published by WISE News Communique on April 10, 1996




Contents Introduction 1 2 3 4

2. Playing dangerous games

Introduction

Shortly after the catastrophe with the Chernobyl reactor no. 4, Western politicians agreed that the Chernobyl-type RBMK reactor was inherently unsafe. There was agreement that all the RBMK reactors should be closed as soon as possible. The Western nuclear lobby feared that a second Chernobyl would be the end for nuclear reactors and for their own industry. That was their main argument for demanding the closure of all the 15 RBMK reactors. Later on, nuclear safety experts also recommended the closure of the ten oldest reactors of the Russian type of Western PWR (Pressure Water Reactor), the VVER-440/230. Even the pro-nuclear IAEA concluded that these reactors were unsafe and should be closed.

The next steps consisted of studies, done by the G-7, EBRD, EU and the World Bank, on the costs of closure of the most dangerous reactors and on the possibilities of safety upgrades with Western technology of the other reactors. Time went by, different cost estimates and recommendations were made, but nearly nothing was done.

" Things became especially bad once we started using the regiment commander's new invention in the fight against radiation: a wide strip op metal hooked on a stick. The radiation levels started going up again in already cleaned places, as usual, and since you couldn't peel away the earth forever - at least not without a U.S. or Australian visa - we started to scrape it on its surface with these inventions. Now there appeared an enormous amount of tiny little piles that were too small for any self-respecting excavator to even stop for, so we had to use spades to throw them over our heads onto the trucks. Even someone not given to much day-dreaming shoul be able to imagine the kind of dust that accompanies this."
Source:Tiit Tarlap, Chernobyl 1986, Memories of an Estonian Cleanup Worker.
The Western countries quarrelled over the high costs of closure of all the RBMK reactors. Japan and the USA were especially reluctant to give money. They did not fear the consequences of a second Chernobyl as much as the Europeans, since their countries were farther away and thus would not get so much fall-out.

Then came the implosion of the Soviet Union and decision-making was postponed. Negotiations on the closure of the RBMK plants now had to be done with three countries: Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Russia and Lithuania flatly refused to shut their RBMK reactors down; they wanted to keep them in operation for another ten years. Under Western pressure, the Ukraine agreed to close Chernobyl, on the condition that the Western countries paid for this. In late 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to close all the Chernobyl reactors by the end of 1993 and appealed to the world for urgent assistance. In 1993, however, the Ukrainian government decided to postpone the closure of Chernobyl 'because of energy shortages' and the high costs of closure, which they estimated at $4 billion1 in the short term and $10 billion2 in the long term.

The G-7 finally decided to give some money only for the closure of the three remaining Chernobyl nuclear reactors and for the building of a shelter around the crumbling and leaking sarcophagus of the exploded Chernobyl 4 reactor. Ukraine judged that the money was not enough and resisted all the Western calls for closure. They simply said they could not miss the nuclear energy and could financially not afford the costs of closing and replacing them.

This went straight against the recommendations of the World Bank and the International Energy Agency to close all the 25 most unsafe reactors in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union.3 This advice was based on cost estimates of updating and modernising these 25 nuclear plants, US $24 billion, and the costs of closing them all: US $18 billion.4

President Barnevik of ABB, one of the biggest Western energy companies, said in March 1992: 'Europe should finance the closure of all RBMKs and old VVERs, a total of 26 reactors, without waiting for help from Japan and the USA.' He estimated the costs of upgrading only the Baltic and Eastern European nuclear plants at between $20 and $60 billion.5 The German Ministry of Environment estimated a complete safety upgrade of the East European nuclear reactors even at DM 100 billion.6


The memorandum of understanding

On December 20, 1995, after nearly ten years of negotiating and bargaining, the G-7, EU and Ukraine finally signed a so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).7 This MoU foresees the closure of the Chernobyl reactors in the year 2000 and promises assistance in the reorganisation and modernisation of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. But the assistance is utterly insufficient and consists of 80 per cent loans and only 20 per cent grants:

Table 1:
G-7/Ukraine program for the closure of Chernobyl
Summary of current financial resources

US $ millions Grants Loans Totals
Power sector restructuring 43   43
Energy program investment 102 1.809 1.911
Nuclear safety & closure 349   349
Social impact 4   4
Total 498 1.809 2.307

Nobody who reads this MoU will understand why it took nearly ten years to reach such a disappointing and meagre result. Moreover, it is not sure at all whether the Chernobyl reactors will be really closed in 2000.8 Closing down the last two working Chernobyl reactors, dismantling all four of them and building a second sarcophagus will cost US $4 to 10 billion.9 The former president Kravchuk even estimated that closing the Chernobyl reactors and replacing them would cost $14 billion.10

The G-7 and the EU have every bit of interest to prevent another Chernobyl catastrophe, which would put the Western nuclear industry in jeopardy too. And they know that Ukraine has big debts and no money. So why the MoU has come up with only $2.3 billion, of which $0.5 billion are grants and $1.8 billion loans, and why the Ukraine has accepted this, is difficult to understand.

