published by WISE News Communique on April 10, 1996




Contents Introduction 1 2 3 4

1. Extending the dangers: Western Financing Policy


" Here in this big town (Pripyat), amid the nine-, twelve- and fiveteen-story buildings, I sensed for the first time catastrophe. A sense - not previous knowlege. You couldn't feel it in the villages - there everything was green as usual - and in the distant inhabited cities. But there, the silence reigned - despite the presence of a whole battalion, a whole regiment. If you ignored the growing grass, it seemed as if time had stopped in a tenth of a second. On the balconies laundry hung for the fifth month, at newsstands were newspapers with the date April twenty eight, and on glass-covered boards were long outdated ads. And everywhere was emptyness."

Source:Tiit Tarlap, Chernobyl 1986, Memories of an Estonian Cleanup Worker.

Introduction

Since the Chernobyl disaster, there has been a lot of discussion about the closure of unsafe reactors in the former Soviet bloc. Pressure for the shutdown of the Russian RBMK reactors (the Chernobyl type) and the oldest pressurized water reactors, the VVER-440/230s, was particularly strong. In the West, the opinion was widespread that these reactors should be closed as soon as possible. Even well-known nuclear lobbyists were saying this. Until today, however, most of these reactors have not been shut down. Since November 1995, one of the Medzamor reactors in Armenia has been producing electricity again. Bulgaria continues to operate its four Kozloduy reactors despite agreements earlier made for their closure. In the Chernobyl plant itself, two of the four reactors are still operating.

After the Chernobyl disaster, it took some time before concrete efforts aimed at having unsafe reactors closed could be undertaken. In fact, concrete initiatives got off the ground only in 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The dramatic political and social changes in the former Soviet bloc did not help to accelerate these efforts. In 1989 and 1990, the European Union (EU) started two assistance programs called Phare and Tacis. Until 1989, economic cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe took place only on a bilateral basis. One part of the EU programs was assistance in closing or upgrading RBMK and VVER-230 reactors. Until 1990, only the four VVER-440/230 reactors and a VVER-440/213 in Greifswald (former East Germany) were closed. In 1992, the G-7 launched the plan to create a Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), designed to help the former Eastern bloc countries modernize their nuclear reactors.

This chapter summarizes the initiatives that were taken during the past decade to close the most unsafe reactors in the former Eastern bloc. A Counter Offensive. In 1979, the Harrisburg (U.S.) accident happened. The core of the reactor in Harrisburg melted and radioactive energy was emitted. The consequences of this very serious nuclear accident showed how disastrous such an accident could be for the nuclear industry. All orders for new reactors in the US were cancelled. All at once, some of the biggest reactor builders in the world lost their biggest market. After the Chernobyl accident, something similar happened. Several Western European countries decided not to build new nuclear power stations at least for a certain while.

In an effort to polish its image, the nuclear industry desperately started a campaign to typify the Eastern reactors as very dangerous and the Western reactors as safe. In this campaign, the oldest Russian reactors were often compared with the the most modern Western reactors. There was much attention focused on the shortcomings of the Russian reactors like the lack of safety containment. Such a containment is important because it can help keep the radioactivity inside the reactor after an accident. Most of the Western reactors have a safety containment. But not all of the Western reactors have it and sometimes they do not have a good one. On the other hand, quite a number of the modern Russian reactors have a containment. So the perception that Eastern reactors are unsafe because, unlike Western reactors, they do not have a safety containment is not really accurate. Some other deficiencies in Russian reactors can also be found in Western reactors, such as the absence of certain security systems. And certain Western reactors can be just as badly maintained as some Russian ones.


Safety investigations

Two years after the Chernobyl disaster, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) received the first requests from Eastern European countries for the investigation of the safety of their nuclear power stations. Several investigation programs were set up. One of the first safety missions advised the Bulgarian government in 1991 to stop the operations of the VVER-440/230 reactors in Kozloduy.

