The heads of state of the seven richest countries (the G-7), at their Munich
Summit in 1992, decided to offer the CEE and NIS countries a multilateral program for financing
nuclear safety improvements. In 1993, the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) was set up with the already
existing European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) acting as its secretariat. The
purpose of the NSA is to ensure short-term operational and safety improvements of VVER 440/230 and
RBMK-type reactors, which would lead to their closure according to agreed timetables. The NSA
grants were not supposed to be used to extend the operating lifetime of these reactors.
Up till now, all the available ECU 257 million has been committed for projects in Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia but none of the grants lent through the NSA has led to substantial
safety improvements nor resulted in closure of a single high-risk reactor in CEE and CIS. Instead
the NSA has contributed to upgrading and expanding the lifetime of those reactors. The operation of
the NSA has proved to be highly non-transparent with insufficient implementation monitoring and
control. Due to its narrow focus, the NSA has failed to ensure actual plant decommissioning. The
conditionalities included in NSA agreements are insufficient in their scope and force, and a number
of recipient governments failed to comply with the original agreements. All grants have failed to
ensure clear closure dates for the reactors.
The NSA has insufficient resources to guarantee closure of the reactors and there is no clear
mechanism for estimation of the needed cost of improvements. The grants have helped to extend the
operating lifetime of those unsafe reactors. It is clear that a number of Western nuclear companies
have benefited from NSA contract work, and have an interest in ensuring future markets for their
services.
The European Union is one of the large contributors of the NSA. EU and its member states payed
about 75% of the financial contributions (ECU 260 million) sofar.
Complete failure of NSA; the Kozloduy example
The Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria contains six reactors:
- 1-4 are VVER 440/230s (first-generation VVERs)
- 4/5 are VVER 1000/320s (third-generation VVERs)
All of them have been a source of concern, not only in Bulgaria itself but also in the Western
European countries. In 1991 a research team with Western experts was for the first time allowed to
make a full safety analysis of the first four reactors. In June 1991 the IAEA released its
findings: the reactors were highly unsafe, the reactor vessels were embrittled.
Reactors 1 and 2 were closed immediately and the European Union committed 18 million ECU for
short-term safety upgrades of the units 3 and 4 (using material from the closed German Greifswald
reactors). Meanwhile, the staff of units 1 and 2 were trained in Western safety standards and
philosophy. At the beginning of 1993, unit 2 was started again and unit 1 followed in late December
1993 but was closed again in January 1995 for repairs.
In June 1993, the Bulgarian government signed the NSA agreement with the EBRD for ECU 24 million,
a grant for (again) short-term safety improvements for units 1-4 under the condition of closing
units 1 and 2 by the end of 1997 and units 3 and 4 by the end of 1998. Another part of the deal was
the promise of the West to partly finance the building of four hydropower stations, replacement
capacity for the closed units. These power stations would be ready and grid connected at the end of
1998.
The Bulgarian government had its own viewpoint and invited Bulgarian and Russian nuclear experts
to make a new safety analysis. They concluded that nothing was wrong and in October 1995 unit 1 was
started again.
2 The Bulgarians thanked the EU for its help (grants!) up
till that moment and declare that the government was "considering" lifetime extension of the
reactor units 1-4.
Although outraged by the Bulgarian decision, the EU did not have the means or the political will
and power to change the situation. In October 1997 the Bulgarian government officially adopted a
memorandum which opposed the NSA requirement of early closure of the Kozloduy reactors and
furthermore states that units 1-2 should continue operation until 2005 and units 3-4 until
2011.
3 The National Electric Company already has prepared a new program
for their upgrading.
But because the EU failed to ensure a clear decision policy on closure dates, it was easy and very
predictable for Bulgaria to delay the closure of units 1-4. The NSA agreement with Bulgaria has led
only to limited safety improvements at the Kozloduy nuclear power plants. These limited safety
improvements are used now by the Bulgarian government and energy authorities to claim substantial
improvements: "These units are now completely different". The EBRD is now claiming there is `no
chance' Bulgaria would get more NSA grants for further upgrading units 1-4.
4 But the NSA has not led to the early closure of the four high risk reactors;
instead it was used to extend their lifetime. And that was exactly what it was not suppose to
do.
Currently, the EC is considering Euratom loans for the upgrading of units 5-6. This is another
example of a lack of consistent policy: talking of loans, while the Bulgarian government doesn't
meet the agreements on closure of units 1-4.
The Mochovce-Bohunice example
From 1984 until 1991 the Mochovce project (two VVER 440/213 units) was jointly managed by the
Russian designer and the Czechoslovak principal contractor Skoda. In 1991 the project was abandoned
due to lack of funds.
In 1994, however, the Meciar government decided to restart the project with Western partners, EdF
as the project manager and the EBRD as the lead financier. Although the Meciar government promised
to close the two Bohunice units (ranked by the US Department of Energy in the early 1990s as one of
the six most dangerous nuclear reactors in Europe) when the Mochovce reactors would go on-line,
still even within the EBRD the following countries voted against the project: Austria, Norway,
Luxembourg, Greece, Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey. Also the European Parliament voted
in large majority to halt the project until safety issues could be resolved. More than 200
non-governmental units (NGOs) from all over the world called for a complete halt. Due to this
pressure some of the main players were forced out, among them the EBRD.
5
But Siemens stayed involved in the discussion by lobbying for and accepting a US$200-million
upgrade program of Bohunice (guaranteed by state-owned German banks). This is important to stress
because all of the Western lenders required the closure of Bohunice as one of the conditions for
completion of Mochovce. The Slovak government many times claimed the Bohunice plant would be closed
in 2000. If so, the Bohunice upgrades, scheduled to be complete in 1999, did not make any sense.
And, of course, this is what is used now by the Slovaks. The situation has changed and Mikus,
general director of the state-owned Slovenské Elektrárne, stated that "no reactor
will be closed if demand for power continues to rise"
6. The Bohunice
reactors provide 45% of Slovakia's electricity.
In 1996 the Slovak government restarted the Mochovce project with the Czech Skoda as the main
contractor and with the EdF and Siemens building the Instrumentation and Control Systems, among
other things.
Early this June, the first Mochovce unit began test runs, and is expected to go on line later this
year. The second unit is expected to be finished in late 1999. Austria was outraged by the decision
of its neighboring country to start the reactor and called the move `highly irresponsible'
7.
Slovakia's determination to continue with its plans for Mochovce has prompted also criticism from
the European Parliament. On May 14, MEP's voted in plenary session to call on the Slovak Government
to postpone the start up of the Mochovce plant untill any safety problems that might be identified
by the independent international panel of experts had been resolved. They expressed their
dissatisfaction at steps taken to date by the Slovak authorities to tackle the problem of nuclear
waste storage and stressed that these authorities would be required to comply with Community
standards before Slovakia was allowed to become part of the EU. The Parliament has warned that
Slovakia's bid to join the EU, which is already shrouded in question marks as a result of
Slovakia's democratic deficit, may be further jeopardised unless the Government in Bratislava
rethinks its policies.
8
Sources
- Contributions to the Nuclear Safety Account; EBRD, 31
December 1997.
- Reuters; 11 October 1995.
- WISE News Communique 481 Bulgaria
should comply with NSA agreement, 21 November 1997.
- Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1998, p. 7.
- WISE News Communique 462, 29
November 1996.
- Environment News Service, June 5, 1998.
- Reuters, 8 June 1998.
- Europe Energy, No. 515, Europe Information Service, 5 June
1998.