(399.3894) WISE Amsterdam - At that time Belgium did not use MOX in its reactors, despite the fact that, in Dessel (Mol), the country has the biggest operating MOX-factory in the world.
An independent and critical analysis of the TRACTEBEL report seemed indispensable, thus one was ordered by Greenpeace Belgium. The report, LE MOX ou L'ABERRATION AU PLUTONIUM: Reflexions sur un projet de l'industrie nucléaire belge (MOX or THE PLUTONIUM ABERRATION: Reflections on a project of the Belgian Nuclear Industry) by Mycle Schneider of WISE-Paris, was published in June. Unfortunately, in that same month the Belgium government decided to go ahead and give permission for the use of MOX in Belgium reactors. Nevertheless, Schneider's report remains an important document.
It provides an extensive analysis of the Belgian situation concerning the management of used nuclear fuels, the aspects of reprocessing/not-reprocessing and aspects of the use of MOX fuel, and gives recommendations to the Belgian parliament, government and nuclear industry. The emphasis of the document lies on the aspects directly related to the production and use of plutonium, not on the issue of the management of waste.
Though the report focuses on the Belgium situation, much of it is applicable to other countries dealing with similar problems.
The first part gives a country by country analysis of nuclear policies. It shows clearly that the initial enthusiasm of the seventies for plutonium programs has made place for the systematic dismantlement of these programs.
The second begins with an examination of the changed international situation and then takes a look at reprocessing. The expected number of reactors worldwide has gone down drastically, leading to a spectacular drop in the price of natural uranium and to an overcapacity for the enrichment of uranium, which is very important in the long term. The vision of large numbers of plutonium fast-breeders has evaporated while the level of combustion of nuclear fuel was augmented and its efficiency went up. There are considerable stocks of plutonium, received from both civil programs and the dismantling of nuclear arms.
Fuel reprocessing is an activity which, worldwide, is totally marginal, given the small percentage of irradiated fuel concerned (less than 10% reprocessed). The comparison between strategies for dealing with spent fuel shows the disadvantages of reprocessing at practically all levels (environment, waste, proliferation, radiology, econonomy). Taking the disadvantages into account, the theoretical potential of reusing fissile materials seems absurd, in particular because of the costs involved. Ninety-seven percent of the matter which is recovered after reprocessing is low enriched uranium. The greatest part of this will probably never be re-enriched due to the lack of economic interest. Part of the recovered uranium will, without doubt, be added to the mountains of nuclear waste. At any rate, reprocessing causes the production of at least 15 times the amount of waste not-reprocessing it would cause.
The third part of the report analyses the use of MOX in two Belgian reactors. The use of plutonium mixed with uranium in the so-called MOX fuel should allow the absorption of significant quantities resulting from the reprocessing contracts and should reduce the stocks. But MOX not only doesn't solve the problems, it also causes others:
- The reducing of plutonium by MOX is a deception. At the most it allows the reduction of the increase of the stocks of irradiated fuels.
- Irradiated MOX fuel is clearly more radiotoxic than uranium-based fuel. It not only contains an average of five times more plutonium than irradiated uranium fuel, but also 15 times more curium-242 (highly radiotoxic), 22 times more curium 244 (half-life of 18 years, changing into plutonium-240 with a half-life of 6450 years), four times more neptunium-237 (half-life of 2.2 million years) and nine times more americium-241 (half-life of 430 years, transforming into neptunium-237, and so on...). The reprocessing of MOX - consequently resulting in a greater quantity of waste, which is also more radiotoxic -won't be happening, due to a lack of energetical and economic stimulus. Irradiated MOX will thus have to be treated ultimately as waste.
- The introduction of MOX into a reactor reduces security margins. Using it is more difficult than using uranium-based fuel. The recent discovery of the phenomenon of cracks in reactor lids adds an extra risk.
- MOX is more radioactive than uranium based fuel, so it has to be treated with even more precaution. Even more so, because the two types of fuel, being identical in appearance, could be mistaken for each other.
- A MOX program would require many transports of plutonium and MOX, in which accidents could occur.
- Finally, the realization of a MOX program is an economic aberration. Recent economic conditions has, for Belgium, made the MOX option at least 11 times more expensive than the no-MOX option.
What could be done about plutonium already separated? Ways for the conditioning of plutonium as waste are being developed. This mainly happens within the framework of the enormous quantities of plutonium originating from arms programs. The main option developed so far would be to vitrify the plutonium, mixed, in adapted plants like La Hague, along with other radioactive waste. The resulting packages would then be managed like other highly active waste. The costs would in all likelihood be much lower than manufacturing costs of MOX fuels.
Contact: Mycle Schneider, WISE-Paris, 5 rue Buot, 75013 Paris, France; tel: + 33-145 65 47 93; fax: 45 89 73 57; e-mail: wiseparis (GreenNet). |
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