In the same year, the IAEA also carried out a general investigation on the safety of the VVER-230 type of reactors. The result was a list of about one hundred safety defects in the VVER-230. About sixty of these defects were very serious.1 According to the IAEA, these problems had to be solved immediately. At the same time, however, the IAEA had to admit that a lot of them could not be solved immediately.2 The IAEA presented only a summary of its report to the public, claiming that it lacked finances to publish the full report.3 It seems that the IAEA found it difficult to openly come out with the startling conclusion that the ten VVER-230 reactors that were operating at that time should be closed as soon as possible.

With regards to the RBMK reactors, a similar investigation program was started. The conclusion of the IAEA was even more urgent: all sixteen existing RBMK reactors should be closed immediately.4

Reacting to the results of the IAEA investigation into the safety of VVER-230 reactors, Greenpeace warned of the risk of a major nuclear accident resulting from the continued operations of this type of reactors. According to Greenpeace, the chance of a serious meltdown of the core of the VVER-230 reactor occurring within five years was 25 percent. This conclusion was based on the risk analyses that the IAEA carried out in the Russian Kola reactor.5


Assistance programs

At the beginning of the 1990s, the initial ideas regarding the extension of Western assistance for modernizing unsafe Eastern reactors surfaced. In 1989, the G-7, the conference of the seven richest industrial countries in the world, had emphasized the difference between Eastern and Western reactors and stuck to the safety norms that were valid at that time. In 1991, the G-7 gave special attention to the nuclear situation in the former Eastern bloc and set up a commission of the G-24 (the OECD plus Turkey) to coordinate several assistance programs. The G-24 Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination (Nusac) made an inventory of the types of assistance, tried to avoid duplication of work and searched for problems possibly overlooked.6

The opinions differed on how much money was needed to make the Eastern reactors safe. The German Society for Reactor Safety (GRS) estimated in 1991 that 15 to 20 billion German marks (US $10 to 15 billion) would be needed to upgrade the Eastern reactors to Western safety standards. With this amount, 58 reactors could be adjusted and another five completed, according to the GRS.7 In 1992, the IAEA and Western industries declared that an amount between five and 50 billion dollars would be needed to make the most dangerous Eastern reactors safer.8 The enormous margin between these two figures clearly show that safety is a very elastic notion.

The financial feasibility of reactor modernization gets clearer if one looks at the situation of the Greifswald reactors in the former East Germany. At the time of the German reunification in 1990, a discussion started on the future of the Greifswald reactors and of the unfinished plants in Stendahl. Greifswald was closed because adjustment to West German safety norms would have been too expensive. The completion of the reactors in Stendahl in accordance with West German norms would have been as expensive as the construction of completely new plants.9


The EU assistance programs Phare and Tacis

Phare and Tacis are Assistance Programs which the European Union established to support the political and economic reforms in the former Soviet bloc. Phare, which has been in operation since 1990, addresses Central and Eastern European countries. Since 1992, the Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been included in the program. Tacis, which has been in operation since 1991, addresses the former Soviet republics and, since 1994, also Mongolia. In the first year, 13 Million Ecu (Mecu) 10 from the Tacis budget was spent on the Baltic states. Since 1992, these countries have been included in the Phare program. The assistance consists of policy advice, training, grants and credits. The financing does not only come from the European Union, but also from member states. Germany has invested a lot in Phare projects, especially in projects in the neighbor countries Poland and the Czech Republic. Tacis in fact contains the same kind of activities, but with different priorities. There is a special budget for 'Environment and Nuclear Safety'. The nuclear activities of both Phare and Tacis are defined in close cooperation.

The projects of Phare en Tacis are defined and carried out on the basis of requests from the countries concerned. Special Phare and Tacis Committees, which consist of representatives of the EU member states, discuss these requests. The final budget is appointed by the European Commission. The budget is then presented to the European Parliament (EP) that can only approve or reject it. The EP is not allowed to approve (or reject) parts of the budget. This hampers a good evaluation of projects and democratic decision-making.


