published by WISE News Communique on April 11, 1997




Contents 1 2 3 4 5 6 Summary

6. Proliferation and safety problems of MOX use


The increasing quantities of plutonium which are fabricated, transported, burned in reactors and stored give rise to several dangers and risks. In this chapter we will look at them.


6.1 Proliferation

6.1.1 No inspection in Nuclear Weapon States

It is not commonly known that the reprocessing plants and MOX fuel plants in France and England are not safeguarded by the IAEA, because they are Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). According to the discriminating Non Proliferation Treaty NWS are exempted from IAEA safeguards. In 1995 only one French nuclear facility (a storage facility at La Hague) was under IAEA safeguards and in England four nuclear facilities (two storage facilities at Sellafield; two enrichment plants of Urenco at Capenhurst).1 These facilities were offered voluntarily for safeguards by the countries.
Only the spent fuel rods from Non-Nuclear Weapon States at the storage sites in La Hague and Sellafield are being safeguarded by IAEA inspectors: they count the number of rods when these arrive and when they leave to be reprocessed, and that's it. In the European Union (EU), the IAEA only monitors whether the bookkeeping of Euratom inspectors has been correct. This lack of safeguarding at reprocessing plants and MOX fuel plants could have as consequence that plutonium from Non-Nuclear Weapon States ends up in French or British nuclear weapons; for example Japanese plutonium in French nuclear weapons.2 It may be clear that it is rather difficult to divert plutonium, which is inside the highly radioactive spent fuel, because reprocessing is needed before it can be used for nuclear weapons. This is drastically changed when the plutonium has been separated from the spent fuel in reprocessing plants. The proliferation risks of separated plutonium, as plutoniumoxide or as MOX, are thus much greater than of plutonium inside the spent fuel. The nuclear industry assures us there is no proliferation risk, which they mainly base on two arguments. As we have seen, this is not true: two nuclear bombs made from reactor-grade plutonium have been tested, by the UK and the US. (see Chapter 2.2) But what if no control takes place? Most of the nuclear facilities are inside the Nuclear Weapons States, where the IAEA does not have the right to safeguard any facility, if it is not offered voluntarily. In the five NWS, in 1995 11 nuclear facilities were offered voluntarily for IAEA inspection. Not one reprocessing or MOX plant belongs to these 11 facilities: one power reactor and one research reactor in China; two enrichment plants in the UK; seven storage facilities (two in the UK; one in France; one in Russia; three in the US).3 So this attempt of assurance by the nuclear industry is not very convincing.
In the meantime the first case of smuggling of MOX has been reported. On August 10, 1994, at the Munich airport in Germany, 560 grams of MOX powder was seized. Analysis showed that 350 grams (or 62%) of it was plutonium and 87% of this was Pu-239.4

6.1.2 Material unaccounted for

MUF stands for the difference between the quantity of nuclear materials in (part of) a facility or container as calculated and as measured. The difference can be negative or positive. The IAEA sees the quantity of MUF only as important if it is equal to or more than one Significant Quantity (SQ). This is a short-sighted approach, because it is possible that over a long period, several amounts of sensitive nuclear materials smaller than one SQ are booked as MUF. But more important: if there is uncertainty of the exact measurements the IAEA can accept a much larger MUF than one SQ.5 In the largescale reprocessing plants and MOX fuel plants in England and France, it is even possible that some 3.3% of the plutonium can go missing, without any alarm being raised.6
On a throughput of 1,600 tons of spent fuel and 16,000 kg of plutonium per year, as is the case in the reprocessing plants UP-2 and UP-3 in La Hague, this means that each year 528 kg of plutonium can be missing without anybody noticing. As the number of reactors using MOX fuel increases, so does the number of storage sites of fresh and spent MOX fuel.
An example of how large amounts of plutonium can get lost is the PFPF MOX plant in Japan, where 70 kg of plutonium were booked as MUF in 1994. Compared to the throughput of the plant, five tons of MOX/year, equivalent to 300 kg Pu/yr, this was seen as a very large amount of MUF: more than 23%. It was only after the Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute raised public awareness that the IAEA announced that it was taken seriously. After two years, the quantity of MUF was reduced to about 10 kg Pu.7