Although the MoU is directed towards the closure of Chernobyl, only US $349 million will be spent on it. However, from this amount a short-term upgrade of nuclear safety of Chernobyl reactor no. 3 will be paid, so it can be operated till 2000. Reactor no. 1, which is the oldest and most dangerous one, will not be upgraded at all, nor closed before 2000. The rest of the US $349 million - it is yet unknown how much - will be spent on the decommissioning of the Chernobyl reactors and on building a second shelter around the exploded reactor 4. The fact that a US $890 million loan from Euratom will go to the completion of two new nuclear reactors, which will pose new safety risks and are not needed at all, is even harder to understand.This MoU is far from what was proposed by the G-7 in 1992.11 he biggest changes since then are: 1.The G-7 dropped its earlier position to close the 25 most dangerous reactors2. The G-7 bowed to the demand to finance new nuclear reactors that would replace the power of the closed Chernobyl reactors3. The money offered was much less.These changes amount to a complete change of mind. As late as April 1994, the governments of France and Germany had proposed to the G-7 to close Chernobyl on the tenth anniversary of the explosion of reactor 4, on 26 April 1996.12

What has changed is not the danger of the Soviet-made nuclear reactors: too many accidents have occurred since - 250 accidents in 1992 alone.13 There must have been the fear in the Western countries that if unsafe Eastern reactors were closed, there would be a call for the closure of unsafe Western reactors too. There has also been a gradual change in the attitude of Western public opinion towards the risks of a second Chernobyl. Plus the unwillingness of the G-7 to pay for the closure and dismantling of the nuclear plants.

The EU, in particular, has been and still is very pro-nuclear. Right after the Chernobyl catastrophe, it did not dare to say that openly. The EU waited for better times to come. Ten years were spent talking about closure without really willing it. Now, the EU sees the opportunity to support the European nuclear industry via grants and loans to Ukraine and other Eastern European countries. Russia also wants Chernobyl and all other RBMK reactors kept open to support its own nuclear industry. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for the enrichment of uranium and for the production of nuclear fuel, at a cost of about US $250 million a year. Russia also stores the spent nuclear fuel from Ukraine, because Ukraine itself does not have enough storage capacity.


The role of the EU, Euratom and the EBRD

The European Union (EU) has had a big say in the G-7 deal. The EU has chosen a pro-nuclear standpoint. Via the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and Euratom both the Ukrainian and Western European nuclear industries are subsidized. The EU has opted for keeping unsafe reactors in operation and for funding new unsafe nuclear reactors.

The EU has created two special programs to help increase the safety of Eastern European nuclear reactors - the Tacis and the Phare programs. Tacis funds studies on safety upgrades; Phare is meant for direct technical assistance with Western experts. For the two programs, a total of 330 million ECU was made available. Not all of this money has been spent, due to a slow start, slow implementation and problems about nuclear liability.14


The Lahmeyer report

The G-7 MoU is based mainly on a report of Lahmeyer International15, a German engineering firm, dated July 1995. Lahmeyer had been commissioned by the EBRD to conduct a study on the least-cost plans for reorganisation of the Ukranian energy infrastructure. The EBRD has subscribed to almost all the conclusions of the Lahmeyer report. And the contents of the G-7 MoU and the Lahmeyer conclusions are largely the same. From the results of the study it would seem that there must have been a secret clause in the EBRD order: 'The salvation and promotion of the Western and Eastern nuclear industry'.