Phare

In 1994, the total budget of Phare was 963.3 Mecu. In the period from 1990 until 1994, the cumulative amount was 4,248.4 Mecu.11 About nine per cent of this amount- 401.4 Mecu- was spent for 'Environment and Nuclear Safety'. In 1994, 77.5 Mecu was spent for projects under 'Environment and Nuclear Safety'. The budget for nuclear safety in 1994 was 20 Mecu.12 Under the Phare multi-country program in 1994, only 9.0 Mecu was allocated for nuclear projects. These were projects in Paks (Hungary), Kozloduy (Bulgaria), Bohunice (Slovakia) and Dukovany (Czech Republic).13
In 1995, 13.5 Mecu was earmarked for nuclear projects in the Phare multi-country program, and 3.5 Mecu for safety research (combined Phare/Tacis). The research program included not only integrity of reactor pressure-vessels, monitoring the aging of electric cables in containment, but also technical assistance in the implementation of security systems and the reform of regulatory bodies.14


Tacis

In 1994, the Tacis project budget was 469.7 Mecu. 88 Mecu was earmarked for projects connected with 'Environment and Nuclear Safety'. Of this amount, 75 Mecu was reserved for nuclear safety.15 For the period from 1991 to 1994, the total budget of Tacis was 1,756.9 Mecu. 321 Mecu went to 'Environment and Nuclear Safety'.16

In 1994, the Tacis budget for nuclear projects in the Russian Federation was 40 Mecu. The Tacis budget for nuclear projects in the Ukraine was 15 Mecu (excluding several projects with an undefined budget). In the 1995 Tacis budget, the allocations for nuclear projects in the Russian Federation and in the Ukraine were 29 Mecu and 39 Mecu, respectively. The most important projects were the construction of a solid waste processing plant and of a solid waste retrieval facility. These two installations are situated near the nuclear power plants in Chernobyl and will need investments of about 30 Mecu altogether.17


The inertia of the international community

In spite of Tacis, Phare and several bilateral programs, international assistance for nuclear safety in the former Eastern bloc countries has not been satisfactory in terms of both the actual amounts given and the rapidness with which these have been extended. Furthermore, the VVER-230 and RBMK reactors have not been closed at all. Only the RBMK 2 reactor in Chernobyl was stopped in 1991 after a serious fire. The Eastern governments have been criticized by Western institutions because of their bureaucratic way of working. Western companies have persistently refused to start working for as long as there are no clear agreements about legal responsibility. They do not want to take financial risks with regards possible accidents. The insistence on liability arrangements shows that Western companies see the possibility of a serious accident with big consequences as something very real.

Russian authorities were very much concerned about the image of the Russian nuclear industry. In an interview in Moscow News, the Deputy Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering Reshetnikov said that he viewed particular statements by Western experts as an attack against Russian industry. He said that the RBMK reactors can operate until the year 2000 at the very least. He has even asserted, "Russian reactors are the safest reactors in the world." 18 The Russian refusal to close the RBMK reactors is also connected to the fact that these reactors are suitable for producing weapons-grade plutonium. In the past, the RBMK reactors were used to produce plutonium for Russian nuclear weapons.19
In the beginning of 1992, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs said that until then, nearly nothing had been spent from the EU Assistance budget of 160 million guilders.20 The EP passed a resolution in April 1992 that calls for more intensive assistance programs, for more funds and manpower. While aware that it is not possible to adjust the RBMK and VVER-230 in accordance with Western safety standards, the EP points out the risks of the successor of the VVER-230, the VVER-213. Furthermore, the EP wants a stock-taking of nuclear installations which could be modernized to Western safety levels. The EP's position is that if a nuclear installation cannot be upgraded to meet these safety norms, it should be closed as soon as possible. By way of compensation, the EP insists on programs which are oriented towards decentralization and alternative energy production.21
During the preparations for the G-7 Summit in Munich (July 1992), the governments of Germany and France tried to get larger financial commitments from the other G-7 countries for assistance programs. According to Bonn and Paris, at least $9 billion would be needed to close the most unsafe reactors and make the others safe. This would be financed by industry, loans from banks and international financial institutions and loans and grants from governments.22


