(479.4756) WISE Amsterdam -In 1985 the US Congress passed a Joint Resolution on the trade agreement with China. In the Joint Resolution the president is asked for guarantees on Chinese nonproliferation policy; under the US Atomic Energy Act companies are not allowed to deal with countries aiding unsafeguarded nuclear programs. After delays in the negotiations, due to the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, a certification of the agreement by president Clinton is expected soon when Chinese president Zemin is visiting the US. The agreement would allow American concerns for instance to export nuclear reactors to China, a welcome market as China is planning to build several reactors the coming years.
The American nonproliferation organisation Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) asked Clinton for more guarantees on proliferation policy and the assurance that China stopped helping unsafeguarded nuclear programs in Pakistan and other countries. NCI also asked Clinton to require a ban on reprocessing of civilian spent fuel. US officials say that in May 1996 China stated it was not aiding unsafeguarded programs and that it would have given evidence since mid-1996. On reprocessing they said only US origin materials are discussed and US consent is necessary when China decides to reprocess spent fuel for a plutonium recycling program.
NCI doubts the China statement that it is not aiding unsafeguarded programs in Pakistan. NCI President Paul Leventhal told Clinton that NCI was "frankly concerned about the verifiability" of Chinese pledges. Especially the export of heavy water to the Kanupp Candu reactor in Pakistan is under discussion. Pakistan is suspected of diverting heavy water from the IAEA safeguarded reactor to a non-safeguarded plutonium producing reactor in Khushab. The Khushab reactor has been under construction in cooperation with China since late 1980s and has gone critical last summer (see WISE NC 475.4716: Indigenous Pakistani reactor gone critical). For full power of the 50 MW (thermal) reactor Pakistan needs 15 Metric Tonnes (MT) of unsafeguarded heavy water. For the Kanupp reactor safeguarded heavy water is imported from China. The Kanupp reactor in total contains 130 MT of heavy water. Due to water losses Pakistan imports 5 MT annually from China but is suspected of diverting it to the unsafeguarded Khushab reactor. According to China no heavy water would have been sent to Khushab, the aging state of the Kanupp reactor would clarify the need for heavy water from China. However, the reactor was upgraded recently to reduce water losses to 1 percent annually. That would mean that the 5 MT import is far more than needed to neutralize the losses. In the negotiations on the US-China agreement China assured that no heavy water would be diverted to Khushab. The US State Department warned Pakistan that eventual diversion would have serious consequences for US-Pakistan relations.
Besides the troubles on the heavy water export, China also sold 5,000 magnetic rings for Pakistan's secret enrichment program in 1995. In October 1996 the CIA discovered the deliverence of dual-use material. It remains unclear when this deal was made, before or after the 11 May 1996 Chinese pledge not to aid unsafeguarded programs. China also helped Pakistan with its missile program by exporting nuclear capable ballistic missiles and assistence in the building of a missile factory.
Iran started nuclear cooperation with China in 1985. China is the main supplier of nuclear technology worth US$60 million annually. China is accused of supplying enrichment technology and a uranium conversion plant. Early 1997 IAEA inspectors reported that the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, where the plant would be located, is "building up at a rate not justified by Iran's declared nuclear activities". In the US-China negotiations China promised not to supply the conversion plant to Iran, regardless the fact that the deal is scheduled and payments were already made. China would also have exported a research reactor capable of producing plutonium and a calutron for the enrichment of uranium. Furthermore it has supplied Iran with nuclear capable missiles and chemicals for the production of nerve gas.
The US also raised concerns on the aid to the Algerian nuclear program. In 1991 Western countries asked Algeria to put a research reactor, supplied by China, under IAEA safeguards. A safeguard agreement in 1992 resulted finally in the 1995 joining of the NPT by Algeria. Now concerns are raised on the assistence to build hot cells at the research reactor site for the chemical separation of irradiated fuel. Algeria says it is willing to become a major supplier of medical isotopes and therefore needs the hot cells. The hot cells would also be capable for separation of plutonium from spent fuel. The deal would be "not in the picture" at the US-China negotiations. In an agreement with the IAEA Algeria promised to put the cells in a safeguarding program. Algeria is cooperating with the IAEA for access of inspectors to the site, being more intensive than usual routine inspections.
For the Nuclear Control Institute Chinese supplies to nuclear weapons developing countries are reason to ask Clinton to give clearance on China's proliferation policy. The NCI would rather see China accepting the principles of IAEA's full-scope safeguards. US negotiaters also hope China to join the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In May 1997 China joined the Zangger Committee as an observer. The Zangger Committee controls nuclear exports to non-Non Proliferation Treaty member-countries and regulates safeguarding in individual transfers. China is expected to become a member of the Committee soon. On the contrary the entry of China in the NSG is not expected soon as the NSG rules are stronger and also covers the export of dual-use items not included in the Zangger list. The membership of Zangger and NSG is not required for the proposed US-China nuclear agreement.
Sources:
- NuclearFuel, 2 June, 28 July, 11 August and 8 September 1997
- Nuclear Control Institute: China's record of proliferation misbehavior, 4 September 1997
- UPI, 18 September 1997
Tel: +1-202-822-8444; Fax: 1-202-452-0892
Email: nci@mailback.com
WWW: www.nci.org
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