The Lahmeyer report gives in detail what is purported to be a 'least-cost' investment plan to meet Ukrainian electric power demands forecast for the period 1995-2010:

  1. Three new 1000 MW nuclear plants should be completed 'as soon as possible' (Zaporozhe 6, Rovno 4, Kmelnitsky 2), with Western safety upgrades and with Western financial assistance.
  2. The existing VVERs must be upgraded, with Western financial assistance.
  3. The existing fossil fuel plants should not be upgraded
  4. No new fossil fuel plants (gas or coal) should be built for ten years.
  5. The conversion of existing coal plants into 'fluidized bed boilers' should be studied.
  6. New wind power and hydro projects will only offer modest contributions.
The Lahmeyer report does not even mention that upgrading of existing fossil fuel plants would be a much cheaper option. Nor does it propose the building of new gas- or coal-fired co-generation plants. The building of co-generation plants in the US and Western Europe has become an unexpected great success story, as Lahmeyer knows very well. Energy conservation and efficiency measures deliver at nearly no cost more energy than all nuclear plants, as they know too. It seems the report just sums up the highest-cost options and leaves out all the least-cost options. Furthermore, the Lahmeyer report has chosen a scenario with a high growth of electric consumption. In reality, everything points to a further decline of electricity demand. This is very understandable, as the Ukraine is one of the most energy-wasteful countries in the world, with an unparallelled potential for energy-saving and efficiency measures. The report overstates future Ukrainian energy demand and fails to consider cost-effective energy-efficient measures. The risk is that Ukraine and the G-7 will spend billions of dollars to meet energy demand that may not materialize. The EBRD approach is incorrect and should not have been the basis for the Ukrainian energy policy or international assistance projects.16 The real least-cost option is not the upgrading of old nuclear plants and building of new ones. Closure of all unsafe reactors is much cheaper and much safer, as was concluded in 1993 by the World Bank and the IAEA. The nuclear plants will never become safe by adding some Western technology. Even Siemens topman Hüttl says it is impossible to upgrade RBMK reactors.17 It is clear that the Lahmeyer report, the EU and the Ukrainian nuclear lobby have one thing in common: they put their hopes on further energy growth, as this seems to make nuclear energy indispensable.

Euratom plays a disgusting role by lending the Ukraine hundreds of millions of dollars for completing new unsafe nuclear plants, while knowing that this money will just go to Western nuclear companies like Siemens and EDF. It appears that since Euratom is not very successful in promoting nuclear energy in the European Union, it tries to do this in the East instead.

In March 1994 the Council of the EU amended an article in the Euratom treaty to allow, for the first time, the lending of money for nuclear projects in non-member states. Following the slowdown in the European nuclear sector, there was no strong demand in the Community for the remaining Euratom finances for nuclear energy. As of December 31, 1991, only ECU 2876 million of Euratom's ECU 4000 million for nuclear energy had been used up. The EU was thus willing to raise 400 million ECU in Euratom loans for the completion of Ukrainian nuclear reactors, and reach an agreement with Ukraine on this.18)

The EBRD channels millions of dollars to upgrading the safety of Eastern European reactors, even while IAEA experts declare that these plants cannot be made safe. In 1993, the EBRD set up the NSA (Nuclear Safety Account), upon the proposal of the G-7. Fifteen countries have so far donated money for the NSA fund, ECU 154 million by December 1994. The money has thus far gone to:191. the Kozloduy nuclear units in Bulgaria, on the absolute condition that the oldest units 1-4 will be closed when units 5-6 have been completed (24 million ECU).2. the two Ignalina nuclear reactors in Lithuania, which are of the same reactor type (RBMK) as Chernobyl, for the 'most urgent and feasible upgrades', with a conditional closure clause, dependent on further safety and least-cost analyses. (33 million ECU)3. the four RBMK reactors at Leningrad (Sosnovy Bor) in Russia, without a condition for closure at all (30 million ECU)4. the four VVER-440/230 reactors at Kola and two at Novovoronezh, without a condition for closure at all (45 million ECU).

The change in conditions are clear: the requirement of closure of the most dangerous reactors in the first deal has been dropped in the later deals. A main condition for the assistance was that Russia would provide an indemnity to the Western nuclear suppliers of goods or services paid by EBRD, to protect suppliers against claims related to accidents and nuclear liability.20

Compared to earlier estimates of billions of dollars for upgrading the safety of the Eastern European reactors, these few hundred millions are peanuts. What has to be taken seriously is the fact that the upgrading does not really make these reactors any safer and only gives a false feeling of improved safety. The amounts being allocated for upgrading in Eastern Europe hardly compare with the amounts of money spent in Western Europe to bring the (safer?) Western reactors to an even higher level of safety. The upgrading of the relatively small Borssele reactor in the Netherlands, for instance, will cost $300 million.21