Prehistory of a necessity fund

Because of delays in the assistance programs and intentions, the G-7 felt compelled to give more attention to the problem of the most unsafe reactors in the former Eastern bloc. During the G-7 Summit in July 1992, this problem even became one of the main topics. Economic assistance to the former Soviet republics in a broader sense was also discussed in Munich. The G-7 allotted $24 billion for this, but set the condition that more economic reforms would first have to be implemented.23

A proposal for a special Necessity Fund of $700 million for assistance programs to make Russian reactors safe was put forward. Under this proposal, priority would be given to the most unsafe VVER-230 and RBMK reactors. Future projects would focus on adjusting the worst reactors, which would be closed as soon as new reactors could be built to replace them. This fund would not work with loans, as the costs of the adjustments would never be earned back during the remaining operating period of the reactors.24The Necessity Fund did not get easily off the ground. The USA and Japan, geographically far from the dangerous reactors, were not very enthousiastic about it. Both countries preferred bilateral projects. If an American company directly concluded a contract with an Eastern European government, this could lead to more contracts in the future. But if the initial contract had to be concluded via an international fund, the chances of future contracts for American companies would be much smaller.25 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which disburses the funds, is dominated by European countries, particularly France and Germany. The US and Japan fear that the European nuclear industry (Edf and KWU/Siemens) would eventually get the bulk of future orders.

In spite of initial problems, the Necessity Fund was set up in April 1993. The General Director for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection of the European Union, L.J. Brinkhorst stressed the need for such a fund: "If a catastrophe like Chernobyl ever happens again, public opinion will never ever accept new nuclear power plants."26 Thus, the fund was not only meant as an investment for the safety of Eastern reactors, but also as an investment for the future of Western reactor constructors.


Super mice!

Scientists of the University of Georgia studying wildlife in contaminated wastes around Chernobyl have made a sinister discovery - voles that thrive on radioactive pollution.

Radioactivity and other pollutants usually trigger mutations in animal genes, which weaken the species by killing its members off before they can reproduce. But a species of vole is breeding healthily and producing ever-stronger offspring beside the Ukraine's Chernobyl plant, which exploded in 1986 spewing out radioactive poison in the world's worst nuclear disaster.

The scientists examined the supervole's genetic make-up and found it was mutating at an incredible rate. Since genetic diversity is what ensures the survival of a species, the supervoles were actually becoming more resilient.

Scientists measure the rate of genetic mutation by looking at the gene which codes for a protein called cytochrome b, found in the cell's mitochondria. Under normal circumstances, the cytochrome b gene changes at a rate of one mutation in every one million letters of genetic code per generation. But the supervole's cytochrome b gene was producing one new mutation for every 10,000 letters of DNA code per generation. One female vole, which built her nest beneath a monument praising the Soviet workers that built the Chernobyl power station, produced five offspring, of which three had newly mutated versions of the cytochrome b gene. Voles of the same species living 30 km away, outside the contaminated area, had normal rates of mutation. "We're seeing more diversity in the mitochondrial DNA between two individual Chernobyl voles than we see between two different species, such as mice and rats," said Chesser, one of the scientists.
Source: Reuter, 28 Februari 1996

The Nuclear Safety Account (NSA)

The name of the fund, now hosted at the EBRD, is the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA). The EBRD provides the NSA with facilities like staff and also prepares its projects. Within a short period, fourteen individual countries, apart from the EU, have become NSA participants. The minimum contribution of every participating donor country is 1.5 Mecu.27

