Notes on History and Meaning of the NPT

Piet de Klerk

I will begin this presentation with some brief, general remarks regarding the Dutch perspective on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and go on to discuss part of the negotiating history of the NPT. On the basis of three Treaty articles, I will then examine more closely specific problems concerning the system of safeguards and inspections (Art. III), disarmament (Art. VI), and the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Art. IV). In closing, I will present my perspective on the NPT Review and Extension Conference to be held in New York this year.

The Netherlands and the NPT Negotiating History

The Netherlands has always been a strong proponent of the NPT and is currently unwavering in its support for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The country's representatives - especially in the initial negotiating period - endeavored to make the Treaty a success. As a result of the active role played during the NPT negotiations, the Netherlands was rewarded with membership of the Conference on Disarmament (CD).⁽¹⁾

Beginning in 1958, Ireland, on several occasions, proposed resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. At the time, it was difficult to separate this problem from the wider issue of general and complete disarmament which was then dominating UN debates. In 1961, Sweden introduced a new resolution on the matter containing a controversial element. Rather than defining the problem as the expanding number of nations with an independent nuclear force, this new resolution identified the problem as the number of nations with nuclear weapons on their territory. The resolution was unacceptable to the Netherlands, given the important role nuclear weapons played within NATO policy.

From a non-proliferation perspective, some held that it was irrelevant where these weapons were stationed as long as they remained under the control of the known nuclear weapon states, and in particular the United States. Sweden had a different perspective which was shared, by and large, with the Soviet Union. For a long time the Soviet Union used Sweden's dissension as leverage to prevent or reverse the stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly in Germany. During this period NATO was stationing nuclear weapons in Europe to balance the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The Dutch perspective was clearly influenced by the fact that the Netherlands was sheltered beneath the US nuclear umbrella. While there is nothing wrong with this, it does help explain why states sometimes have different perspectives on the NPT. In fact, the use of the US nuclear umbrella was sound non-proliferation policy. If there ever were early plans for developing nuclear weapons in NATO-Europe, they were no doubt discouraged by the US security guarantee in the Treaty of Washington (NATO Treaty, 1949). Also with respect to the future, I consider this guarantee important from a non-proliferation perspective, even though the nuclear threat from those we now call our cooperation partners in Eastern Europe has been greatly reduced.

In 1965, non-proliferation became the dominant agenda item at the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC).⁽²⁾ The stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe, as said earlier, still remained the divisive issue between East and West. The Soviet Union took a tough stance and demanded that no German finger be allowed on a nuclear trigger. This was remarkable since the Federal Republic of Germany had already, in 1954, categorically abandoned the development and possession of ABC weapons on its territory as part of its entry into the Western security community (NATO and WEU).

In those early years the non-aligned nations were already playing an important role in the ENDC. Joining the five Western and five Eastern countries, the eight non-aligned nations stressed the link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and in particular the need for a ban on nuclear testing. In 1966, when negotiations appeared to come to an end, US President Johnson initiated bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, which resulted in what later became Article I of the Treaty.

The System of Safeguards and Inspections (Article III)

The system of inspections was a hotly debated issue. The Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate, provided that it remained outside of any safeguards system and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted all inspections. The latter condition posed a problem for some Western European countries, which argued for EURATOM to conduct the inspections. Others, however, saw this as an unacceptable form of self-inspection. The Netherlands always sympathized with this criticism. At internal European Community discussions, the Netherlands argued - often with its Benelux partners and against Germany and Italy - in favor of a strong IAEA role.

Verification was the thorniest issue. When, on August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union introduced nearly identical proposals for the text of Article III, the issue of safeguards was still sketchy. In November of that year, the United States introduced a compromise text, which the Soviet Union agreed to in early 1968.

Before 1967, US proposals had been discussed extensively with the five non-nuclear weapon states of the European Community, although these countries had difficulty reaching agreement among themselves. Important outstanding issues raised by some countries were the following:

• whether or not the system of safeguards should apply only to nuclear materials or to facilities as well;
• whether or not the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that were party to the Treaty would individually negotiate their own safeguards agreements with the IAEA allowing them to take into account their obligations under EURATOM;
• whether there was sufficient time available to negotiate these agreements; negotiations had to start within 180 days after the Treaty took force and finish within 18 months after the beginning of the negotiations.