Victory for the nuclear lobby

The nuclear lobbies in the East and the West can celebrate four victories.
  1. All the Eastern European nuclear plants have been allowed to continue operating.
  2. Many of these plants are now subsidized by the EU and the US for the upgrading of their safety, which was formerly said to be impossible.
  3. New nuclear reactors in Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Rumania and Russia are now co-financed by Western countries.
  4. The Western European nuclear industry is assured of new orders: almost all the G-7 funds and EU money will flow back to Western Europe.
The loans of Euratom and G-7 for building new nuclear reactors are in reality subsidies for the Western nuclear industry (especially in Germany and France), which is starved for new orders.

The Russian, Ukrainian and European nuclear lobbies won a great victory. The Ukrainian nuclear establishment will use any argument for not closing Chernobyl in 2000. The main argument is now already well-known: there will not be enough money for it. There is no doubt that the pro-nuclear Ukrainian government will seize on the improved safety of the Chernobyl reactor no. 3, financed by the West, to keep it in operation beyond the year 2000. The government will claim that Ukraine cannot miss the electricity from Chernobyl. But this is wrong, the opposite is true.


Enough options for replacing Chernobyl

The Ukrainian government should know better when it says it cannot miss the nuclear electricity from Chernobyl. In 1994, the share of nuclear electricity from Chernobyl of the total electricity production was only 6 per cent. From 1990 to 1994, the consumption of electricity however decreased by about 34 per cent! This is not at all surprising, since Ukrainian industry produced mainly military products for Russia and for export. The rest of Ukrainian industry consisted of heavy industry, which also mainly produced goods for Russia. Both markets shrunk to less than 50% of what they were before 1990.22 From the fact that all nuclear reactors in the Ukraine contribute also 34% to the total production of electricity, it can be concluded that Ukraine can do without Chernobyl.

It is also nonsense that the closed Chernobyl reactors have to be replaced with new nuclear plants. The fossil fuel power plants (mainly coal) only have to operate at the same level as in 1990 to produce all the electricity needed. These will also be cheaper and will provide more work, since the coal is 90 per cent produced in the Ukraine itself and does not need to be imported23, unlike nuclear fuel which is 100 per cent imported. Coal mining is more important for employment than the nuclear sector. There is a big overcapacity of fossil fuel power plants; they could easily replace not only the production of the two remaining Chernobyl reactors, but also that of the other twelve Ukrainian nuclear reactors. And yet, in the meantime, one third of the fossil fuel plants have been idled already.24 It is therefore clear that the claim that Chernobyl cannot be missed is misleading. Leaked secret reports reveal, however, that Ukraine has already made plans to operate Chernobyl for another ten years.25

Each dollar spent on upgrading, repairing and building nuclear plants is wasted. It only strengthens the irresponsible nuclear lobby. The $890 million loan from the G-7 and the EU for completing new nuclear power plants can be used in a much better for improving the efficiency of the existing fossil fuel plants.


The worst deal imaginable

The most probable results of the G-7 deal will be that till the year 2000:
  • Two or three new unsafe nuclear reactors will be finished, with a little help from the West in the form of money and technology.
  • The two remaining crumbling Chernobyl reactors will not be closed.
  • The new shelter around the collapsing sarcophagus will not be built.
  • The big-scale waste of energy in the Ukraine will continue: for each unit of the Gross National Product, the energy use will more than five times that in Western Europe.
  • The thirteen other Chernobyl-type reactors (two in Lithania, eleven in Russia) will not be closed.
  • The ten oldest reactors of the VVER-type in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russia will also still be operating. (In the ex-DDR all 4 reactors of this type in Greifswald were immediately closed after the reunification!)
All these enhance the risks of a second Chernobyl.The Belarus government estimates that the costs of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe for Belarus alone, for the period 1986 up to 2015, will amount to at least at $235 billion.26 The short-term costs of the first Chernobyl catastophe in the Ukraine were estimated at about $100 billion.27 In reality, the overall costs of Chernobyl's consequences will be many times higher than these estimates. Who can calculate the worth of thousands of children, who will die from thyroid cancers or other cancers in the coming decades?