6.1.3 More nuclear material; less safeguards

The IAEA safeguards budget has known a zero growth for more than 10 years. In 1995 the regular safeguards budget expenditures were a meager $87.56 million, far too short to effectively safeguard all nuclear facilities. Already in 1985 only at 514 from the 887 nuclear facilities under safeguards inspections were carried out. At 168 from the facilities with a significant amount of nuclear material the inspection goal was attained. It was possible to carry out only 72.9% of the planned routine inspections (which are announced beforehand).8 The zero budget growth since 1985 has led to a further reduction in the attainment of inspection goals. As Bruno Pellaud, Deputy Director General of IAEA Safeguard Division, says: "it must be emphasized that with a continuing zero-growth budget the Agency will not be able to cope with the extended programs and demands placed on it".9 At the same time the quantities of nuclear materials under safeguards by IAEA increased enormously. Expressed in Significant Quantities, the increase was threefold: from 31,116 SQ in 198510 to 90,291 SQ in 1995.11 The annual expenditure of safeguarding one SQ decreased from $3000 in 1980 to $1000 per SQ in 1995.12 Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, said in September 1991 that the safeguards system would have to undergo a threefold strengthening to cope effectively with suspect cases, such as in South Africa, Iraq and North Korea.13
Driven by the lack of funds, the trend is to reduce the number of inspections by the IAEA at nuclear facilities.14 In the countries of the European Union (EU), inspection efforts have been largely reduced after the introduction of the so-called "New Partnership Approach" (NPA) in 1992 between the IAEA and Euratom. In a MOX fuel fabrication plant the continuous presence of inspectors will be replaced by a presence of four to five days a month.15 In the EU, the IAEA becomes more and more dependent on information from Euratom inspectors. To achieve as much cost savings as possible, duplication of inspection is stopped: formerly both Euratom and IAEA inspected nuclear facilities, at present there is only one of them, mostly Euratom.

Table 6.1 Significant quantities and timelines goals16

Category Type Significant quantities Timelines goals
Direct-use material Plutonium* 8 kg 1 month
High-enriched Uranium 25 kg U-235 1 month (fresh)
3 months (spent)
Pu in spent fuel 8 kg 3 months
Uranium-233 8 kg 1 month
Indirect-use material Low-enriched Uranium** 75 kg U-235 12 months
Thorium 20 ton 12 months
* For Pu containing less than 80% Pu-238
** less than 20% U-235, includes natural and depleted uranium

The result of the threefold reduction of expenditures per SQ is that the objective of safeguards is in serious danger. The main objective of safeguards by the IAEA is the "timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons".17 Both the timely detection goals and the diversion of SQ in largescale reprocessing and MOX fuel plants can no longer be attained.18 Another reason for the shortcoming of the present safeguard system is the fact that both civil and military nuclear materials and facilities in the Nuclear Weapon States are not covered by the IAEA safeguards. For example, in 1992 only 28% of the world's plutonium inventory and less than 1% of the world stock of High Enriched Uranium is under IAEA safeguards.19 The IAEA safeguards less than 25% of all plutonium. The same situation applies to High Enriched Uranium.
Proliferation dangers will increase when the stockpiles of weapon-plutonium in the US and Russia will be used as MOX fuel for commercial reactors, as is being planned: the IAEA has no right to inspect the facilities and sites where the weapon-plutonium is handled or stored. Given the bad state of security and control in Russia, such a future must arouse apprehension. During the storage, handling and transport of especially the separated plutonium, the risks of hijacking and stealing are real. The plutonium present in MOX fuel can be quite easily separated and used for producing nuclear bombs.
Never before have such large quantities of plutonium been stored, handled and transported. The largescale reprocessing and recycling of plutonium will have the effect of normalizing the use of plutonium. Each country can start a plutonium program now and simply justify this by pointing to the others. This effect is seen clearly already by the neighbors of Japan: The two Koreas, China, Taiwan. They fear that the massive Japanese plutonium program has a latent proliferation background. They feel they are being forced to start and own a plutonium program. Especially if the US decides to realize their present plans for the use of plutonium in commercial reactors, the White House may find it is impossible to convince other countries not to use plutonium in their reactors. The real plutonium society has arrived.