The basis for these disagreements was the fear that the nuclear industry in Germany and other industrialized NNWS would be open to discrimination. Concern existed about both the risk of commercial disadvantage for countries undergoing inspections, and the danger of espionage by IAEA inspectors. Looking back, we can conclude that these fears, however understandable at the time, are no longer valid. Espionage by inspectors has never occurred, and commercial disadvantages resulting from the safeguards system have proven to be marginal.

From the present perspective, safeguards serve as an advantage rather than a risk to the nuclear industry. I sometimes think that the Soviet, now Russian, civil nuclear industry would have appreciated being forced to set up a nuclear accounting and control system under permanent international scrutiny. This would have increased the accuracy of their accounting. As for the nuclear industry in the West, we are faced with the curious situation where the nuclear industry sometimes provides more information to the public, environmental activists and others, than it does to international inspectors.

But the fact remains that due to compromises in both the Treaty text and the accompanying safeguards agreements (named after the 1971 model agreement Information Circular 153 and commonly referred to as the INFCIRC/153 agreements), the safeguards system is weaker than one would have hoped for. IAEA inspectors have the narrowly defined task of inspecting only civil nuclear material with regard to its possible diversion for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Inspections are only permitted at so-called strategic points in nuclear installations. And although all safeguards agreements contain a paragraph allowing special inspections beyond strategic points in declared nuclear facilities or directed at undeclared facilities, this last option has never been exercised. We saw the results of this in Iraq. If the IAEA inspectors had been allowed to roam freely through Tuwaitha, the Iraqi nuclear research center, they would have found indications of all the types of nuclear activities that were discovered the year following the Gulf War.

Presently, the IAEA is trying to strengthen its safeguards system - and I am proud to be a part of that effort - but it is an uphill battle. Little enthusiasm exists to change INFCIRC/153 and the individual safeguards agreements that are based upon it. Moreover, there is the question of finance and the related discussion of how the IAEA allocates resources for inspection and promotional activities. Finally, larger inspection tasks loom in the background for the IAEA, such as the verification of a cutoff agreement regarding a ban on the production of fissile materials.

Nuclear Disarmament (Article VI)

As said earlier, the non-aligned countries within the ENDC emphasized the relationship between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In this respect it is relevant to note that both the US and Soviet drafts of August 24, 1967 did not contain an article related to nuclear disarmament. Thus, it was not surprising that both these drafts were criticized. India took the position that a good non-proliferation treaty should contain a prohibition on the production of nuclear weapons for all states, including the NWS, and that the treaty should contain a binding agreement on nuclear disarmament. Other countries did not agree with the Indian position. Canada, for example, stated: "We should not argue that if five people are stricken with smallpox, no measures of guarantee or vaccination should be applied to the rest of the population until the first afflicted were cured."

The Indian perspective is of fundamental difference from the Canadian one. In discussing this difference, I would like to distinguish two aspects. The first is one's view on nuclear weapons as such. The second perspective is to what extent it would be actually feasible to make nuclear disarmament arrangements in a multilateral treaty like the NPT, instead of, for example, in a bilateral treaty between the main nuclear antagonists. In my opinion this feasibility is limited.

The US took the criticism at heart to a certain extent. In their draft of January 18, 1968 an article was included in which the nuclear weapon states promised to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. This subsequently became the formulation of Article VI of the NPT when it was opened for signature on July 1, 1968.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Article IV)

I do not want to dwell on all the Articles of the Treaty, but I would like to say a few words about Article IV, which covers the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It should be kept in mind that as negotiations were taking place, nuclear energy was rapidly getting off the ground. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program of 1953, the founding of the IAEA in 1957, and the hosting of large conferences on peaceful nuclear energy in Geneva in the late Fifties, all gave a boost to the construction of nuclear power plants and, to a lesser extent, to fuel-cycle facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants. In the wake of these developments, the August 1967 proposed treaty text contained an Article stating that nothing would affect the inalienable right of all parties to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination.