The big question is: Who will pay for the costs of a second Chernobyl catastrophe if it occurs. That risk is high. All the money spent on upgrading inherently unsafe reactors will be wasted: it only supports the nuclear industry and prevents real changes and improvements in the energy infrastructure. It seems that no one wants to think about the risks, consequences and costs of another catastrophe. The grip of the nuclear lobbies in Russia, Ukraine and the West on energy policy is still very strong at the moment, but a second Chernobyl will spell the end of it. But too late and at too high a cost. It is a pity to see that the EU has finally bowed to the short-term interests of its nuclear industry. Prevention is still better than curing.


Ukraine nuclear power program

The nuclear lobby is satisfied with the changed G-7 policy. The more absurd and unrealistic energy demands are, the better for them. The more electricity is used or wasted, the better they can claim nuclear energy cannot be missed. The pro-nuclear government is not interested in real 'least-cost' options. That is the hurdle that stays in the way of real solutions.

In Ukraine, the opposition to the closure of Chernobyl is growing. In February 1996, a two-week coal miners' strike resulted in a severe energy crisis in the country. As many as 10,000 industrial enterprises were closed till mid-March. This was seized upon by the government to point at the importance of nuclear energy. The government wants the Chernobyl plant to operate until 2007, so the plant can bring in more than $5 billion in electricity exports. The Ukraine's industries owe electricity utilities about $855,6 million for power.28 Thus, the nuclear power plants have no money to pay for the salaries of their personnel or for their nuclear fuel.

The Ukrainian nuclear lobby has developed ambitious plans for a national nuclear industry and an accelerated development of nuclear power, which have been approved by the government, the President and the Supreme Soviet. These plans call for:- building of storage sites for spent fuel and nuclear waste- a threefold production of uranium- a national nuclear fuel factory- building of four new nuclear plants before 2000- a uranium conversion factory for the production of UF6- the restart of Chernobyl reactor no. 2- the operation of the Chernobyl reactors for another ten years- adjusting the Ukrainian industry to the needs of the nuclear industry.

All these plans will cost billions of dollars, money that will not be spent on non-nuclear energy investments, which would be much more cost-efficient and make the country far less dependent on imports.

" And since we couldn't do anything anyway, we had no problems with our conscience any more. if, for example, we were given an order to dig up the earth from the buildings to the fences: we just moved the fences and that was it ... Cleaning up just one part seemed like utter nonsense (as did the cleaning up of everything else while the power plant continued to spit out contamination), and so we simply decreased the measures of nonsense and started to fit our days in the categories of the comfort of this nonsense."

Source: Tiit Tarlap, Chernobyl 1986, Memories of an Estonian Cleanup Worker.
Today, 85 per cent of Ukraine's nuclear requirements are imported. On the basis of these plans, this share should be decreased to 60 per cent in 2000, which is not much less.29 Currently, the nuclear plants do not even have enough money to pay for spare parts or repairs. Nobody knows from where the billions must come to finance a complete nuclear fuel cycle.30

Russian nuclear policy

In Russia, nuclear ambitions are even grander than in Ukraine. Minatom, the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Industry, wants to build thirty new nuclear reactors.31 The nuclear industry has succeeded in protecting itself. It has many privileges, including its secrecy and the total financial dependence on the taxpayer. The cost of nuclear energy is classified - a matter of national security. This cover of secrecy permits the nuclear lobby to ask for trillions of rubles.32 The nuclear industry claims that nuclear energy is cheap and clean, and that there is no alternative to it. But nuclear energy has proven to be neither safe nor cheap.

Russia has always refused to close its Chernobyl-type reactors (RBMK), of which there are eleven. It even finished a new RBMK after Chernobyl: the Smolensk 3 reactor, in 1990. Plans to build a new reprocessing plant have been postponed due to a lack of financing. The old reprocessing plants are however still in operation. Dangerous accidents and explosions in nuclear facilities or near meltdowns in nuclear submarines occur nearly each year. In the Sosnovy Bor nuclear plant near St. Petersburg, a nuclear fuel failure led to an escape of radioactivity, detected in Finland and Sweden.33 In March 1995, a military rocket was misfired from a fighter airplane. It exploded in a little village, four and a half kilometers from the Novovoronezh nuclear complex, which has three reactors. Two of them have no safety containment.34 The nuclear safety situation is now worse than before 26 April 1986. Even in Belarus, which was also hit most severely by the Chernobyl catastrophe, the government plans to build nuclear reactors, against the will of the population.35