The EBRD does the pre-selection of projects, while the NSA decides on the allocation of funds. Once a project is approved, a Project Management Unit (PMU) is set up to take charge of its implementation. The PMUs, which are established by electricity companies, are assisted by Western advisors.28 Only companies from the donor countries and from the receiving countries can subscribe to the projects. The final division of the orders among countries has to conform to the amount of money that these countries pay. This means that a donor country that makes a large amount of funds available for the NSA will be able to get big orders. In this way, the donors earn their money back.29

Eastern countries can also apply for orders. In practice, however, Western companies get most of them. An NSA report (April 1995) shows that of the orders given until then in connection with the projects in Kozloduy and Ignalina, only 2.9 percent went to Eastern companies. This 2.9 percent refers to two orders for Bulgaria in connection with the plant of Kozloduy.30 NSA decisions are made on the basis of consensus in the Assembly of Contributors, which consists of all participating donors (EU, US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.) The donors do not question the modernization of the oldest reactors. For them, there is no alternative, since the Eastern countries refuse to close these reactors.31


NSA projects

In July 1993, the first NSA project was approved: the adjustment of the reactors in Kozloduy, Bulgaria. Kozloduy's VVER-230 reactors would be patched up; a date for the closure of these reactors however was also set. The total costs of this project will amount to 24 Mecu.32 A few months later, the decision was made to spend 33 Mecu to patch up the two RBMK reactors in Ignalina, Lithuania - the biggest RBMKs ever built (1,500 MW each). Lithuania promised to close these reactors fifteen to twenty years after the original start-up operation (in 1983 and in 1986). This would be the moment that the fuelchannels would have to be replaced. Reactor 1 was expected to be closed in 1998. But the NSA has again made 7.3 Mecu available for a supplementary investigation into the possibility of keeping the reactor in operation for an additional period. On the basis of the results of this investigation, a final decision will be made on when the reactor will be closed.33

During the summer of 1995, three other projects were approved. 30 Mecu was made available for the Leningrad (Sosnovy Bor) RBMK reactors, 45 Mecu for the VVER reactors in Kola and Novovoronezh and 0.9 Mecu for the Russian Safety Authority. Furthermore, an agreement was reached that Russia would permit an investigation into the safety and economic necessity of all its VVER-230 reactors and its oldest RBMK reactors. The Kursk-1 reactor will not start operating before 1998; it will be allowed to operate only after a detailed safety investigation and a new licence.34 For these three NSA projects, no concrete closing dates have been set. This implies the risk that the electricity companies will decide upon the closing dates themselves and will refer to the safety adjustments in order to keep these plants operating. Kozloduy already is an example of this. The fact that no concrete closing dates have been set is a serious weakening of the demand that unsafe installations must be closed.

In the near future, the NSA will start a project to patch up the Chernobyl 3 reactor. According to the NSA, the Chernobyl 1 reactor is too old to be modernized, and it will be closed before Chernobyl 3.35 Located in the same building as the ill-fated Chernobyl 4 reactor, Chernobyl 3 is a very dangerous reactor. Because of the unstable construction of the sarcophagus that now wraps reactor 4, there is a great risk that the sarcophagus could collapse.36


No progress

Shortly before the G-7 Summit in Naples (July 1994), a report of the World Bank showed that little progress had been made since 1986 and that the international community had missed various opportunities. Already, in 1993, the World Bank had published a report on the possible scenarios with regard to the VVER-230 and RBMK reactors. The conclusions were very clear: The reactors could be closed within a few years without the risk of an energy shortage. It would cost $18 billion to replace the old RBMK reactors by gas-fired plants, while upgrading of the reactors would cost $24 billion dollars.37 A year later, the World Bank concluded that the closure of the RBMK and VVER reactors had not even been started.38 The choice was made for patching up these reactors and keeping them open. An expensive option and a very dangerous one.