6.2 Safety

Light Water Reactors are designed to use low-enriched uranium fuel. Reactors need to be adapted to use MOX. There are specific problems concerning the safe operation of MOX facilities and reactors using MOX. Accidents will have more impact due to more actinides.

6.2.1 Pu degradation and Americium-241

MOX fuel contains, next to depleted uranium, 4-8% of plutonium. This is called first generation plutonium because it has been reprocessed only once. The plutonium inside spent MOX fuel is called second generation.20 The concentration of plutonium in MOX fuel must increase to 8-10% plutonium in the future, to be equivalent to 3.5% enriched uranium. This is because the present high burn-up spent fuel (which reprocessed plutonium will be used for MOX) contains degraded plutonium. This means the plutonium contains less fissile Pu-239 and Pu-241 and more non-fissile isotopes: Pu-240 and Pu-242. The higher the share of non-fissile Pu-isotopes, the less it is suitable for the production of electricity.
Another problem will be the presence of Americium-241 (Am-241), which is a decay product of plutonium-241. Because of the relatively short half-life of Pu-241 (13.2 years), the amount of Am-241 quickly increases. The presence of Am-241 in plutonium makes it even more dangerous and less efficacious. Am-241 is a hard alpha and gamma emitter. Therefore, in the fabrication of MOX fuel, the amount of Am-241 must be as low as possible. The plutonium which is used for MOX fabrication must not be older than three years, because of this americium increase. Separated plutonium older than three years must first be "recleaned", that is, reprocessed to separate the Am from the plutonium before it can be used. This is a very expansive operation.21 The Belgian PO MOX fuel plant can work with plutonium containing up to 1.7% of americium-241 on average, the French Cadarache MOX fuel plant is limited to 1%.22 The newer Melox plant is licensed to use up to 3% Am-241.23 MOX fuel must be used quickly. After five months, the fuel has lost 3% of its durability.24

6.2.2 Gallium

Recently, a new problem was discovered in connection with the presence of gallium in Russian and US weapon-grade plutonium. The gallium has to be removed from the plutonium before MOX fuel is fabricated.25 Gallium causes problems during the production of MOX fuel, the use in reactors and the disposal of spent MOX fuel. The gallium attacks the zirconium, present in the fuel rods, and so deteriorates the fuel rods. This leads to migration of fission products in the spent fuel and to serious waste disposal problems.26

6.2.3 Worker hazards

Workers in a MOX fuel fabrication plant must be protected against the much higher radiation levels of MOX. A $40-million investment program is planned for the Dessel PO MOX plant. This is necessary to allow the plant to respect the new, more severe, worker- exposure limits of ICRP-60, to be passed into Belgian law by 2000, despite the anticipated degradation in the quality of the separated plutonium. This means among others further automation and the massive introduction of neutron shielding in the workshops.27
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), which cannot be said to be very critical on nuclear energy, sets a standard for occupational exposure to radiation at 100 mSv over five years, with a maximum of 50 mSv in any one year. If you interpret this by comparing workers in a uranium fuel fabrication plant with workers om a MOX fuel fabrication plant, the standards for protection against inhalation are roughly two million times stricter in plutonium processing than in uranium processing.28

6.2.4 Accidents at MOX fabrication plants

Accidents at MOX fuel fabrication plants have occurred. In June 1991, the storage bunker of the MOX fuel fabrication plant in Hanau, Germany, was contaminated with MOX. It occurred after the rupture of a foil for container packaging in the course of an in-plant transportation process. Four workers were exposed to plutonium.29 This accident was the main reason the fabrication plant at Hanau was shut down.

In November 1992, a fuel rod was broken through a handling error, and MOX dust was released during the mounting of MOX fuel rods to fuel assemblies in the fuel fabrication facility adjoining the MOX facility in Dessel, Belgium. In the event of such accidents, if the ICRP recommendations for general public exposure were adhered to, only about one mg of plutonium may be released from a MOX facility to the environment. As a comparison, in uranium fabrication facility, 2kg (2,000,000mg) of uranium could be released in the same radiation exposure. A one mg release of plutonium can easily happen during various smaller incidents.30