No nuclear safety

When the Ukrainian parliament decided in Oct. 1993 to postpone closure of the Chernobyl reactors and lifted the moratorium on building new nuclear plants, much criticism was heard, from inside and outside the country. The former chairman of the Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Commission (GANU), Kopchinsky, said that the decision to continue operation of Chernobyl was purely made on economic grounds without analysis of the safety level and ignored the opinion of the GANU. Kopchinsky said this kind of attitude was "one of the main causes of the Chernobyl catastrophe". According to him, Ukraine lacks the nuclear infrastructure necessary for reliable and safe nuclear operation. GANU cannot issue licenses to nuclear facilities due to a lack of a licensing law. Moreover, safety audits of operating plants are often not completed; thus upgrades are on hold and safety at risk.36The IAEA was so concerned about the decision to postpone closure of Chernobyl that it asked Ukraine to be allowed to review the safety of Chernobyl. After a two-week status review, the IAEA sounded the alarm, especially on Chernobyl's safety level. The safety conditions were considered so grave that IAEA director Hans Blix himself went to President Kravchuk to tell him personally. Lederman of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Division said: 'We see additional deficiencies that have not been corrected'.37

The IAEA team found 38 'main safety shortcomings in major areas':

  • Layout problems, poor separation between control and protection systems
  • No emergency control room for units 1 & 2
  • No filtered ventilation in the main control room
  • Units 1 & 2 have no accident localization system, such as that found in the later-generation RBMKs.
  • Main steam lines are located directly above the control room in units 1 & 2, which means that radioactive steam is released directly to the atmosphere, in case of overpressure in the reactor building. This is a deficiency that has 'no feasible solution' at present. Leak rates from 'hermetic' compartments are as high as 40 per cent per hour at 40 per cent overpressure, the IAEA group found.
  • The ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) cannot cope with breaks in pipes with a diameter bigger than 300 mm.
  • The IAEA faulted the design's limited capability for pressure relief which cannot cope with the break of no more than four pressure tubes, out of a total of 1660 tubes!
  • No equipment for non-destructive examination of metal components like the pressure tubes and reactor vessel. Other RBMKs in Russia and Lithuania have procured this equipment, but at Chernobyl: 'we didn't find anything coming in the future'.
  • Serious deficiencies were found in fire protection, especially at unit 1.
  • Radiological protection: several serious deficiencies, insufficient instrumentation to cover radioactive ranges associated with accidents - even eight years after!
  • The IAEA was also concerned about the capability for procuring modern equipment and spare parts.The IAEA message is that those backfits are not enough to convince the world that Chernobyl can be operated safely.
The IAEA is alarmed about the deteriorating conditions of units 1 & 3 and unit 4's sarcophagus. The sarcophagus is in a bad state and because it has a wall in common with reactor 3, there is a danger of a second Chernobyl if this wall collapses and falls on reactor 3.39 The Consortium Alliance, formed to study a long-term solution for containing Chernobyl reactor 4, under a 3 million ECU contract with the European Commission, concluded that a new shelter must be built over both unit 4 and adjacent unit 3, because they share common facilities.40 The present sarcophagus, built in haste in a few months after the disaster in April 1986, is unstable and could collapse under external forces, like heavy snowfall or earthquakes.41 Building the new shelter will be very costly and it will mean that Chernobyl unit 3 would have to be closed and decommissioned.42 The IAEA also reported on the safety of the oldest type VVER-440/230, for which design concerns remain.43 The IAEA also denies that the more modern VVER-1000 can meet Western safety standards.44 Mr. Umanets, former manager of Chernobyl and now chief of Nuclear Power Operations (Goskomatom), intends to close the Chernobyl reactors by 2003 at the earliest. He will, if necessary, re-open and backfit the closed unit 2 (heavily damaged by a fire in 1991), just as unit 1 was reopened in 1992. He claims that since 1986, 270 million rubles have been spent on safety measures at the plant, 25 per cent of the original cost. Umanets also says that Goskomatom will soon submit to the government a set of measures for improving the safety of Chernobyl, at a cost of $540 million.45


Other problems

Characteristic of the serious safety situation is the fact that because of financial limitations, the nuclear plants not only have trouble buying fuel and spare parts, but also have had to freeze all programs to review plant safety. A life-long nuclear energy proponent, Kopchinsky, director of Ukraine's Nucon said: 'Today, the safety of operating nuclear units in Ukraine is an increasingly important, very grave, concern. There is a severe deficit of the safety culture, even at the highest level of the government. A situation which can be considered strange in a country that is home to the worst disaster in human history.'46

