The political and legal responsibility for the implementation of final disposal lies with the Federal Government in Germany and given its ostensible commitment to a nuclear phase-out policy, this article considers the hazardous, controversial and costly business of waste disposal and the preparations being made to address the issue.
(603.5576) Helmut Hirsh - Following a proposal from the state of Lower Saxony, the government in 1977 selected Gorleben as the site for final disposal of all types of radioactive waste, including high-level waste. It was planned that the repository would be ready to receive the first waste containers before the year 2000.
The salt dome at Gorleben was to act as host formation for the waste; however, the high quality of the salt was not the reason the site was selected. Political considerations were more influential and the site was chosen for the following reasons:
- It is situated in a poor agricultural region with high unemployment so it was assumed that residents would welcome any industrial enterprise, even nuclear waste.
- The surrounding region has low population density thus no vigorous local resistance could be expected.
- Furthermore, Gorleben lies in a region then close to the border of the GDR. Many of the people endangered by the repository lived on the other side of this border and could not take part in protests or file objections against the plans, for obvious reasons.
To date, no waste has been sent into the Gorleben salt dome, site investigation has not officially been completed and the licensing procedure has yet to begin. It would appear that despite the best-made plans, the site selection is not a dead cert. The people in the region continue to resist the plans to this day and neither the pro-nuclear politicians nor the nuclear industry support the proposals.
In addition to delays caused by regional resistance, there are sound scientific reasons to abandon the site:
- The layers of clay covering the salt dome have gaps, permitting free circulation of ground water above the dome.
- The salt dome actually has contact with ground water; salt has been dissolved in the recent geologic past.
- A repository in the Gorleben salt dome would not be protected by multiple barriers, as is generally required in nuclear technology.
Since 2000, there has been a moratorium on further work (suspended for 3-10 years) on the Gorleben salt dome but this could soon be lifted, or alternatively remain until 2010. (See WISE News Communique 532.5186 "Germany: Government and utilities reach agreement on phase-out") The German Federal Government plans to have a repository for high-activity waste ready by 2030 - in about 27 years. The original 1977 plan was to have a repository within 22 years, which means that the goal is actually 5 years further away now than it was thought to be in 1977 - this could be called 'negative progress'.
The Gorleben situation is similar, although more complicated from a juridical point of view, to the Konrad repository project intended for non-heat-producing wastes; low-level and some intermediate-level wastes, including waste from dismantling of nuclear power plants. Despite years of delays and persistent open questions regarding long-term safety, in 2002 the Konrad repository was licensed but as yet no waste can be disposed of there. The license is not immediately executable (in contrast to the usual practice for nuclear projects), and legal proceedings have been instituted against the repository by neighboring municipalities. Konrad is not permitted to go into operation until those proceedings are concluded, which could take several years.
The so-called German 'nuclear phase-out' is in fact a lengthy process that allows for the gradual shut down of plants that have more or less operated for their planned commercial lifetime anyway. The Stade NPP, shut down in late 2003, closed for economic reasons alone and between now and 2010, only a couple of NPPs will be shut down. Furthermore, immediate dismantling of a decommissioned NPP is not the safest strategy - allowing decay time of several decades can significantly reduce risk and radiation exposure associated with dismantling.
Hesitant Approach
The red/green coalition government came into power in Germany in 1998 and by the following year, the Federal Minister for the Environment, Trittin, had established an expert commission (AkEnd, 'Arbeitskreis Auswahlverfahren Endlagerstandorte') with the task of developing site selection procedure for a nuclear waste repository. The commission submitted its final report in December 2002 and proposals included:
- A stepwise procedure to select, starting with the whole area of Germany, several potential site regions to begin with, subsequently narrowing the choice to select at least two sites for in-depth investigation.
- Geologic criteria to be applied during the site selection process.
- A procedure for public participation, to give all people concerned a say in the selection process.
- Criteria incorporating social and regional planning aspects to be taken into account in the process.
- A timetable for further procedure. In particular, public discussion and, possibly, revision of the AkEnd proposal according to the outcome of this discussion was to follow in the years 2003 and 2004 ('Phase II').
As a basic condition for the work of AkEnd, Trittin had postulated that only one repository for all waste categories was to be built in the end - meaning that Konrad would be excluded because the site is unsuitable for high-level waste. This stipulation was severely challenged by the majority of AkEnd members on scientific grounds and recently, the Federal Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof) also criticized the "one-repository-concept", for financial reasons.
The work of AkEnd certainly constitutes a step in the right direction, in spite of its shortcomings (for example, alternatives to waste disposal in geologic formations were not considered; retrievability of waste not taken into account; social and planning criteria are not binding). However, despite having a plan, there has been no further progress since the end of 2002. Phase II (broad public discussion) should be halfway complete by now yet has not even begun and is unlikely to begin in the near future.