Camouflaging the lack of decisiveness

As mentioned earlier, many voices called for the immediate closure of Chernobyl-type reactors - the RBMKs - after the Chernobyl disaster. Nearly everybody seemed convinced that it would not be feasible to modernize these reactors and bring their safety in accordance with the Western standards. In a statement to the German media, A. Hüttl, the Director of the German KraftWerk Union (KWU), the Reactor Construction Division of Siemens, was very emphatic: "We can do nothing about this. These reactors must be closed."39 This statement even seems to exclude emergency measures with regard to the RBMK. Despite statements such as this, not even one RBMK reactor has been closed as a result of Western pressure. On the contrary, quite a lot of money is now being spent to try to upgrade these reactors. The Chernobyl experience shows how and why the Western view has changed over the past decade.

The present situation in the Ukraine and other former Soviet republics is not only a debacle in terms of safety but also a strategic and diplomatic fiasco for the Western countries. Until 1990, the RBMK reactors were completely ignored in the plans that were made. Until that moment, nobody even wanted to look at this problem. Western experts saw only one solution: the closure of these reactors as soon as possible. Lip-service to the closure option seemed to be enough; concrete measures were not taken. The German KWU/Siemens, which is permanently looking for orders in Eastern Europe, has given the RBMK locations a wide berth. So has the rest of the Western world. The results are that the RBMKs remaine in operation and that Western assistance for replacement of those plants and energy-saving measures have not come through. A policy of accomplished facts has followed: Because no assistance for an alternative energy path has materialized, it is now 'necessary' to keep the RBMK reactors open. As a consequence of this policy, the prevailing view has changed from the immediate closure option to the patch-up option. First in Sweden, with the Lithuanian RBMK in Ignalina in its backyard, then within the IAEA, the European Union and the US.

The diplomatic fiasco came right after this strategic fiasco. The verbal pressure for the closure was not followed by any action, neither for the upgrading of plants nor for an alternative energy policy. This Western inertia was used by the Russian nuclear industry, which still is very centralized and which still has a lot of the communist nomenklatura in powerful positions,40 to set aside Western demands as "capitalistic propaganda". The Russian Vice-Minister of Nuclear Energy Reshetnikow stated in June 1992 in an interview by the Moscow News: "The Western politicians and businessmen are now aiming at the Russian market." Question: "Do you believe that the West is not interested in investing money in boosting the safety of the Russian-built reactors?" Answer: "Yes, I do agree with this."41

The safety debacle is a logical consequence of the strategic and diplomatic failure. The most unsafe reactors, which should have been closed immediately, are still operating. Worse, a number of new RBMKs started operating after April 1986: Smolensk 3 in Russia (November 1989) and Ignalina 2 in Lithuania (December 1986).
While the verbal demand for the immediate closure of Chernobyl-type reactors is repeated after every accident in a RBMK reactor, Western nuclear industries are desperately looking for new orders. If it turns out that the most favored option - the construction of nuclear reactors to replace the RBMKs - is not feasible, the interest ultimately shifts to the upgrading of the RBMK's. At the Munich Summit, the G-7 leaders tried to respond to the public demand that something be done about the closure of these reactors. The meager result - the establishment of the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) - was a compromise between the European countries and the US and Japan. The funds available via the NSA are not being spent for the realization of relatively very cheap energy-saving measures nor for the replacement of nuclear plants by other types of energy plants. The money is mainly being spent for the upgrading of the other fifteen RBMKs and the oldest VVER reactors. In March 1992, the German Minister for Environment and Reactor Safety Klaus Töpfer said that he would oppose financial support for the upgrading of the RBMKs, because this option would not be feasible.42 In the end, the nuclear energy policy of the G-7 seems to be dictated by the Western nuclear industry. The G-7 has not been able to support a transition towards a sensible and environmentally-friendly energy policy.