6.2.5 Behavior of MOX fuel in the reactor

All Light Water Reactors are designed to use uranium fuel. Therefore MOX fuel assemblies should be comparable to the operation of uranium assemblies with the same kind of performance. In order to use another fuel such as MOX, the reactor must be adapted. This is done by increasing the number and the reactivity of the control rods and of the quantity of boron dissolved in the cooling water.31 These changes lead to smaller safety margins when the reactor is switched off and the fuel rods and damaged sooner.32 The rate of fission of Pu tends to increase with temperature. This can endanger reactor control. The higher the share of Pu-239, the greater this problem. With the general introduction of higher burn-up fuels, the drive is also to use more plutonium in the MOX fuel.
Utilities want to increase the burn-up of MOX fuel to the same level as the uranium fuel. In a PWR, MOX assemblies with three different concentrations of plutonium are inserted. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) gives as example a core with three sorts of MOX fuel rods: with 8.7%, with 7% and with 4.3% plutonium, all in the center of the core.33 The use of MOX fuel has several problems. A few are: For these reasons French nuclear safety authorities for instance continue to deny EdF a license for higher burn-up of MOX fuel. The burn-up of MOX in France is now limited to 36 MWD/kg. EdF wants a license to increase the MOX fuel burn-up to 52 MWD/kg.36 As we have seen in Chapter 5.2.2. higher burn-up also has negative safety aspects; an important one is fuel rods' deformation which results in sticking of the control rods. During an experiment with MOX fuel on January 24, 1997, in the Cabri research reactor at Cadarache, an unexpectedly violent rupture of the MOX fuel clad occurred, leading to dispersal of fuel fragments in the test channel. If this rupture were caused by the MOX fuel, it would be bad news for utilities wanting to use MOX fuel and for MOX fuel fabricators. One more MOX fuel test with a two-cycle MOX fuel pin is scheduled this year. However, only when and if the Cabri reactor is refitted with a water loop (it now has a sodium coolant loop) it will be able to represent LWR conditions. A decision is expected in June 1997. Utilities and regulators will be left with at least two years of uncertainty over the significance of the Cabri MOX fuel failure. The deputy director Rousseau of the French regulatory organization DSIN said that the latest test result "isn't going to encourage us to go faster" in licensing high burn-up MOX fuel. EdF has to wait several years before it is allowed to increase the burn-up of its MOX fuel.37

6.2.6 Accident scenario when burning MOX

Accidents involving overheating and meltdown are possible in any nuclear reactor. In such accidents, not only would readily volatile noble gases like iodine and caesium be released to the environment, but a small portion of the actinides, including plutonium and neptunium, would be released. As the activity of the actinides is substantially higher in the case of MOX, the consequences of such severe accidents become more serious.
When MOX fuels are used, the probability of having such serious accidents or trouble would increase due to the high content of plutonium in the fuel. Even if an accident is not a serious one, it could become serious since even a small portion of the inventory of actinides released to the environment could cause significant radiological consequences. According to a comparative analysis of possible consequences of a core meltdown accident in the German Kruemmel nuclear power plant with and without the use of MOX fuel.38

6.2.7 Plutonium transport problems

The consequence of more and more reactors using MOX is an increasing number of dangerous transports with highly radioactive plutonium by road, rail, air or sea.
Compared to the once-through option, where the spent fuel is stored at the reactor or at a central storage, with MOX there is a fourfold increase of plutonium transports. The increase in distances covered is far more: since there are only a few reprocessing plants worldwide and clients the whole world over. For instance: Spent fuel sent by sea from Japan to French and English reprocessing plants; from there to MOX plants in Dessel, Melox or CfCa in Cadarache, or to MDF in Sellafield; finally the shipment of thousands of kg of plutonium the whole way back.

In 1984 190 kg of plutonium was transported by sea from France to Japan; in November 1992 a second transport of 1,700 kg of plutonium took place, which was heavily criticized, escorted by an armed vessel and watched from a satellite. Many countries along the route refused to allow these to pass by in their coastal waters.39 From 1994 till 2010, about 30,000 kg of plutonium will be transported from Europe to Japan.40 Around the year 2000, the number of MOX transports in France will be more than 400, with more than 40,000 kg of plutonium.41