Both industry and the political opposition are against the AkEnd proposal with the red/green government apparently hesitant and irresolute in efforts to implement it.
Future Deadlock?
The present situation in Germany can be characterized as deadlocked. The nuclear industry and the opposition parties insist that the Gorleben moratorium be lifted and that the site investigation be concluded as swiftly as possible. They claim that the site will very likely be found suitable despite its problems, therefore should be used so as not to waste the 1.3 billion Euro (US$ 1.6 billion) spent so far. They also demand that the Konrad repository go into operation as soon as possible and believe that nuclear plant operators should not be forced to pay for the procedure as proposed by AkEnd. The Federal Government, on the other hand, wishes to implement the AkEnd proposal but are inconsistent in their endeavor.
The central, most important idea of the AkEnd procedure is to start site selection from zero, without prejudice, from a so-called 'white map' of Germany. However, the government does not want to give up the sites of Gorleben and Konrad (the existing moratorium applies only to Gorleben whereas Konrad was licensed in 2002). The result is a half-baked mixture of a new approach with old mistakes, a policy that is self-contradicting.
It is not really surprising that the government could not assert itself and win over opposition and industry to their standpoint, since it seems unsure of what it wants.
At present, the Federal Ministry for the Environment is considering new structures and a new division of responsibilities for the implementation of final disposal projects. The favored model appears to be the founding of a corporation to perform the task on behalf of the federal authorities (indirect federal administration, "mittelbare Bundesverwaltung") as opposed to the present construction of direct federal responsibility. The members of the corporation would be all major producers of nuclear waste, i.e. the nuclear power plant operators. The obvious shortcoming of this model being that if implemented, the NPP operators would be responsible for executing the new approach, with the AkEnd procedure for new site selection, they actually despise. Thus, it would be a classical case "to give the goat the gardener's job", to quote a well-known German idiomatic expression.
Costs of Disposal and Decommissioning
As in the other EU countries, German NPP operators had to establish reserve funds for the expected costs of waste management and disposal, as well as decommissioning.
The sources differ slightly concerning the exact volume of those funds. However, it is clear that at present, the overall amount lies in the vicinity of 35 billion Euro (US$ 44 billion). The shares of waste management and disposal on the one hand, decommissioning on the other are roughly 55 %: 45 %. A company like Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE) has funds of about 10-11 billion Euro (US$ 12-13 billion), a very sizeable amount, in the order of 10 % of the overall balance sheet of the RWE company group.
The German funds also appear large compared to the funds in other countries. Alone, they constitute about 50 % of all such funds in the European Union (15 old members). The funds in France, where there are over three times as many NPPs operating as in Germany, are only about a third of the German funds.
The reason the coffers are well filled in Germany is not that the German NPP operators are particularly conscientious. From their point of view, the money can be put to better use and the situation as it is in Germany permits each company to use its own funds as it sees fit meaning that it is free to invest the money, take over other firms etc. The profit thus gained increases the company profit and power and allows it an unfair advantage over the market. The most severe problem associated with this model is that it remains questionable whether the funds will really be available when needed since they might at that time be locked in investments.
An obvious alternative solution would be to have the disposal and decommissioning reserves in funds under public control, rather than within the clutches of the NPP operators. So far, however, the red/green coalition government has shown no willingness to pursue such an alternative. On the contrary, the German government, fearing that German utilities would otherwise withdraw from the 'nuclear phase-out' agreement opposed even the very cautious reforms proposed recently by the European Commission.
Source and contact:
Dr. Helmut Hirsh, Scientific Consultant
Tilsiter Str. 41, D-30657 Hannover, Germany
Email: cervus@onlinehome.de
GERMAN ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The internal report of the Bundesrechnungshof (Accounting Office) on the costs of German waste policy concluded that the "one-repository-concept" could cost as much as 10 billion Euro (US$12.4 billion). The moratorium on research at Gorleben and the exclusion of Konrad resulted in Environment Minister Trittin choosing to build one single repository for all waste categories. The search for a new single site will lead to the following costs:
- compensation to utilities that financed excavation and conversion works at Gorleben and Konrad: 1.5 - 3.2 billion Euro (US$ 1.9-4 billion);
- transport and interim storage of low/medium level waste in absent of Konrad: 1.9 billion Euro (US$ 2.4 billion);
- search for a new single repository: 6.8 billion Euro (US$ 8.4 billion) Minister Trittin has denied responsibility for the extra costs and accused the Accounting Office of meddling in politics. Trittin stated previously that one single repository has lower operational costs than two separate sites.
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |