(328.3280) WISE Amsterdam - The technology involved in fast breeder reactors is expensive. For this reason many people believe that only "rich" countries can afford it. But a number of developing countries are interested and have adopted a national policy promoting fast breeders, including: South Korea, China, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Taiwan and India. Of these, the fast breeder program begun by India is by far the most advanced and ambitious. Together, all these countries produce 14,034 MW with a total of 24 reactors, and are in the process of constructing 20 more nuclear power plants, to produce another 11,261 MW (1). Other countries will soon follow: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Zambia (2).
In 1987 a joint report was made by experts of the nuclear energy agency of the OECD and the In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on expectations of the integration of fast breeders in the developing countries, in socialist countries and in OECD countries. Klaus-Gerd Giesen, the author of the article from which we have taken this information, criticizes the way in which the report incites "third world" countries on an ideological level. In fact, he says, the international experts are saying: Look, this is our common road. With little delay you will follow us. Especially when after the turn of the century oil and uranium will become scarce and expensive. Thus you will save yourself from energy-bankruptcy.
India, however, is a special case. It began with nuclear research even before its independence in 1947. In 1944 the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) was founded, and the founding of the Atomic Energy Research Committee followed in 1946. After independence in 1947, it was the opinion of premier Nehru that only science could solve the problems of hunger and poverty, thus in 1948 he had the "Atomic Energy Act" adopted. That act mobilized important national resources for the nuclear option and moved all the related decisionmaking power to the executive center in New Delhi.
In 1954 the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up as the main organ to decide on atomic policy, and Nehru became Minister of Atomic Energy (already being Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Also in 1954 the "Bhabha Atomic Research Center" was set up in Trombay, near Bombay.
In the vision of Nehru and Bhabha, fast breeders were to have a key position in the nuclear future of India. Nehru wished to build a self-reliant nation, and for him that meant the development of new technologies, as much as possible, within India itself. This concept is still today the basis of Indian policy. And as India had few sources of uranium within its borders, fast breeders became of crucial import ance.
Bhabha developed a three-stage plan to make the maximum use of the limited natural uranium resources in India. First was to be the development of a number of nuclear power plants of a type (heavy-water moderated) which could use Indian uranium-235 and could, in addition to energy production, allow for a maximum conversion of the remaining uranium (U-238 which is unfissionable) into plutonium. The second stage was to include the fast breeders that used the plutonium. In the third stage, the thorium-232, abundantly present in India, enters the cycle of energy production. Uranium-233 would serve as fuel while the thorium is transformed in such a way that the process can be repeated.
In this policy of self-reliance for energy - and atomic weapons - the case of India differs from other eastern countries. The technology, nevertheless, had to be imported from Great Britain, Canada, USA, USSR and France.
On May 18, 1974, India exploded an atomic bomb. The detonation was equivalent to 15 kilotonnes, produced by 12 kg plutonium. This illustrated the strong wish to remain autonomous, breaking the monopoly of the countries already possessing the atomic bomb, in order the break the western monopoly on nuclear arms - and in order to export facilities for plutonium production to, for example Cuba, Brazil and Argentina.
After the 1974 explosion, the countries exporting nuclear facilities to the South formed the "Club of London". Its 15 members (in. 1978) wanted "safeguards" to prevent proliferation. India was invited to join the "Club" but refused. As a result, Canada refused nuclear cooperation with India and the US stopped the delivery of heavy water. This in turn encouraged India to move more quickly towards self-sufficiency. But to get there, it first needed outside help. That help was forthcoming from a French and a Swiss company which helped India to build its third heavy-water facility - showing that the Club of London was simply not as effective as the North Americans wanted it to be.
In spite of several difficulties, India proved to be self-reliant in the field of nuclear power plants with natural uranium as well. In 1976 India refused the very expensive offer from the French COGEMA of highly enriched uranium - forcing itself thereby to also become independent in the field of fast t:reeders. Now, at the "Indira Gandhi Fast Breeder Reactor Center" in Kalpakkam, the construction of a new reprocessing factory is planned for the future Indian fast breeders.
India wishes to reach a capacity of 10,000 MW of nuclear origin by the turn of the century and has already begun on the third stage of the "Bhabha plan": building, at an accelerated rate, the fast treeders. In August 1988, the Indian Minister of Sciences and Technology announced in the Indian Parliament that the plans are ready for a 500 MW fast breeder constructed entirely through Indian technology. Construction is to begin in 1990 or 1991. Also in 1988, then-premier, Rajiv Gandhi, ordered certain Indian industries to produce the principal parts necessary for the project. Should the fast breeder "function well", more of the same type will be constructed in the beginning of the next century.
Meanwhile, the enormous costs involved in realizing the "Bhabha plan" are being partially justified by promises of export. (India is already exporting parts of reactors and food irradiation technology and will probably convince other countries to buy their fast breeder technology.)
Footnotes:
(1) IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 31, No.1, 1989, p.57
(2) Nuclear Energy, Vol. 28, No.1, Feb. 1989, p.6
Sources: Gazette de l'APAG (Switzerland), 4th trimester 1989.
Contact: For the full article (11 pages), write to Gazette de l'APAG, Case Postale 506, 1212 Grand-Lancy 1, Switzerland.
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