(489.4852) LAKA Foundation Until January, 1998, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) denied that more than a few dozen veterans were exposed to Depleted Uranium (DU) during Operation Desert Storm. On January 8, 1998, DoD made the acknowledgment that exposures to chemically toxic and radioactive DU were widespread during the Gulf War. However, the US DoD and the UK Ministry of Defense have now fallen back to their next standard line of defense: 'no one is sick from their exposure to depleted uranium'. The current positions of the US DoD and the UK Ministry of Defense with respect to DU exposures can be summed up as 'They climbed on contaminated equipment, but they didn't inhale.'
Apparently this renewed official view have been adopted by all authorities concerned with DU
contamination. Let's take for example the El Al plane crash in the Amsterdam south-east, the
Netherlands on 4 October 1992.
On 12 October 1993 Laka foundation make publicly known the presence of DU counterweights in the
crashed El Al cargo- Boeing 747. The same day the radiation expert dr. A.S. Keverling Buisman from
the Dutch Energy Research Center (ECN) let known in a press release that the DU counterweights were
unimpaired. As a result of this he comes to the conclusion that there is not any harm for the
public health. Based on his findings the Dutch government hasn't taken any action until today. Last
September, when Laka confronts the radiation expert with the experimental results from a US weapon
laboratory he admits that the missing DU (227 kilogram) could be burnt totally. But he immediately
adds: "There was not a single danger for the public health."
Just as the new approach of the DoD, a very curious statement. Very difficult to proof without
doing any health research.
Moreover, many documents from the US Army and the NATO stress the serious risks of DU exposures on
the battlefield and fires where DU is involved.
The first major study to assess the health and environmental impacts of DU munitions was the April, 1974 report, Medical and Environmmental Evaluation of DU (USA). This report was completed by a group of Army, Navy and Air Force officers. The report stated: "In combat situations involving the widespread use of DU munitions, the potential for inhalation, ingestion, or implantation of DU compounds may be locally significant." It wisely noted that "adherence to safety procedures and use of protective clothing minimize the potential for human exposure" to DU. However, until today the exisisting safety procedures to accompany the use of DU munitions have not been instituted.
By July, 1990, both the effectiveness and the hazards of DU penetrators were well documented by the US Army. On July 24, 1990 - nine days before Iraq invaded Kuwait - the US Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCOMM) released a comprehensive report comparing DU and tungsten kinetic energy penetrators. Attached as Appendix D of this report was the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) report, 'Kinetic Energy Penetrator Environmental and Health Considerations. The report warned: "Aerosol DU exposures to soldiers on the battlefield could be significant with potential radiological and toxicological effects. It further noted: "Under combat conditions, the most exposed individuals are probably the ground troops that re-enter a battlefield following the exchange of armor-piercing munitions, either on foot or on motorized vehicles."
Areas containing DU or other radioactive hazards are sometimes referred to as Low-Level
Radiation (LLR) hazard areas. The US Army Field Manual 3-14, 'Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) Vulnerability Analysis'(July 1996), states: "Appropiate staff officers, including the
chemical and medical officers, must advise the commander prior to operations in LLR hazard areas.
Commanders must be cognizant of the serious long-term health effects involved with LLR exposure.
Units that do not possess the appropriate equipment, personnel, and training should not conduct
missions that involve operations in LLR environments."
These dictates are echoed in Allied Command Europe (ACE) directive 80-63, 'ACE Policy for
Defensive Measures against Low Level Radiological Hazards during Military Operations' (August
1996). It notes that "formations that do not possess the appropriate equipment, personnel and
training as described in this document and other relevant NATO standards shall not be be used in
radiation hazard areas."
Since 1991, Gulf War veterans have stated that they were never informed about the use of DU
penetrators, the potential for the presence of DU contamination on destroyed equipment, or safety
procedures which should be followed in a DU- contaminated area. In the meantime DoD has still not
implemented a DU training program completed in 1995. The expanded use of DU ammunition in the US
arsenal combined with the international proliferation of DU penetrators highlights the urgent need
for immediate DU training. Not only for all US GI's, but also for all military personnel in joint
NATO operations.
Two independent surveys of more than 10,000 Gulf War veterans indicates that approximately 3 out
of 4 veterans came in contact with captured Iraqi vehicles. Based on the number of military
personnel in the Gulf War Theater, it is possible that at least 400,000 US troops came in contact
with contaminated equipment.
Although there is still no hard evidence about the medical consequences when people are exposed to
DU dust particles, the scientific data from experiments with lab animals show alarming results. The
chronical illnesses vary from serious kidney ailments to induction of tumors and mutations. Many
Gulf War veterans and their families are currently exhibiting symptoms of DU poisoning, including
kidney and liver problems, immune system disfunctioning, and reproductive problems. The long-term
health effects of DU, including cancers, may not have fully manifested in exposed veterans and
civilians at this time.
Since Operation Desert Storm, the populations of Kuwait and Iraq have experienced health
problems similar to those affecting American and coalition Gulf War veterans, civilian contractors,
and their families. Possible causes of these health problems include exposure to chemical warfare
agents, oil well fire smoke and pollution, and DU. In Iraq, the health situation is further
complicated by widespread disease and malnutrition resulting from Saddam Hussein's despotic rule
and the UN sanctions imposed in August 1990.
A 1994 survey of 317 Iraqi doctors by the Iraqi Society for Environmental Protection and
Improvement found higher rates of infertility, birth defects, leukemia, arthritis, asthma,
bronchitis, lung cancer, hearing loss, tumors, and blood disorders among the Iraqi population.
The adverse effects of DU on local populations was actually predicted in the previously mentioned
SAIC-report (July 1990): "Following combat, however, the condition of the battlefield, and the
long-term health risks to natives and combat veterans may become issues in the acceptability of the
continued use of DU kinetic energy penetrators."
On January 28, 1998, the Iraqi health ministry reported a rise in leukemia rates in the Muthanna province bordering Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Between 1989 and 1995, the leukemia rate reportedly rose from 3.8% of the population to 10.6%. Iraqi sources have also stated that increased rates of acute lympoblastic and non-lymphoblastic leukemia have been seen in Iraqi children during the post-war period. Health care services for the sick and dying in post-war Iraq are crippled because of severe shortage of medicines, medical instruments and related equipment.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (ECOSOC, 24 June 1997) condemned the use of 'conventional' DU weaponry as an agent of mass destruction: "Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weaponry and weaponry containing DU are all fundamentally indiscriminate and uncontainable, have severe residual effects long after the war is over, cause undue suffering and harm the environment. For example, DU may cause deaths and serious illnesses, disabilities and birth defects long after its war-time use in weapons. It remains in the soil, water supply and atmosphere for generations, rendering water supplies and agricultural land unusable."
'Case Narrative' is a 'must' for everyone who wants to be informed about the use and risks of DU weaponry. The only disappointing remark on this comprehensive overview which could be made is the lack of monitoring the debates inside the UN Commission for Human Rights on the military use of DU.
'Case Narrative - Depleted Uranium Exposures'
a report by:
Swords to Plowshares, National Gulf War Resource Center and Military Toxics Project.
Author: Dan Fahey. Published on March 2, 1998. 235 pages.
Contact: Dan Fahey at Swords to Plowshares, 1063 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94103
USA.
Tel: +1-415-247-8777; Fax: +1-415-227-0848
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