Contemporary perspectives regarding this area have changed considerably. The optimism of the Sixties is gone. In Europe and the United States growth of nuclear power remains stationary. Nuclear energy production is increasing only in East Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China among others), alongside the rapidly expanding economies of East Asian countries.

The stagnation of the development of nuclear energy in the West, and the realization that only certain developing countries can absorb nuclear assistance in a sensible manner, have had repercussions on how the West assists the developing world. The frustration of those who would like more nuclear assistance than they are getting - in particular through the small-scale IAEA Technological Cooperation Fund - is understandable, but I am afraid the shortage is a fact of life. The Netherlands, for example, pays its fair share to this Fund. Extra contributions that come from the Dutch development cooperation budget, however, do not have a high priority, even though certain nuclear techniques are quite valuable in medicine and agriculture.

For the Netherlands, Article IV is of special importance in the upcoming NPT Extension Conference because the Committee drafting the text of the final document will be under Dutch chairmanship.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

Every five years the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is reviewed, as dictated under Article VIII.3, which stems from a Swedish suggestion made in February 1968. All previous Review Conferences have been held in Geneva and to date have yielded mixed results. In 1975 and in 1985, the parties agreed on a final document. In 1980 and 1990, they failed to reach agreement on a final text due to disagreements related to nuclear disarmament, and in particular to a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear testing.

This year, not only a Review Conference but also an Extension Conference will take place, as stipulated under Article X. The Extension Conference must decide "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties." I quote this article because I want everybody to be clear about what has to be done.

Also, during the upcoming Review and Extension Conference in New York, the main yardstick for assessing the operation of the Treaty will be the progress made on the issue of nuclear disarmament. I want to stress the enormous headway that has been made in nuclear arms control over the last ten years. In 1987, the INF Treaty was signed, and in 1991 the START Treaty, which only recently came into force due to difficulties arising out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine in particular tried to gain some leverage for itself by holding on to the strategic nuclear weapons which were on its territory. The way the Clinton administration has handled this issue is, in my view, one of its greatest achievements in foreign policy.

I also want to stress the importance of the unilateral measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons that President Bush announced within a month after the Moscow coup of August 1991: all nuclear artillery and all short- range missiles on land were withdrawn, as were all tactical weapons from ships and submarines. President Gorbachev reciprocated with a comparable package. Some time later, just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, President Bush announced important further unilateral measures regarding strategic nuclear weapons, including halting the development of the Midgetman ICBM. START II, signed in January 1993, would reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons to between 3,000 and 3,500, but this bilateral Treaty has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma.

In 1993, President Clinton attempted to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. With support from many countries in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, this initiative resulted in a rolling text, and the expectation is that negotiations can be concluded, with a little bit of luck, in 1996. The CD has also started preparatory work on a multilateral "Cutoff Treaty", an agreement to end production of all fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

Looking back on the past five years, it is my conclusion that the nuclear weapon nations - in particular the United States, the Russian Federation, and previously, the Soviet Union - have certainly negotiated nuclear arms control measures in good faith and with impressive results. As a result of START I and START II, the numbers of nuclear weapons have dropped below 1968 levels. Of course, further reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals must be discussed. But, for the time being, the implementation of START I and the entry into force of START II, along with the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, remain the central issues.

This positive assessment of the past five years does not automatically settle the outstanding issue of an extension of the Treaty. Whereas Europe (East and West, as well as the Russian Federation), the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, etc. are all in favor of an indefinite and unconditional extension, a considerable number of non-aligned nations are in favor of a limited and conditional extension (or extensions). They see this as a way to gain greater leverage in the nuclear disarmament process.

I would argue, however, that the history of the NPT does not support such a proposition. By limiting the extension of the Treaty the non-proliferation regime, including new measures like a CTBT, is put at risk in a way that is in nobody's interest. By now nearly all countries have concluded that the Treaty is in their interest. The number of parties to the Treaty has increased slowly over the years and now exceeds 170, while the most important disbelievers can be counted on the fingers of one or two hands.

Notes:

1. From 1969 to 1978 the CD was called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).
2. The ENDC was replaced by the CCD in 1969.