).

In short, a plethora of treaties. It appears that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the negotiations of treaties have occurred in rapid succession. The "Peace Dividend" has vanished so quickly that today the Dutch military forces would be happy to have the ceilings allowed under the CFE Treaty. These treaties exemplify the saying that "in times of war quantitative arms control agreements are, at best, a useless practice, while in times of peace they are superfluous".

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the existence of the two Cold War military alliances - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - prevented the spread of nuclear weapons. In Western Europe, doubts raised shortly after the Sputnik launch regarding the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. The Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, feared that it would be destroyed twice: once during conventional warfare, and a second time during a nuclear counterattack. Technically, West Germany had been capable of producing nuclear weapons, but in 1954 it abandoned "production". At the end of 1957, then Minister of Defense Strauss and his Italian colleague Taviani communicated with French Minister Chaban-Delmas concerning the possibilities for a Western European nuclear option. Little is known about the course of these talks. Whatever their outcome, however, they never lead to a European nuclear force because French President Charles de Gaulle - who in 1958 was back in power - rejected the "German Option".

Likewise, the plans were viewed with suspicion by other European governments. Little enthusiasm existed for "a German finger on the nuclear trigger". The failure of these plans - in addition to reducing defense-related costs - motivated the Dutch government in December 1957 to back a US proposal to station nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, and to equip its military forces with the means to carry out nuclear tasks. Decisions as to the use of nuclear weapons, however, remained solely under US control.(1)

This, however, did not end discussion of the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. In the early Sixties, the United States proposed a complex plan for a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) to halt the further spread of national nuclear forces. The MLF was to have consisted of a fleet of twenty-five vessels - presumably, destroyers like the USS Claude V. Rickets - staffed with an international crew and equipped with eight Polaris missiles. Given that this did not resolve the question of who controlled the use of nuclear weapons - it would remain under US control - few Western European countries were enthusiastic. Infuriated over the lack of support, President John Kennedy remarked in 1963, "If the Europeans don't want it, then to hell with it."(2) Also, the head of the US Chiefs of Staff raised practical considerations against the plan. He said it went against his grain to command ships with "crews chattering away in languages incomprehensible to one another and [with] ships' stores stocked with everything from stout to ouzo".(3) In 1964, the plan was permanently discarded.

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), set up in 1966, has been more successful. The NPG meets twice a year and discusses nuclear weapons-related developments and problems. These discussions have been responsible, in large part, for no new national nuclear powers arising in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact - or rather, the demise of it - has had a similar effect. Romania - the only Warsaw Pact country to follow an independent course, with military forces not directly under Soviet command - was secretly developing a nuclear weapon. Upon Nicolae Ceaucescu's death, this program came to a halt.(4)

The Nuclear Legacy from the Soviet Union

Following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, four new nuclear powers came into being. In addition to the Russian Federation, these included Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. Both Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed, after much discussion, to dismantle their nuclear arsenals and ship them to Russia. Ukraine received $350 million to help cover the costs of its dismantling operations and a similar amount for economic aid. Upon signing the NPT in November 1994, Ukraine received another $200 million from the United States. Other countries received financial support as well. Kazakhstan, for instance, sold a large quantity of fissile material to the United States in 1994, and in October 1995 received a second, unknown amount for shutting down its nuclear testing grounds in Semipalatinsk.

None of this, however, alleviates fears that nuclear material - or even whole nuclear warheads - could be smuggled into countries that are secretly attempting to obtain nuclear weapons. The exodus of nuclear physicists from the former Soviet Union presents other grounds for concern. In short, despite all of the signed treaties, the situation has only become more complicated.

The Counter Proliferation Initiative

In 1993, US President Clinton launched the Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI) to counter the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC). The CPI is, in fact, the glue that holds together the work done by a variety of US federal departments. It is an overarching structure that provides a set of political, economic, technical, and financial instruments with which to address the current predicament. To this structure belong the previously mentioned aid programs, including one from 1993 that allows for the United States to purchase 500 tons of highly enriched uranium for $11.9 billion from the Russian Federation. Over the course of the twenty-year project, this fissile material will be readied for use in nuclear power plants.

Collaborative projects to keep Russian nuclear physicists employed have also been started with both the European Union (EU) and Japan. In the United States these projects are supervised by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Pentagon. The DOE, however, is also responsible for clean up activities needed in the US at nuclear weapon plants and other nuclear facilities, and $325 billion has been allocated for this over the next ten years. Cleaning up the nuclear mess in Russia will be a very dangerous job. In September 1995 a near disaster occurred, when the electrical supply to the cooling-water system of an out-of-service nuclear submarine was cut off due to insufficient funds to pay the bills.

The Department of State under Secretary of State Warren Christopher, with support from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), led the effort to bring new life to the NPT through an indefinite extension of the Treaty, and by strengthening inspections conducted by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Eventually, they succeeded in these efforts - in May 1995, in New York - but it had not been easy. The Treaty had been at risk of failing because various countries were using it for their own agendas. Egypt, for instance, strongly demanded that Israel accede to the Treaty, while other countries voiced concern over India's and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.