Most nuclear countries have transport regulations, based upon several publications of the IAEA; basic "Safety standards" in the "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material", (Safety Series No. 6); "Safety Guides; Schedules of Requirements for Transport of Specified Types of Radioactive Material Consignment", (Safety Series No. 80). The shipments of radioactive materials, whether they are private or government-owned, must be packaged and carried according to these regulations. Containers have to fulfill requirements and to withstand accidents and radiation and proliferation risks. Packages are divided into four categories:

The test conditions for the four categories differ strongly. Type A containers must meet special tests to ensure they would withstand normal transport conditions, for example to withstand an impact of only 13 meters/sec.42 Any radioactive material shipment that exceeds the limit of Type A package specifications must be shipped in a Type B package. Only the conditions for Type B containers claim to guarantee their integrity after an accident. They must withstand both normal shipping conditions and hypothetical accidents without a breach in the containment. Type B containers are subjected to four tests: Impact Test, Crush Test, Thermal Test and Water Immersion Test.43
On September 10, 1996, the IAEA adopted revised standards for the transport of radioactive material at the Board Meeting held in Vienna. They will go into effect by the year 2000. The revision allows the continuous use of existing Type B casks for plutonium and MOX shipments, provided transporters can demonstrate that radionuclides will not be dispersed (so-called Low-Dispersable Materials, LDM) following a severe accident that ruptures the container. Type B containers are designed to survive a crash speed of 48 km/h and a 30-minute fire of 800 degrees Celsius, but B-containers have not been tested in a plane crash. In 1992 an El Al plane crashed in Amsterdam at 520 km/h and burned intensely for hours. The standards also create a new container category, Type C, which is stronger and could be used for shipping materials which are not LDM. An exemption, however, is made for shipping MOX fuel, which is LDM, in Type C containers. Strong oppposition came from Greenpeace International and the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI). They will campaign to prevent the new IAEA standards from being accepted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the influential International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Opponents assert that the plutonium industry pressed for the LDM exemption for MOX, because shipment in Type C containers would increase the cost of MOX transport. The US will not allow plutonium flights in US airspace because neither Type B nor Type C containers meet US standards. The new Type C container is not yet ready; testing involves a mere 90 mile/hour impact. A crashing airplane could have a higher speed.
The US plutonium air transport standards require a cask to survive a "maximum credible accident", with impact speeds of 180 meter/second, twice the IAEA Type C standard. Cogema's Ricaud said that a cask meeting the US standards would be "much more costly" than a Type C container, but Cogema does not need plutonium air transport standards. Ricaud did not mention air shipment of MOX to Japan.44 The Greens in the European Parliament charged that the new recommendations on stricter safety standards for the transport of nuclear materials do not go far enough. They asked the European Commission to suspend the transports of MOX fuel until the new guidelines are reviewed. The US Nuclear Control Institute also asked the EU states to ban the transport of nuclear material.45

Sources:

  1. IAEA: 'Annual Report 1995', Annex, p.77,87-89
  2. Pavageau, M. and M. Schneider: 'Japanese plutonium and the French Nuclear Weapons Program', WISE Paris, August 1995, p.12-13
  3. IAEA: 'Annual Report 1995', p.77,78-89
  4. Nuclear Fuel, 29 August 1994: 'Cache of material seized in Munich is said to be High-Grade MOX fuel', p.2
  5. Ruiter, W.de, B. vd Sijde: 'De Nucleaire erfenis', Boom Amsterdam, 1996, p.348
  6. Pantsers, D.: 'Opwerking en hergebruik van plutonium', Technical University Eindhoven, 1996, p.62
  7. Nuclear Fuel, 4 November 1996: 'PFPF holdup Pu inventory under 10 kg; R&D work to focus on Monju fuel', p.15
  8. IAEA: IAEA Annual Report 1985, p.59,61-70
  9. IAEA Bulletin no 3, 1994: 'Safeguards in transition: Status, challenges and opportunities', p.2
  10. IAEA: 'Annual Reports 1985', p.72
  11. IAEA: 'Annual Report 1995',p.77
  12. IAEA Bulletin, No. 4 1996: 'Safeguards: The evolving picture', p.5
  13. IAEA Bulletin No. 3, 1994: 'Safeguards in transition: Status, challenges and opportunities', p.2
  14. IAEA Bulletin, No. 4, 1996: 'Safeguards at light-water reactors: Current practices, future directions', p.17
  15. IAEA Bulletin, No. 1 1995, 'Safeguards in the European Union: The New Partnership Approach', p.27
  16. IAEA Bulletin, No. 4, 1996: 'Safeguards at light-water reactors: Current practices, future directions', p.17
  17. IAEA Bulletin, No. 4, 1996: 'Safeguards at light-water reactors: Current practices, future directions', p.17
  18. Gruppe Ökologie, Anti Atom International, Ökologie Institut: '35 years of promotion of nuclear energy: The IAEA', Vienna, 1993, p.63
  19. Albright, D., F. Berkhout, W. Walker: 'World Inventories of plutonium and High enriched Uranium 1992', Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1993, p.203-212
  20. Electricité de France, May 1994: 'Recyclage du Plutonium dans les centrales REP d'EdF'
  21. Albright, D., F. Berkhout, W. Walker: 'World Inventories of plutonium and High enriched Uranium 1992', Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1993, p.15
  22. Nuclear Fuel, 18 November 1996: 'Belgonucléaire fabricating MOX fuel for second Swiss reactor', p.13
  23. Pavageau, M., 'Les Transports de L'Industry i du Plutonium', WISE Paris, October 1995
  24. Desmoulins, P., 9 June 1994: 'Les Stratégies d'Emploi du Plutonium à Courts et Moyens Termes'
  25. Nuclear Fuel, 24 February 1997: 'Gallium-MOX interactions analyzed', p.12
  26. Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1997, 'DOE official downplays policy, technical issues dogging MOX', p.5
  27. Nuclear Fuel,18 November 1996: 'Belgonucléaire fabricating MOX fuel for second Swiss reactor', p.13
  28. Küppers, C. and M. Sailer: 'MOX-Wirtschaft oder die zivile Plutoniumnutzung', IPPNW, 1994, p.38
  29. Die Tageszeitung, 18 June 1991: 'Atomunfall in Hanau'
  30. Küppers, C. and M. Sailer: 'MOX-Wirtschaft oder die zivile Plutoniumnutzung', IPPNW, 1994, p.38
  31. Revue Generale Nucleaire, January/February 1995: 'Le combustible MOX et l'usine de fabrication Melox'
  32. Küppers, C. and M. Sailer: 'MOX-Wirtschaft oder die zivile Plutoniumnutzung', IPPNW, 1994, p.38
  33. NEA Newsletter, Spring 1996: 'Plutonium recycling', p.13
  34. Nuclear Fuel, 6 November 1995, 'French working to improve MOX performance and economics', p.8
  35. Ayukawa, Y., Issue 5, 16 December 1996: 'Fissile material disposition and civil use of plutonium'
  36. Nuclear Fuel, 11 March 1996: 'First Cabri test of high-burn-up MOX fuel doesn't lead to failure', p.11
  37. Nuclear Fuel, 10 February 1997, 'IPSN expects results of NDE on Cabri fuel pin in about one month', p.13
  38. Öko-Institut: 'Folgen schwerer Unfälle in KKW Krümmel für das Gebiet der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg uns Auswirkungen von Katastrophenschutzmassnahmen', 1992, as cited in: Küppers, C. and M. Sailer: 'MOX-Wirtschaft oder die zivile Plutoniumnutzung', IPPNW, 1994, p.46
  39. WISE Newscommunique 382, 20 November 1992: 'Tension mounts as Japanese Pu shipment leaves Cherbourg', p.1
  40. Nuclear Fuel, 9 October 1995: 'Japan could buy and burn 2 MT of Russian Pu per year; Suzuki says', p.8
  41. WISE Paris: 'Les Transports de l'Industrie de Plutonium en France', 1995, p.4-8
  42. Nuke Info Tokyo, September/October 1996: 'The IAEA Revises Guidelines for Transport of Radioactive Material', p.6
  43. Transportation Management Division, 'Radioactive Material Shipping Regulations'
  44. Nuclear Fuel, 23 September 1996: 'New standards for Pu shipments won't be a problem, Cogema says', p.14
  45. Nuclear Fuel, 4 November 1996: 'Greens charge IAEA Recommendations don't go far enough for safe transport', p.16
Contents 1 2 3 4 5 6 Summary


- | -
-
   home > newsletter > search > about us > links    
 -
- - -