The old attitude of keeping things secret, remains a big problem. On March 11, 1996, it became known that a serious accident at the third Chernobyl reactor had taken place in Nov. 1995.47In the Ukraine, there is a catastrophic outflow of qualified personnel, over 2500 in 1993, of which 1000 are very high skilled. They have been replaced by 'reserve' personnel from nuclear units under construction, hit by the moratorium. But soon there will be no more 'reserves'. The low salaries are the main problem; these are only one-fifth of the salaries in the Russian nuclear industry.48 In Russia, the operators are the first to recognize that their plants are far from ideal. Inspection technology is especially sought. During a workshop in the US on December 12, 1994, speakers from Ukraine and Russia agreed: 'Because of economic difficulties, safety at nuclear stations is more imperiled than ever.'49 In Lithuania not only serious accidents happened, such as a near-meltdown. Also threats of sabotage, which took place at the Ignalina nuclear station. Fortunately, no explosives went off.50A Swedish safety expert remarks: 'The Eastern Europeans want equipment to avoid accidents. The West wants to give them equipment to mitigate the accidents.' He concludes: 'The West is not aiding Eastern Europe's nuclear safety or learning from it'.51Besides the safety risks of the nuclear reactors, the sarcophagus also poses a great danger. If the sarcophagus falls, it can ruin the neighboring reactor no 3 and hence cause a second Chernobyl. There exists also a real danger that the nuclear fuel and dust from reactor no 4 will be partly set free if the sarcophagus fails. Studies about building a second shelter around the sarcophagus show that the shelter must be built around reactors no 3 and 4, because these reactors have some walls and chimneys in common, which are in danger of collapsing. The costs will be high. The Ukrainian government does not yet intend to build this shelter, due to lack of money. The G-7 together with the EU should pay for it. Prevention of a second Chernobyl is a good investment: it is cheaper than coping with the consequences. After a second Chernobyl, the call for closure of Western nuclear reactors will be too loud to ignore. Closing them means an enormous capital destruction, equivalent to many times the cost of building a new shelter around Chernobyl.

Sources:

  1. Nucleonics Week, 22 June 1995; "Kuchma's Chernobyl closure pledge praised but not funded by G-7" p.18
  2. Transition, 17 Nov. 1995; "The Chornobyl Fallout Persists" p.21
  3. NRC (NL), 26 June 1993; "Tsjernobyl 1993: vrijwillige brandweer eist compensatie" (Chernobyl 1993: voluntary firemen demand compensation)
  4. Volkskrant (NL), 23 June 1993; "Moderniseren kerncentrales in Oostblok te duur" (Modernising nuclear reactors eastern-bloc too expensive)
  5. Nucleonics Week, 26 March 1992; "ABB Head says Europe must finance closure of all RBMKs, old VVERs" p.1
  6. Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 1 July 1992; "Strittiger Sanierungsfonds" (Contested Sanitation Fund)
  7. "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of the G-7 Countries and the Commission of the European Communities on the Closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear power Plant" 20 Dec. 1995
  8. Transition, 17 Nov. 1995; "The Chornobyl Fallout Persists" p.21
  9. Nucleonics Week, 22 June 1995; "Kuchma's Chernobyl closure pledge praised but not funded by G-7" p.18
  10. Nucleonics Week, 16 June 1994; "French, German back funding VVER construction if Chernobyl closed" p.6
  11. Hervormd Nederland, (NL), 4 July 1992; "Dom, duur en riskant" (Stupid, Expensive and Risky)
  12. Nucleonics Week, 7 July 1994; "Ukrainians say proposed EU aid is 'obviously insufficient'" p.6
  13. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993; "Russia's nuclear elite on rampage" p.14
  14. Volkskrant (NL), 10 June 1993; "De laksheid van Europa na Tsjernobyl" (Europe's laxity after Chernobyl)
  15. Lahmeyer International, July 1995; "Ukraine Power Sector Least Cost Investment Plan and Training Programme", cited in: Atomwirtschaft (FRG), Aug/Sept. 1995, p.562
  16. Letter from Bill Chandler, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (USA), to Miriam Bowling, NRDC, dated: 5 Jan. 1996
  17. Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 26 March 1992: "Wer nachrüstet, ist mitschuldig am nächsten Unfall" (Who upgrades, is guilty of causing the next accident)
  18. Greenpeace Press Report, 21 Dec. 1995; "Greenpeace Calls G7 Memorandum on Chernobyl Closure, Clear Evidence that Lessons Have Not Been Learned"
  19. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Dec. 1994; "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.3
  20. Nucleonics Week, 15 June 1995; "EBRD Commits Funds For Upgrades At Three Russian Nuclear Plants" p.1
  21. Trouw (NL), 31 Dec. 1994; "Raad van State verwerpt bezwaren tegen Borssele" (State Council rejects objections against Borssele)
  22. Nucleonics Week, 24 Nov. 1994; "Economic Distress Complicates Search For Solutions At Chernobyl" p.9
  23. Uranium Institute (UK), Dec. 1995; "Nuclear Power in Ukraine" p.1
  24. Nucleonics Week, 24 Nov. 1994; "Economic Distress Complicates Search For Solutions At Chernobyl" p.9
  25. Itar-Tass (Rus), 8 Aug. 1995, cited: in Transition, 17 Nov. 1995; "The Chornobyl Fallout Persists" p.22
  26. Reuter, 13 Febr. 1996; "Belarus, Ukraine want action on Chernobyl disaster"
  27. Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), 15 June 1994; "Non-Nuclear Options for Replacing Chernobyl", p.18
  28. International Herald Tribune (IHT), 19 Febr. 1996; "Ukraine Factories Being Shut Down Amid Energy Crisis"
  29. Uranium Institute (UK), Sept. 1995; "Nuclear Power in Ukraine" p.4
  30. Nucleonics Week, 10 Nov. 1994; "Ukraine Accepts Chernobyl Close But Doesn't Commit To Schedule" p.15
  31. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993; "Russia's nuclear elite on rampage" p.14
  32. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993; "Russia's nuclear elite on rampage" p.14
  33. WISE News Communique 369.3619, 27 March 1992; "Accident at Russian Sosnovy Bor no 3"
  34. Der Spiegel (FRG), no 12, 1995; "Ausser Kontrolle" (Out of Control) p.156
  35. Uranium Issues (UK), Nov. 1993; "Belarus looks to nuclear power" p.4
  36. Nucleonics Week, 7 April 1994; "Chernobyl Operations Scored By Former Deputy Chief" p.11
  37. Nucleonics Week, 7 April 1994; "IAEA Sounds Alarm On Chernobyl Safety Level", p.10
  38. IAEA Pressrelease PR 94/10, 31 March 1994; "The IAEA Reviews the Safety of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant"
  39. The Observer (UK), 26 March 1995; "West faces new radiation threat"
  40. Nucleonics Week, 23 March 1995; "Alliance Group Says Chernobyl- 3 Must Be Shut To Shelter Unit 4" p.1,10
  41. Nucleonics Week, 7 April 1994; "IAEA Sounds Alarm On Chernobyl Safety Level", p.10
  42. Nucleonics Week, 14 April 1994; "IAEA Sets Crisis Talks To Explore Options For Ukraine, Chernobyl" p.1,10
  43. Nucleonics Week, 26 May 1994; "IAEA Experts Say V-230 Safety Better But More Work Needed" p.12,13
  44. Nucleonics Week, 10 March 1994, "IAEA, DOE Quietly Deny Saying VVER-100 Can Meet Western Norms" p.1,8
  45. Nucleonics Week, 10 Nov. 1994; "Ukraine Accepts Chernobyl Close But Doesn't Commit To Schedule" p.14
  46. Nucleonics Week, 24 Nov. 1994; "Economic Distress Complicates Search For Solutions At Chernobyl" p.9,10
  47. Reuter, 8 March 1996; "Chernobyl incident understated before anniversary"
  48. Nucleonics Week, 17 March 1994; "Umanets: Western Help On VVERs Means Chernobyl Close By 2003" p.16
  49. Nucleonics Week, 17 Nov. 1994; "Vendors Ask U.S. Aid In Technology Transfer To Improve Ex-USSR Safety", p.13
  50. Le Monde (Fr), 17 Nov. 1994; "Lituanie: fausse alerte à la bombe dans une centrale nucléaire" (Lithuania: false bomb-alarm in a nuclear reactor)
  51. Nucleonics Week, 10 March 1994; "Experts Says West Isn't Aiding East's Safety, Or Learning From It" p.9
Contents Introduction 1 top 3 4
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