Payments and assistance agreements must be examined with a magnifying glass. In every G-7 Summit, aid for Eastern Europe and the closure of Chernobyl are important items on the agenda. But nothing has thus far been achieved except general plans and discussions on who is to blame for the lack of any progress. In July 1994 on Corfu, the G-7 decided to make US $200 million available for the closure of Chernobyl. Reacting to this, the Director of the Ukrainian Nuclear Energy Company, Mikhail Umanets, said: "If it had been $200 billion, I would not complain. But $200 million is only ten per cent of what is needed."43
In the West, there are a lot of complaints about "blackmail tactics" used by the Ukraine: "If you don't give more money, we will not close Chernobyl." But blackmail tactics are also being used the other way around. For instance, as reported by Reuter in February 1996, Germany and France, in a joint memorandum, put the modernization of unsafe Eastern European reactors as a pre-condition for Central European countries to become members of the European Union. This seems to be a way for the German and French nuclear industry to keep its head above water.44


Legal liability

One of the arguments of the West for the neglect of actual steps was the question companies are afraid that they would be held liable for damage as a result of an accident in a plant they were operating or assisting. The long wait for the signing by Eastern governments of international liability treaties shows that only the nuclear option was pursued. Within that period, there would have been opportunities to start an alternative energy policy.

In October 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament unanimously and unilaterally decided to close the remaining Chernobyl reactors by the end of 1993.45 In 1993 however this decision was revoked on the pretext that the Ukraine absolutely would need the energy produced by the two operating reactors.46 This simply means that in a period of more than a year, the Western countries, all together, were not able to offer the Ukraine a replacement of the six per cent of the Ukraine energy production that the Chernobyl reactors provide. At the same time, the Ukraine still exports electricity. The quantity of the electricity exported by the Ukraine, however, has decreased from 12 percent of the total electricity production in 1990 to three per cent in 1993.47

In March 1994, the IAEA again confirmed the deplorable situation of the Chernobyl 1 and 3 reactors. Design faults in reactor 1, which still had not been corrected, were particular cause for anxiety. Other problems were the continuous loss of qualified staff and the lack of up-to-date equipment. The IAEA again emphasized that the condition of the sarcophagus of reactor 4 was continuously getting worse. 48

Sources:

  1. IAEA, Dec. 1993; "International Assistance to Upgrade the Safety of Soviet-designed Nuclear Power Plants", p.2, 8
  2. Greenpeace News Release, 11 Febr. 1991; "Greater than one-in-four chance of nuclear catastrophe unless oldest Soviet plants are closed: Greenpeace".
  3. NRC (NL), 7 Febr. 1992; "IAEA: in Oost-Europa zijn 10 atoomcentrales gebrekkig en gevaarlijk" ("IAEA: 10 obsolete and dangerous reactors in Eastern Europe)"
  4. NRC (NL), 7 May 1992; "GOS: kerncentrales nog tien jaar open" ("CIS: nuclear reactors open for another 10 years")
  5. Greenpeace News Release, 11 Febr. 1991; "Greater than one-in-four chance of nuclear catastrophe unless oldest Soviet plants are closed: Greenpeace".
  6. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Dec. 1994; "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.1
  7. NRC (NL), 28 Nov. 1991; "Miljarden nodig voor veiligheid kerncentrales SU" ("Billions needed for upgrading Soviet reactors")
  8. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1993; T. Halveson, "Ticking time bombs: East Bloc Reactors"
  9. Konfrontatie (NL), October 1992; H.vd Keur/LAKA, "Voorkom een Tweede Tsjernobyl" ("Prevent a second Chernobyl")
  10. an Ecu is the common monetary unit of the European Union; One Ecu is about US$1.25
  11. European Commission, 20 July 1995; "Phare Jaar verslag 1994" (Phare Annual Report 1994)
  12. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 Sept. 1995); "Voortgangsrapportage Nederlands Ondersteuningsbeleid Midden- en Oost-Europa" ("Progressreport on Dutch relief policy for Central- and East-Europe")
  13. European Commission, 1994; "Phare/Tacis. Contract Information Nuclear Safety Programmes. Budget 1994"
  14. European Commission, 1995: Phare/Tacis: "Contract Information Nuclear safety programma. Budget 1995"
  15. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 Sept. 1995; "Voortgangsrapportage Nederlands Ondersteuningsbeleid Midden- en Oost-Europa" ("Progressreport on Dutch relief policy for Central- and East-Europe")
  16. European Commission, 18 July 1995; "Tacis Annual Report 1994"
  17. European Commission, 1995: Phare/Tacis: "Contract Information Nuclear safety programma. Budget 1995"
  18. Moscow News (Rus), weekly no.25: 15/21 June 1992, "Nuclear War"
  19. Der Spiegel (FRG), 30 March 1992; "Keine Zeit zu warten" ("No time to wait").
  20. Graafschapsbode (NL), 19 March 1992; "EG-hulp opknappen van kerncentrales Oost-Europa faalt" (EC-support for upgrading East-European nuclear reactors fails)
  21. Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1992; B.Tigner, "EP says more money and aid needed for eastern reactors"
  22. Nucleonics Week, 16 April 1992; M.Hibbs, "Germans, French continue drive for G7 aid to unsafe reactors"
  23. Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung (FRG), 3 July 1992; "Für Brussel geht es um die nukleare Sicherheit" ("Brussel's aim is nuclear safety")
  24. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1993; T. Halveson, "Ticking time bombs: East Bloc Reactors"
  25. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 July 1992; "Länder uneinig über Reaktor-Sicherheitsprogramm" ("No agreement on reactor safety program")
  26. NRC (NL), 8 July 1992: H.Buddingh/R.Janssen; "EG coördineert beveiliging kerncentrales in GOS" (EC coordinating upgrading reactors CIS")
  27. EBRD, Dec. 1994; "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.8
  28. EBRD, Dec. 1994; "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.8
  29. EBRD, April 1995; "Report on NSA Procurement Activities", p.1
  30. EBRD, April 1995; "Report on NSA Procurement Activities", p.1
  31. Personal interview RJ.van den Berg/LAKA Foundation with Mr. Bosman (Dutch delegate at the NSA), 1 Febr. 1996
  32. EBRD, Dec. 1994, "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.10-11
  33. EBRD, Dec. 1994, "The Nuclear Safety Account" p.10-11
  34. EBRD Press Release, 9 June 1995; "Three Russian nuclear power plants to be upgraded with grant from EBRD-administered Nuclear Safety Account"
  35. EBRD, Dec. 1994; "The Nuclear Safety Account", p.11
  36. The Observer (UK), 26 March 1995; "West faces new radiation threat"
  37. World Bank/International Energy Agency, March 1993; "Nuclear power and safety in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union", p.1
  38. World Bank, 16 June 1994: Progress report on the G-7 Napels Summit; "Nuclear safety and electric power in Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine", p.1
  39. Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 24 March 1992; "EC will Tschernobyl-Reaktoren retten" (EC wants to safe Chernobyl reators)
  40. Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 26 March 1992; "Wer nachrüstest, ist mitschuldig am nächsten Unfall" (Who upgrades, is quilty of causing the next accident)
  41. Moscow News, 15/21 June 1992; "Nuclear War"
  42. Der Spiegel (FRG), 30 March 1992; "Keine Zeit zu warten" (No time to waste)
  43. International Herald Tribune (US), 13 July 1994; "Ukraine scoffs at G-7 Chernobyl aid"
  44. Reuter, 27 Febr. 1996: "Paris, Bonn urge better E. Europe nuclear safety"
  45. ANP-telex, 29 Oct. 1991; "Parlement Oekraine; kerncentrale Tsjernobyl 1993 dicht" (Ukrainian Parliament: closure Chernobyl nuclear reactors in 1993)
  46. Die Tageszeitung (FRG), 22 Oct. 1993; "Seine Väter spielen weiter" (Their fathers play on)
  47. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 15 June 1994; "Non-Nuclear options for replacing Chernobyl." p.8
  48. IAEA Press Release, PR 94/10, 31 March1994; "The IAEA rewiews the safety of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plants"
Contents Introduction top 2 3 4
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