Many countries also insisted on commitments that a Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) be concluded quickly. (It is scheduled for 1996.) As a result of this pressure, both China and France restarted their nuclear testing programs shortly thereafter. A strong protest was raised against the French program carried out to test the TN-75 nuclear warhead, new safety systems, and computer-simulation techniques. And in China there was a demonstration led by Greenpeace, although Greenpeace activists were arrested within minutes.

Christopher had already played an important role earlier on, when North Korea threatened to leave the NPT after the IAEA said it wanted to inspect two reprocessing plants near Yongbyon. The IAEA suspected that North Korea was producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. In October 1994, with Christopher's assistance, an agreement was successfully negotiated: In exchange for closing down its nuclear facilities, North Korea will receive two nuclear power plants constructed by a Japanese-South Korean consortium. These plants will produce less weapon-grade fissile material than the North Korean model. Estimated costs of the settlement: $4 billion. Furthermore, until the reactors are completed, the United States will supply North Korea with approximately 500,000 tons of oil per year. Whether the agreement will hold is difficult to predict; the North Korean government has already raised concerns, saying that the South Korean share in the agreement is too large.

In addition to the activities just described, the US Pentagon is also engaged in other CPI-related projects. These have yet to prove their usefulness; they are in place in the event that diplomatic efforts fail and the United States must take action against a country that has - regardless of international safeguards - acquired NBC weapons. These activities are part of a larger program that includes anti-missile programs and the testing of agents and remedies to counter biological and chemical weapons. The latter focus was motivated by the Iraqi stockpiles of anthrax. Research is conducted into new types of gas masks and better vaccines; some of the current vaccines are related to the so-called veterans' disease.

There are also information-gathering activities through satellites and other means. With great accuracy, suspect regions are analyzed from the millions of pictures that are produced by defense satellites annually. The US National Security Agency was founded for this purpose, and employs tens of thousands of photo-analysts to assist in this work.

Even more spectacular are the anti-missile weapon systems, specifically those used against tactical missiles (Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles, ATBM). According to the Pentagon, these missiles are needed to dissuade countries that might covertly obtain NBC weapons and develop missiles for them. An ATBM missile system - the Arrow - is being developed in collaboration with Israel. Within the United States, great effort is also being given to the development of anti-missile weapon systems. Most of these projects are directed by the US Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). Under guidance from DARPA, the Army is developing the Theater High-Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS); the Navy is developing the successor to its super fast Standard Missile (SM-II); and the Air Force has again started work on its Airborne Laser Laboratory (NKC-135), developed to shoot down missiles from high altitudes.

In addition, the United States is directing some of its attention on Europe, seeking primarily to enhance its observational capacity. Along with NATO's Early Warning Force - equipped with 18 AWACS radar airplanes to observe air activity above enemy territory - the alliance disclosed its intentions to also commission airplanes to observe ground activities in communique 95(19), dated February 28, 1995. The first prospect would be the US Joint Stars (a Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, developed for use by all three US armed forces), which proved itself successful in the Iraqi war. Other candidates are the British Astor (still under development) and the French and Italian radar helicopters - the Horizon and the Creso. The latter, however, are less capable of observing over longer distances, meaning more equipment would be needed. Other countries, including the Netherlands, have advertised their ability to develop special sensors similar to radar systems.

Another communique, 95(20), relates to a defense system against missiles and aircraft, and has been named MEADS (Medium-Range Extended Air Defense System). An agreement regarding MEADS was signed on February 20 in Bonn between the United States, Germany, France, and Italy. By early next century the Hawk and the Patriot missiles will have become obsolete and will need to be replaced. MEADS is an interception missile with a range of approximately 100 kilometers that will be developed by a US-European consortium. The US companies involved - including Honeywell, Hughes, Loral, and Raytheon - have all worked on earlier versions of an anti-missile weapon system. European companies include Dasa and Siemens of Germany, Thomson and Aerospatiale of France, and Alenia of Italy. Preliminary cost estimates come to approximately $40 billion. The United States will supply half of this, Germany and France will contribute 20% each, and Italy will contribute the remaining 10%. As a matter of course, however, the project still needs to be approved by the parliaments of the participating nations.

All in all, the CPI is an extensive program to halt the proliferation of NBC weapons. Although priority is given to diplomatic and financial instruments, other measures are being developed - should diplomacy fail - as a kind of insurance in an uncertain world.

Notes

  1. Hansen, H., "De zes atoomtaken van Nederland", Amsterdam, 1982, p. 18.
  2. Neuman, H.J., "Nuclear Weapons: A Handbook for the Debate", London, 1989, p. 42.
  3. Barnet, R.J., "Massive Retaliation", Annapolis, 1964, p. 220.
  4. Spector, L.S., "Neo-Proliferation", Survival, Spring 1995, p. 69.

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